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Chapter 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Overview
In recent years, the concepts o f  citizenship and social movements, especially the 
so-called new social movements have become major issues for academics from a 
wide variety o f perspectives. The reason why citizenship has returned to centre 
stage probably rests, as Kymlicka and Norman (1994) have written, upon the 
notion that “the health and stability o f  a modem democracy depends, not only on 
the justice o f  its basic structure but also on the qualities and attitudes o f  its 
citizens.” (p.352) Connected with this upsurge o f interest in ‘citizenship’ is a 
growing support for the idea that: “the institutions o f constitutional freedom are 
only worth as much as the population makes o f them." (Habermas, 1992: 7) Such 
thinking may explain the increased interest in social movements since in many 
respects they can be seen to be the major sites o f struggle and negotiation 
between the individual members o f society, albeit working en masse, and the 
ch ief‘institution o f  constitutional freedom’ in the form o f  the state.
Despite the recent upsurge o f  interest in citizenship and social movements, the 
position o f disabled people as ‘citizens’ and the structure and functions o f the 
disability movement has been largely over-looked. The absence o f disability from  
these important areas o f  theorising is all the more interesting in the light o f  the 
increasing interest in the notion o f embodiment and the impact that this has, for 
example, upon theories o f human rights. The empirical aspect o f  this research, 
therefore, seeks to provide a platform for disabled people to voice their opinions 
on issues relating to citizenship and the disability movement. Within the thesis, 
‘disability’ is then used as a case study, contextualised by an interest in the 
manner in which an understanding o f  embodiment may impact on citizenship and 
social movement theorising. The central focus o f this research is, therefore, to 
reconsider citizenship and social movement theorising in the light o f  disability.
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Chapter 1
There are three major research questions that have arisen from the central 
concerns o f the research:
Question 1
How might it be possible to reconsider citizenship in the light o f the 
experiences o f disabled people? Answering this question will involve a 
consideration o f the possible effects that changes to society, such as the 
move towards late/r modernity and the developm ent o f discourses of 
human rights, may be having upon the notion o f citizenship.
Question 2
W hat do disability organisations believe to be the basis o f their 
‘struggle’? O liver (1997) claim s that the disability movement is a ‘new’ 
social m ovement. This research considers the accuracy o f this claim by 
analysing evidence from the field regarding the aims o f a number of 
organisations that can be considered to be part o f the disability 
m ovem ent. The research seeks to establish whether the disability 
m ovement is currently acting within a broadly defined socio-cultural 
sphere, as O liver suggests, or whether it remains largely concerned with 
persistent issues o f social inequality.
Question 3
Thirdly, drawing upon a consideration o f the first and second questions, 
how m ight we reconsider current theories o f social m ovements in the 
light o f understandings o f citizenship and the ‘disability m ovem ent’ 
gained through this research?
Whilst these three research questions provide the central focus of this research, 
there are also clear empirical aims underlying this thesis. The first is to ensure 
that the theoretical analysis is grounded in empirical evidence. It is also an aim of 
this research that this evidence should be as internally valid (Williams and May, 
1996) as possible. It is for this reason that a qualitative approach has been utilised 
since it is though that such approaches, if done well, improve the likelihood that
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research respondents will be able to construct meanings that are valid to them 
within their specific social context. In other words, this quest for internal validity 
is not about seeking out an objective ‘truth’, but rather about asking respondents 
what they consider to be the truth. A s Williams and May (1996) have 
commented:
In one sense, truth is put to one side and validity is considered to 
be that which is important to the respondent. (...) it is the reasons 
that people offer fo r  what they do and the ways in which the 
meanings they use make sense o f their lives that are o f  interest, not 
whether the basis o f  their beliefs are true as such, (p.141-2)
The second empirical aim o f this research is to introduce the voices o f disabled 
people into tw o areas o f  sociology, citizenship and social movement theorising, 
in which the views o f  disabled people have, historically, been largely absent. For 
this reason a data collection method was chosen that was thought to encourage 
and enable disabled respondents to talk in depth about their experiences and their 
views are reproduced at some length within the thesis. In addition, in order that 
the views o f  respondents be accurately represented within this thesis a process o f  
data analysis has been used that seeks to minimise the fracturing o f  texts and 
instead to maintain the narrative dimension o f  the data. Such a process also seeks 
to avoid overly interpreting respondents’ views.
The final empirical aim o f  this research is to contribute to the development o f the 
emancipatory research paradigm. To this end, this research has aimed both to 
empower individual respondents and through adding to knowledge in this area, to 
contribute to the empowerment o f  disabled people more generally. This is not to 
say, however, that this research has adhered to the model o f  emancipatory 
research espoused by authors such as Barnes (1996) or Oliver (1992). For Barnes 
(1996):
Chapter 1
There is no haven or middle ground when researching oppression: 
academics and researchers can only be with the oppressors or 
with the oppressed, (p .l 10)
3
There are some major problems with this ‘partisan’ type of emancipatory 
research for there are risks that research carried out in this way may become 
value laden. This problem is likely to be heightened under circumstances in 
which researchers have personal experience of the issues they are studying and 
may feel justifiably angry about some of those issues. It is the argument here that 
this problem is impacting on the efficacy of a significant amount o f research 
being produced within Disability Studies and thereby the soundness o f some 
theorising in this field. It is a central argument of this thesis, therefore, that whilst 
the emancipatory research paradigm is of great importance epistemologically, it 
must be redefined if it is to become a major methodological approach. These 
empirical issues will be considered in more depth within chapter 2.
Before providing an over-view of the various chapters of this thesis it is 
important, however, to acknowledge a number o f central ideas that underlie this 
research and about which this author maintains a particular standpoint.
Setting the Scene -  an introduction to the key issues underlying this thesis
Underlying this thesis are three issues that need to be addressed within this 
opening chapter. These issues are as follows:
Chapter 1
Why talk about 
'citizenship' instead 
of 'social exclusion'?
/
What is the 
‘disability 
movement'?
Why talk about 'later 
modernity’?
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Chapter 1
Why talk about citizenship not social exclusion?
In recent years, the term social exclusion has become somewhat o f a ‘buzz word’ 
both in academic and non-academic circles in the UK. The importance currently 
being given to the idea is demonstrated by the Government’s commitment to its 
‘Social Exclusion Unit’, for example. Whilst the term may have become a ‘buzz 
word’ that is not, however, to deny its value, for it is a powerful way o f 
expressing the fact that practices can exist in a society that have major 
consequences in terms o f disadvantage for some o f the people in that society. For 
some authors such as Jordan (1996) to talk about ‘social exclusion’, is arguably 
preferable to discussing citizenship since the past twenty years have witnessed 
the development o f  a dominant definition o f  citizenship that is highly 
individualist. He dismisses citizenship as a way o f analysing social exclusion 
because the term has become all too associated with individual rights and duties, 
“at the expense o f  interdependency and collective action. ” (Jordan, 1996: 85) For 
Byrne (1999) this problem with the term ‘citizenship’ has arisen because it: “(...) 
has been formulated as a concept almost entirely in terms o f  abstract 
philosophical discussion rather than by reference to the real historical social 
politics ( . . .) ” (p.24) He goes on to argue, convincingly, that this overly 
philosophical approach to theorising on citizenship has allowed for the 
appropriation o f the concept by the N ew  Right and other proponents o f  
‘possessive individualism’.
It is certainly true that during the 1980’s the term citizenship became linked in 
the minds o f  many with the writings o f  people such as Charles Murray (1990, 
1994) and his notion o f the ‘underclass’. In this way, ‘citizenship’ as a concept 
became a political tool with which to categorise certain individuals and groups as 
‘failed citizens’. The term thus became far ‘narrower’ in definition than had 
historically been the case, and its transformative and collectivist properties 
appeared to have been largely forgotten.
As the end o f  the 20th Century approached, however, ‘citizenship’ again became 
fashionable and continues to be so. The reason for this resurgence in interest in
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citizenship is not entirely clear. One possible reason may be that sufficient time 
has now elapsed since the hey-day o f the N ew  Right, for citizenship to now have 
lost some o f  its individualist connotations. Many authors are now returning to the 
concept o f citizenship as a way o f explaining and mediating the changing 
relationships between the state and its population. Concern with governance, with 
the nature o f  the rights that form part o f citizenship and with the extent to which 
the role o f citizen is an ‘active’ one, have become ‘hot-topics’ again both inside 
and outside o f  academia.
Despite the resurgence o f interest in the idea o f citizenship, however, the risk that 
new work in this area may continue to be predominantly abstract and 
philosophical, remains. Indeed, some o f the most recent work on citizenship 
theory by authors such as Delanty (2000) has been intensely philosophical. 
Whilst this philosophical work is o f considerable value, there is now research 
currently taking place that is more empirically grounded in real social politics. 
This complementary theorising, grounded in evidence, is an important new step 
in the history o f citizenship theorising. Dwyer (2000) for example, has moved 
discussions about social citizenship away from the purely theoretical level by 
making the practical concerns o f citizens an integral part o f  current debates. 
Dwyer’s work is just one example o f a growing trend towards injecting the voices 
o f presently marginalized groups into citizenship theorising.
The new approach to citizenship theorising, o f  which it is hoped this research will 
be a part, is not therefore, an alternative to theorising on ‘social exclusion’ but is 
instead about placing citizenship at the heart o f  discussions surrounding social 
inclusion and exclusion. It is the argument here that the ‘ideal form o f  
citizenship’ is one in which each citizen is socially, politically and legally 
included. Evidence o f disadvantage amongst those who are, officially, ‘legally’ 
included suggests however, that many people are not being ‘socially’ or 
‘politically’ included. In other words when we talk about people being socially 
excluded, w e are talking about people being excluded from important parts o f  
citizenship. This having been said, the question facing theorists within this field 
must then be: what is the basis o f the social inclusion dimension o f citizenship? It
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is hoped that a consideration o f the first question o f this research will contribute 
to some degree to answering this questioa
Why talk about 'later modernity’?
When this author uses the term ‘later modernity’ it is not without an awareness 
that it is a contested concept. The debate surrounding the term, however, appears 
to lie less with the idea that there has been a ‘crisis in modernity’ and more 
surrounding what epoch has come in its place. In other words the debate 
surrounds the relative appropriateness o f  the terms ‘later modernity’ and ‘post- 
modernity’. Whilst it is not the intention here to engage with this debate in any 
great depth, since it warrants a fuller consideration than is possible within the 
confines o f this thesis, it is important to explain why the term ‘later modernity’ is 
used throughout this research in preference to ‘post-modernity’.
A s previously stated, it is now widely, if  not unanimously, accepted by 
sociologists that the past fifty years has witnessed such significant social, 
political, economic and cultural change as to cumulatively render the concept o f  
modernity increasingly problematic. Opinions tend to differ, however, 
surrounding the extent to which there has truly been a movement beyond 
modernity. Many theorists favour the idea that what has occurred is a transition 
from modernity to late modernity, two factors being referred to most frequently 
as having brought about the greatest change. Firstly, there is what Ellison (1997) 
has referred to as changing patterns o f  social and political ‘belonging’ 
characterised by the disruption o f ‘traditional’ social divisions (Ellison, 2000). 
Secondly, there is the impact o f  globalisation and the so-called demise o f the 
nation state, factors considered in some depth by Roche (1995). The threat that 
such changes pose to the coherency o f societies has become the chief concern o f  
those who favour the notion o f ‘later modernity’. The concept o f ‘later 
modernity’ does not, however, imply that at the current time the nation state has 
declined beyond importance, nor does it imply that there has been a total decline 
in the importance o f older social divisions such as class.
Chapter 1
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In other words, to talk about ‘later modernity’ is to remain cautious about 
claiming an ‘end to history’, and to be sceptical about claims such as those made 
by one group o f post-modern authors that:
Chapter 1
Our world is being remade. Mass production, the mass consumer, 
the big city, big-brother state, the sprawling housing estate, and 
the nation-state are in decline: flexibility, diversity, differentiation, 
and mobility, communication, decentralisation and 
internationalisation are in the ascendant. In the process our own 
identities, our sense o f  self, our own subjectivities are being 
transformed. We are in transition to a new era. (Hall et al, 1988)
It is the argument here that the world post-September 11th 2001 is not being 
remade in this way. The threat o f  global terrorism has, arguably, brought about 
the reinforcing o f  the power o f certain nation-states, as demonstrated by the 
decision o f the USA and the UK to go against the wishes o f  the UN in the recent 
war in Iraq. Such a climate o f fear has also led to the further control o f migration, 
as demonstrated by the current UK refugee ‘crisis’. At the same time as this 
‘crack down’ on global mobility is occurring, within the UK continuing problems 
o f social exclusion suggests that despite rises in absolute social mobility, relative 
social mobility remains a problem. These issues, amongst others, convince this 
author that it may be premature to suggest that a post-modern era has arrived and 
that it may be better to utilise instead the idea o f ‘later modernity’.
What is the disability movement?
In his well-known introduction to sociology, Giddens (1993) has provided a 
useful ‘broad-brush’ definition o f social movements as:
A large grouping o f  people who have become involved in seeking 
to accomplish, or to block, a process o f  social change, (p.746)
In addition to his definition, drawing upon the work o f  Blumer ([1951] 1995) it is 
the argument here that the activities o f  social movements may not always be 
about social change, but may also be ‘expressive’ in nature. The combination 
then o f  these two broad definitions has provided the basis, within this thesis, o f
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categorising the various episodes o f collective action by disabled people as the 
‘disability movement’. As will become apparent within the subsequent chapters 
o f  this thesis, however, a certain degree o f diversity in terms o f aim and action 
between the various constituent groups and individual members o f the disability 
movement is something that characterises this movement. On the basis o f  such 
diversity some might question the idea that a social movement o f  disabled people 
truly exists. It is the argument here, however, that many widely recognised social 
movements are equally diverse, the women’s movement being a prime example. 
Total homogeneity in terms o f all aims and forms o f action is not, therefore, 
something that needs to be considered as a defining feature o f a social 
movement1. There does, however, need to be some common ground between the 
various individuals and groups that comprise a movement. Just as the various 
strands o f the women’s movement can be seen to be united on the basis o f  such 
things as a shared understanding o f the need to challenge pre-conceived ideas 
about women, so the various strands o f the disability movement are united in 
their view  that we live in a ‘disabling society’ in which many people with 
impairments are socially excluded in a number o f ways.
Having established this fairly loose framework with which to define the 
‘disability movement’, determining a coherent body o f disability groups or 
disabled individuals who can be considered to be a part o f  this movement is more 
difficult. This difficulty arises because many groups who might easily be 
categorised from an ‘outsider’ perspective as being a part o f  a movement network 
do not appear to see themselves as firmly connected to the disability movement. 
It is at this point that it should be stated that it is not the intention o f this research 
to consider the history o f the disability movement, but rather to provide a ‘snap­
shot’ o f  the contemporary movement. It is the position o f  this thesis that in order 
to remain focused on the particular research aims o f  this project, emphasis should 
be given to a comparison between the definitions o f  the contemporary movement 1
1 In this way, the author is making no distinction between episodes of collective action such as the 
disability rights campaigns/movement of the 1970’s and more contemporary expressions of 
collective action by disabled people. According to this somewhat ‘loose’ framework for defining 
a social movement, the fact that the nature and basis of collective action may alter somewhat, 
over time, does not mean that successive action by a recognised collective should not be 
considered to be a part of a larger phenomenon -  a social movement.
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provided by key academics in the field and the evidence collected within this 
research regarding the actual nature o f  the movement. This is not to deny that a 
consideration o f  the development o f  the disability movement over time is an 
interesting one, or that this history is o f  no relevance to this research. The history, 
however, o f the formation and subsequent tensions between the Disablement 
Income Group, the Disability Alliance and the Union o f Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation (UPIAS), for example, has been well-documented by 
authors such as Oliver (1990 ,1996) and Finkelstein (1993b). The important point 
about the history o f the disability movement in relation to this research, however, 
is that in the UK, the development o f  the social model o f  disability by 
organisations such as UPIAS has been closely linked to a range o f  disability 
rights campaigns carried out by the movement. It is precisely such campaigns 
that, amongst other issues, have called for the funding o f organisations o f  rather 
than for  disabled people.
Oliver’s (1997) definition o f the disability movement as being constituted only by 
organisations o f  disabled people, not organisations fo r  disabled people, therefore 
reflects the campaigns o f  the disability movement o f the past and present1 2. In the 
light o f this tension, and on the basis o f  Oliver’s definition, it was, therefore, 
decided that only groups run by disabled people themselves would be contacted 
about this research. As a final point, however, it is important to state that this 
research did not take as its starting point Oliver’s tendency to equate the 
disability movement with the constituent member groups o f  the BCODP3. This 
decision was made on the basis o f  pre-existing links within the field which 
informed this author that the BCODP does not encompass all groups run by
1 That this issue o f the need for disability organisations to be run by disabled people not fo r  disabled people 
remains central to the campaigns o f the disability movement is shown by criticisms directed against the 
Disability Rights Commission:
The Disability Rights Commission (DRC) was a positive outcome o f Labour's review o f 
disabled people's rights, to help to enforce the DDA. However, the commission is not the 
voice o f disabled people - commissioners are appointed by the government, not by 
disabled people, and some bodies who should consult disabled people consult the DRC 
instead, believing that is sufficient. (Rickell, 2003:
<http:www.guardian.co.Uk/comment/story/o,3604,1053066,OO.html> viewed on 
08/02/04)
Chapter 1
3 British Council o f Disabled People.
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disabled people, fo r  disabled people and that there is considerable debate 
amongst disabled people surrounding the importance of this organisation. Further 
discussion surrounding the nature o f the groups contacted about this research will 
be provided in chapter 2.
Overview o f chapters
Chapter 1
Chapter 2 M ethodology
This chapter considers the various theoretical, ethical and practical issues 
surrounding the empirical aspects o f this research. From a theoretical perspective 
it is argued that this research is ‘critical-abductive’ in approach. The nature o f 
‘critical-abductive’ research is discussed with particular reference to the 
similarities and differences between the approach and that o f grounded theory 
and critical theory. This chapter also considers the ethical dilemmas encountered 
during the process of this research, particularly those relating to the role o f a non­
disabled researcher engaging in disability research. In terms of practical issues, 
the final section of chapter 2 provides discussion relating to such matters as the 
use o f focus/discussion groups, the management and analysis of data and the 
process of feedback to respondents.
Chapter 3 Citizenship
This chapter aims to provide a critical outline o f those theories o f citizenship that
relate most clearly to the focus of this research. It is also the aim of this chapter to
introduce the most contemporary debates within the field that will then be
considered in more depth as they relate to the findings o f this research, in chapter
7. The chapter begins with a critical appraisal o f the ancient and classical theories
of citizenship. Particular attention is given within this section o f the chapter to the
work o f Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau since the influence of their ideas upon
subsequent theorising has been profound. The discussion then moves on to
consider the Conservative Neo-Liberalism of Nozick and Hayek, and the Neo-
Republicanism of authors such as Arendt, Barber and Oldfield. The second
section o f this chapter considers the modem or Social-Liberal theories o f
citizenship provided by Rawls, Marshall and Berlin. This section highlights the
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importance of Berlin’s work to citizenship theorising and argues for greater 
consideration of his work by sociologists working in this field. The final section 
o f this chapter provides a critical outline o f the most contemporary theories o f 
citizenship. The pluralist accounts of Kymlicka and Young are considered in this 
section of the chapter, as is Habermas’ reflexive approach and Mouffe’s more 
post-structural account. The chapter concludes with a reflection upon the future 
o f citizenship theorising and introduces the argument in favour o f a more 
embodied notion of citizenship.
Chapter 1
Chapter 4 D isability in Society, Today
This chapter aims to provide the reader with an overview of the position of 
disabled people in society, today and of the theorising that has sought to explain 
the experience of disability. The first section o f this chapter provides the reader 
with an overview of the current state o f theorising on disability. The work of 
Parsons and Goffman is considered as an important precursor of more 
contemporary theorising. The somewhat different theoretical approaches taken by 
medical sociology and disability studies are then discussed. Having introduced 
the main theoretical approaches to disability within the first part o f this chapter, 
the aim of the second section is to consider the empirical evidence to support the 
widely accepted notion that disabled people occupy a position in society that is 
characterised by discrimination and disadvantage. Given the extent o f this 
empirical evidence, however, it would be impossible within the confines o f this 
chapter, or thesis, to adequately consider all issues. For this reason, two key areas 
have been chosen, and it is hoped that these will, when considered together, 
provide the reader with an overview of the current position o f disabled people 
within society. These two areas are: equal opportunities: and the ‘coming out’ o f 
disability.
Chapter 5 Social Movements!
This chapter begins by considering what this author considers to be the most
important early, or first phase social movement theories. This ‘first phase’ can be
divided into an American and a European tradition. The first phase of the
American tradition centred on the Collective Behaviour approach to social
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movements, and is best exemplified in the work o f Herbert Blumer. The first 
phase theories in the European tradition are less clearly associated with particular 
theorists but can be broadly termed a Social Democratic tradition and can be sub­
divided into Weberian and Marxist approaches. These approaches will be briefly 
discussed before a consideration o f what is meant by the notion o f the ‘1960’s 
watershed’ and what effects it has had upon subsequent theorizing. The second 
section o f  this chapter then aims to provide the reader with an overview o f  the 
‘second phase theories’. This second phase o f theorising can also be divided into 
American and European traditions. In the American tradition, post-1960’s 
theorizing has been dominated by the Resource Mobilization theories. It is argued 
within this chapter that the Political Process theories should be considered as 
being a part o f this resource mobilization approach and therefore, these theories 
are also considered at this point. In post-1960’s Europe a number o f related 
theories emerged based around notions o f  identity, defence o f  the ‘lifeworld’, 
values and culture. These approaches can be rather loosely termed as the ‘new’ 
social movement theories and the work o f  the key authors in this field, Touraine, 
Habermas and Melucci are considered in turn within this section.
The chapter concludes by considering the future for social movement theorising 
and proposes that there are two important inter-related questions that are, as yet, 
unresolved within social movement theorising. The first question relates to the 
appropriateness o f  the idea o f  ‘1960’s watershed’: what was so fundamentally 
different about the movements that came after this ‘watershed’ in comparison to 
those that came before? The second question relates to understanding the nature 
o f  ‘unrest’: has the nature o f  unrest really moved so significantly away from  
older concerns with structural inequalities as to render the older social 
movements theories largely redundant? Possible answers to both o f  these 
questions are proposed within the concluding section o f  this chapter. An even 
more critical analysis o f  certain theories introduced within this chapter will then 
be made in relation to the findings o f  this research, within chapter 7.
Chapter 1
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Chapter 6 Findings
This chapter sets out the key findings o f this research as they relate to the 
following major issues: structural issues; disabling attitudes-enabling identities; 
disability culture; and the disability movement. As previously stated, one o f the 
central aims o f this research has been to provide a platform for the voices of 
disabled people and it is in this chapter that these voices are most apparent, for 
respondents are quoted extensively. The analysis that forms part o f this chapter 
then forms the basis for the more theoretical consideration of the findings in 
chapter 7.
Chapter 7 Reconsidering Theorising on C itizenship and Social M ovem ents 
in the light o f Disability
This chapter considers the appropriateness o f the modern/contemporary theories 
o f citizenship in the light of the findings of this research and proposes that a 
consideration o f the ‘struggle’ faced by disabled people can illuminate useful 
links between citizenship theorizing and current approaches to social movements. 
Particular attention is given in this chapter to the important links between the 
work o f Berlin, Habermas, and Mouffe; to the value o f Ellison's ideas about 
‘proactive and defensive engagement’; and to Turner’s ‘sociology o f the body’. 
The chapter concludes by proposing that a synthesis o f the ideas o f these theorists 
may provide the starting point for a new understanding o f citizenship and the 
process of engagement, according to an understanding o f ‘personhood’ as fragile 
and contingent.
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Chapter 2
Methodology
Chapter 2
The aim o f this chapter is to consider the various practical, theoretical and ethical 
issues surrounding the empirical aspect o f  this research. For reasons o f  clarity, 
the chapter is subdivided into three sections as follows:
1. Theoretical Issues
The first section will consider the theoretical basis o f  the research. 
Discussions upon the abductive approach taken by the research and other 
ontological and epistemological issues will be considered in this section.
2. Ethical Issues
The second section will consider the ethical dilemmas encountered during the 
process o f  this research, in particular those issues faced by a non-disabled 
researcher when undertaking disability research. This section will also 
include some critical reflections upon the process o f  the research.
3. Practical Issues
The final section will consider some o f  the practical issues o f the research, 
namely: the use o f focus/discussion groups; the management and analysis o f  
data; and the process o f feedback to respondents.
Theoretical Issues
The main aims o f  this research have been:
❖  To elicit the views o f a number o f  disabled people who are members o f  
disability organisations, upon a range o f  issues related to the concept o f  
‘citizenship ’.
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❖  To allow their opinions to become a part o f  the ongoing debates
surrounding the concept o f  'citizenship
Initially, grounded theory appeared to be the most suitable research strategy to 
employ in order to achieve these goals. There are however, some well 
documented limitations to the grounded theory approach in terms o f its reliance 
upon inductive reasoning. These limitations will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In the light o f the criticisms directed at grounded theory, however, an alternative 
approach was sought. After considerable investigation, the abductive research 
strategy was thought to be a preferable, if  not entirely unproblematic, alternative. 
The abductive research strategy stems from the work o f C.S.Peirce (1867/1960), 
although the extent to which this research reh'es upon more contemporary 
versions o f his model should be stressed. For Peirce, abductive research relies 
upon a certain type o f intuition on the part o f  the researcher in which he/she 
observe the world with appropriate categories which arise from the internal 
structure o f meanings. In other words, Peirce argued that when a researcher 
analyses data it is not necessary or desirable for every possible explanation to be 
explored. Time constraints mean that if  a piece o f research is to be completed, it 
is not always possible to falsify every possibility. Instead, Peirce argued, 
abductive research involves the observation o f  evidence by minds furnished with 
appropriate ideas, and therefore, the minds o f a trained sociologist will tend to 
make different judgements than those o f individuals who are not trained 
sociologists. In other words, the abductive method is not about hasty thinking, or 
about being completely naïve to such things as previous research in the field.
For Peirce, abductive inferences take the following form:
A) all counters from bag X are green
B) these counters are green
C) therefore these counters are from bag X
A s he admits, however, such reasoning is not always logically valid. Further, 
critics have commented that it is very difficult to see how Peirce’s definition o f
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abductive inferences can be applied to social science reasoning since human 
beings are not inanimate objects, but have feelings. Peirce’s definition does not 
include room for the question “how do the green counters feel? " since this would 
clearly be ridiculous. When the objects being studied are human beings, however, 
such a question is key to the validity o f the research. More recently, therefore, the 
idea o f  abductive reasoning has moved on from Peirce’s definition and has been 
redefined as meaning the ‘inference to the best explanation' (Lipton, 1993). This 
type o f abductive reasoning can be applied more easily to sociological 
investigation and it is this definition o f  abductive reasoning that applies to this 
research, for it is the contention here that all that can ever be achieved in 
sociology is the development o f probable explanations for social phenomena. In 
this way, the abductive research method rejects the positivism o f both deduction 
and induction.
Within Sociology the abductive approach is evident in the work o f  Mead and 
Dewey, within phenomenological and ethnomethodological research and within 
other approaches that use interpretivistic ontological and epistemological 
elements such as feminist research and critical theory. Blaikie (1993) has most 
recently defined the sociological version o f abductive research thus:
(...) the process used to produce social science accounts o f  social 
life by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social 
actors and the activities in which they engage, (p.176)
This is an approach, therefore, that gives a central place to the views o f  the 
‘insiders’ and as such has clear ontological implications for it rests upon an 
understanding o f the social world as being that which is perceived and 
experienced by its members from the ‘inside ’. The abductive research strategy 
therefore rejects the notion that the researcher’s role is to impose ‘outsider’ views 
upon the data. This stance must also, therefore, have some clear epistemological 
implications. In particular, since much activity in social life is taken-for-granted 
and is not reflected upon by actors, it is not easy to see how meaningful 
knowledge can result from observations o f  such mundane occurances. Blaikie
Chapter 2
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(1993), has, however, proposed that meaningful knowledge can result from the 
abductive approach providing that the following method is utilised:
Chapter 2
Everyday concepts and meanings 
provide the basis for 
Social action/interaction 
about which
Social Actors can give accounts 
From which
Social Scientific descriptions can be made
From which
Social Theories can be generated 
Figure 2a.
OR And understood in terms of 
Social Theories or perspectives 
(Blaikie, 1993:177)
In other words, this is a method o f  research that begins by seeking to encourage 
actors to reflect upon their activities and thus ‘give accounts’ for their actions. 
For Blaikie (1993) the role o f  the researcher is then to transfer these accounts into 
‘social science descriptions’. At which level, he claims, it is perfectly legitimate 
to conclude the research. Equally, however, much abductive research will go on 
to  a second level, to form social theories from the data or to relate the findings to 
existing perspectives.
The process o f this research echoes Blaikie’s model, and advances to the second 
level, for it seeks to compare findings from the research with existing 
perspectives on citizenship. In so doing, it points to the need for renewed 
theorising in this area. Having stated the above, however, this may give the 
misleading impression that the research was theory led. This is an important point 
because to follow the abductive approach, as this research attempted to do, is to 
follow  a carefully ordered method, with theory only entering into the final, and 
optional level. In this respect, the abductive research approach does rely upon
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methods developed by inductive research such as grounded theory. It should be 
stated, however, that there are some important distinctions between the two 
approaches.
The term ‘grounded theory’ normally refers to theory that has been developed 
inductively from a dataset. I f grounded theory is done well, it is claimed that the 
resulting theory should be valid at least in terms o f fitting one set o f  data 
perfectly. Key to this approach is the idea that the researcher should enter the 
field as an almost ‘naïve’ data gatherer (see also Kvale, 1996) in order to avoid 
running the risk o f  becoming constrained by the existing perspectives. To embark 
upon a piece o f  grounded theory research is therefore, to begin by observing and 
noting the observable social phenomena occurring within a given context. The 
researcher will, however, rapidly begin to identify key issues. As categories and 
themes become clearer, so some almost subconscious analysis may occur within 
the mind o f the researcher, at the same time as the process o f data collection 
continues. This may impact upon the nature o f the research as it unfolds. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1968), who are widely acknowledged to be the 
founding fathers o f  the grounded theory approach, there is also a process in the 
development o f the theories that result from this data collection. Initially, they 
claim, substantive theories emerge, which are seen to be appropriate to the 
particular context being studied. Eventually, however, the process o f  theorising 
from the data will result in formal theories, which possess a higher level o f  
generality and which can be applied to more than one substantive area.
There are, however, some important problems with this type o f thinking. Firstly 
in relation to the idea that ‘facts speak for themselves’ and that it is possible for a 
researcher to stand back from observed events as a neutral/naive observer, critics 
o f  the approach have suggested that since all observation involves interpretation, 
that it will, therefore, always be theoiy-laden to some extent.1 Abductive research 
whilst employing some o f  the methods o f  inductive research in terms o f  data 
collection and coding (as will be discussed later in the practical issues section)
Chapter 2
1 For further discussion on this see Balihar Sanghera’s website:
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differs from the inductive method because it does not claim that it is either 
possible or desirable to be completely ‘naive' when gathering date in the field. 
Drawing on this abductive approach, it is the argument here, therefore, that in 
reality, most researchers will be familiar to some degree with previous research 
that has been done in the area and that to be intuitive requires the researcher to 
make use o f a pre-existing ‘vocabulary’ o f understanding which they then bring 
to bear on the findings. Rather than suggesting an alternative to the inductive 
approach, therefore, the question posed by this research is whether it is ever 
possible to be entirely ‘naiVe’ when engaging in social research? In other words, 
is the inductive method ever really possible?
Critics o f  the inductive approach have also pointed out that no matter how  
confident we might feel about the correlation between observed events we can 
never entirely conclude the nature o f  the causality. This problem means that it 
will always be difficult to establish a logical way o f determining the true validity 
o f universal statements from particular statements, or as grounded theorists would 
term it, a formal theory from a substantive theory. This issue has not been 
adequately tackled by grounded theorists. In the light o f this, the abductive 
approach’s reliance upon ‘inference to the best explanation ’ is useful because it 
allows for the transformation o f a substantive theory into a formal theory whilst 
at the same time making no claims to a definitive explanation. That having been 
said, it is not the argument here that the abductive method produces theory that 
will always be easily disputed, for the strength o f  this process is that at all times 
the theory is intimately linked to the data.
With such a firm connection to the data, there is also one other important benefit 
to researching in this way: unless the researcher develops overly abstract terms 
for recurring themes the resulting theories should not prove to be inaccessible to 
the social actors in question. This is an important point when the research being 
carried out involves working with vulnerable or disadvantaged people, as in this 
thesis. Since it was considered to be ethically important that this piece o f  research 
be o f  use to disabled people and accurately reflect their ‘voices’, an abductive 
research strategy was thought to be the most appropriate.
Chapter 2
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Establishing some somewhat unfocused, initial aims was the first stage o f  the 
process o f this research. As previously stated in chapter 1, these aims were: To 
elicit the views o f  a number o f  disabled people who are members o f  disability 
organisations, upon a range o f  issues related to the concept o f  'citizenship and 
to allow their opinions to become a part o f  the ongoing debates surrounding the 
concept o f  ‘citizenship’. The next stage was to use these broadly defined aims to 
develop an interview framework with which to loosely structure dialogue, in this 
case in the form o f  group discussions, with members o f  a number o f disability 
organisations. This framework took the form o f  a series o f questions that were 
sent in advance to each o f  the participating organisations. The questions were 
wide-ranging in style from fairly straightforward to more abstract and were 
essentially unfocused with regard to particular issues.
The questions aimed to encourage discussion on a variety o f issues, all o f  which, 
it was initially believed, might bear some relation to the wider citizenship 
debates. The research did not begin, however, with any underlying 
preconceptions concerning which aspects, if  any, o f  the citizenship debates would 
o f  greatest relevance to disabled people. Indeed, in the covering letter that 
accompanied the questions it was made clear that these questions were only 
meant to be a guide to the discussion, and only indicated the general area o f  the 
research. Please see Figure 2b fo r  examples o f  some o f  the questions sent to 
groups. 2 Please also see the appendix fo r  copies o f  the fu ll list o f  questions and 
covering letter. At the start o f each group discussion it was also made clear that 
respondents were encouraged to pick out those questions that most interested 
them. Alternatively, if, having understood the general area o f interest, 
respondents wished to suggest other questions or issues for discussion, this was 
also encouraged. The power to identify key issues was, therefore, given to 
respondents, and their identification o f  these issues as ‘o f  importance’ is 
considered to be central to the claim that meaningful knowledge had been 
produced within this research.
2 The actual layout o f the questions that were sent in advance to participating organisations was slightly 
different in terms o f  providing space for any answers and using a larger typeface. The version sent to 
participating organisations can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 2b.
Section B
1. What would you say was the central function/s o f ...................for
example, group support/campaigning etc?
2. What would you say were the central hopes/aims of your 
organisation?
3. Has your organisations been involved in any campaigning, for 
example, for rights for disabled people? If “yes”, could you give me any 
examples?
4. a. Would you say that campaigning is a significant part of the function 
of your organisation?
b. If the answer to the previous question is “no” -  what reasons do you 
have for working in alternative ways?
5. W hat do you regard as the major achievements of your organisation? 
Section F
4. Is there such a thing as a ‘disability identity'?
5. If there is a ‘disability identity’, what kind of image exists of disabled 
people and what is it like to experience this identity?
6. Is there such a thing as a ‘culture of disabled people’? Do you find this 
a realistic concept?
7. Is it helpful/useful to talk about a ‘disabled culture’? If so, why? If not, 
why not?
Following the first round o f  group discussions at six disability organisations, held 
between late August 2000 and early February 2001, initial analysis o f  the
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transcripts highlighted one key theme arising from each o f the discussion, this 
related to the idea o f  a ‘disability identity’3 and how  this was linked to such 
issues as the ‘se lf, language, respect, the nature o f  rights being claimed by 
disabled people, and a disability culture. At this point in the research some initial 
analysis o f  the data took place. The methods used in this analysis will be 
discussed later in this chapter. A  paper was written at this time, and was given at 
the Seventh International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular 
Protest, held at the Manchester Metropolitan University. This was an important 
stage o f the research because it resulted in a clear focus being established for a 
second round o f group discussions with two o f  the organisations that had 
expressed a wish to engage in further dialogue.
After the first round o f group discussions one further issue also arose and this 
concerned the absence from any o f the participating organisations, o f  disabled 
people from ethnic minorities, D eafdeaf people, or people with mental health 
issues. This absence led to inevitable questioning o f whether this was a chance 
occurrence, or whether such individuals were, for some reason, not a part o f  the 
disability movement. Since the most striking theme arising from the first round o f  
group discussions surrounded the issue o f identity, it was important to investigate 
whether the absence o f these individuals from disability organisations was 
connected in any way to the idea o f the ‘disability identity’. It was considered 
important to establish whether the absence o f  such individuals was because they 
did not feel themselves to be welcome within the disability movement, or because 
they did not regard themselves to be disabled people. Since research time was 
limited, it was decided that further investigation would be made into the apparent 
absence o f  D ea f deaf people4 from such disability organisations. To achieve this, 
a letter and series o f  questions was posted onto the web-based mail group:
3 The following definitions are used throughout this research:
'Disability identity’ -  is used to denote the political identity o f disabled people that is key to disability
•Disabled identity’ -  is used as a shorthand for: ‘those who have been categorised or labelled as having a
^  Throughout this research, the word ‘deaf is used to refer to those people who experience the physical 
impairment of deafness, but who do not regard themselves as being a part of the culture o f Deaf people. The 
word ‘D eaf, therefore, refers to those individuals who aspire to British Sign Language usage and its related 
cultural heritage. 23
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“Deafmail”. {Please see Figure 2c for the list o f questions and the appendix fo r  a 
complete copy o f the "Deafmail ” posting.)
Figure 2c.
“Deafinail” questions:
Are Deaf people disabled'!
Are Deaf people a part o f a disability movement? If “no”, could you tell me 
why this is so? If “yes”, do you personally feel a part o f a disability movement?
Do you feel a part of a Deaf community? If “yes”, how is this different from 
your experiences within the hearing community?
Is there a Deaf identity and/or a Deaf culture that is different from those of 
hearing people?
Have any important improvements been made in the lives of Deaf people in 
your lifetimes? What do you feel has brought these changes about?
Are there any improvements that need to be made in the lives o f Deaf people 
and how could these be brought about?
Do you have any concerns for the future in relation to the lives of Deaf people? 
What could we do to stop these things happening?
How do you see the new developments in technology effecting Deaf people?
For example, advances in knowledge surrounding genetics?
The second stage o f group discussions, and the collation o f the responses to the 
“Deafinail” questions, took place between late February 2001 and the end o f  
April 2001. This marked the end o f the process o f data collection. The next part 
o f  the research was to review all o f  the data gathered and to advance the analysis 
o f  the findings beyond that undertaken after the first round o f interviews. A s in 
the early analysis this took the form o f gaining familiarity with the text o f  the 
group interviews, establishing social science descriptions o f  the key issues arising 
form the discussions and then relating this to existing citizenship theories. In the
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case o f this second phase o f analysis, however, this process was more thorough. 
In this respect, therefore, the process o f  this research clearly echoes Blaikie’s 
model o f  abductive research in that it moved from social scientific descriptions, 
to an attempt to understand the findings in relation to existing perspectives. 
When, however, at the completion o f this more thorough analysis, it was found 
that none o f the existing perspectives adequately fitted the data, some tentative 
steps were taken towards developing a new theory. The data resulting from this 
research has clearly demonstrated that there is a need for a more fluid and 
dynamic understanding o f  citizenship in relation to the experiences o f  disabled 
people. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed explanation o f the particular findings 
o f this research. In the concluding chapter, however, some tentative steps have 
been taken towards more formal or universal theorising, since it is proposed that 
there is a need for a more fluid and dynamic understanding o f personhood as the 
basis for citizenship.
The last part o f the research involved a process o f  feedback to each o f  the 
participating groups. In each case, either a transcript, or detailed minutes from the 
meeting, or both, depending upon the wishes o f the group members, was sent to 
each organisation. Figure 2d provides further details o f  these minutes and 
transcripts.
Chapter 2
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Figure 2d.
Groups for which transcripts were written and length of transcript:
Disability Action South Lakeland Transcript: 9,264 words 
Disability Association Carlisle and Eden Transcript: 14,126 words
{Transcript meeting 1: 8,723 wordsLancaster Disablement Information and Support Centre Transcript meeting 2: 5,995 words
Deafinail responses transcript: 10,391 words
Groups for which minutes were written and length of minutes:
Minutes Meeting 1: 2,568 words
Sheffield Forum of People with Disabilities Minutes Meeting 2:2,792 words
Arthritis Care Support Group Carlisle Minutes: 1,936 words
Group for which minutes and transcript were written and length of these 
documents:
This was then followed by the sending o f a document outlining the key findings
which the findings were discussed. Whilst this final aspect o f  the research may at 
first glance appear to be more o f an issue o f  ethical good practice, there is one 
other important reason for engaging in this process. A s previously stated one o f  
the important advantages o f  using an abductive approach is that because such 
research relies upon tapping into ‘lay’ accounts o f  attitudes to , and experiences o f  
citizenship, and maintains a firm link with this data at all times, then the resulting 
theories should not and ought not, be inaccessible to the respondents. In this 
manner, it was hoped that the respondents would consider the research to be valid 
at the level o f  meaning and in this way the research would have ‘emancipatory’ 
properties.
Minutes: 2,045 words
Speaking Up For Action
Transcript: 11,615 words
o f the research, and in some cases by a further ‘informal’ visit to each group in
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Having stated the above, however, it is important to make a clear distinction 
between the approach taken in this research and that o f  the form o f  ‘emancipatory 
research’ often employed within Disability Studies. Critical theory has greatly 
influenced Disability Studies’ preference for social theory that has been 
generated by research and is so interlinked with social practice, that the truth or 
falsity o f the theory can be partially determined by whether it can be transformed 
into action. In other words according to the model o f  emancipatory research often 
employed within Disability Studies, for research to be emancipatory, it must 
affect praxis within the marginalized group. It is the argument here, however, that 
in order for a piece o f research to have ‘emancipatory’ properties, such an 
outcome in terms o f praxis is not necessary.
Chapter 2
There are some persuasive arguments that suggest that it may be wrong to judge 
emancipatory knowledge only in terms o f the pragmatic criterion o f contribution 
to praxis. For Alvesson and Skbldberg (2000):
Identifiable outcomes in this respect — have people managed to 
free themselves from constraints? has suffering been abolished -  
may not be a good criterion for assessing the value o f  knowledge, 
as the latter's relationship to social action and practical 
accomplishments are never simple or straightforward. An 
insightful study does not necessarily affect praxis in a distinct way.
( p i  26)
Further, Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) suggest that it might be possible to 
achieve a minimal version o f critical research according to which research may 
not have entirely ‘failed’ in terms o f critical theory.
A possible role for critical theory -  as an example o f  a problem- 
identifying, questioning, research position -  could be to 
counteract any (...) unconscious reinforcement o f  existing 
society’s hold over thinking. Critical self-reflection thus has a 
limited emancipatory purpose, which is more about trying to 
prevent research from contributing to dominance and less about 
directly overcoming it. (p. 129)
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It has been the aim o f this research to fulfil these criteria as set out by Alvesson 
and Skoldberg. It is for this reason that it is proposed that the term critical- 
abductive, may be a legitimate description o f this research.
Ethical Issues
As previously stated, there has been much discussion within Disability Studies 
about the need for research in this field to be emancipatory. There appears to be 
widespread agreement that a new and improved research strategy is needed 
within the field, since disabled people themselves have highlighted the 
historically important role that disability research has played in the oppression o f  
disabled people (Barnes, 1996). Indeed, some disabled people have “constructed 
their experience at the hands o f traditional, non-disabled, researchers as 
‘research victims’.” (Lloyd et al, 1996: 305). The expression o f  such experiences 
has provided a clear imperative for the development o f more ethically sound 
research practices. There is less agreement, however, surrounding the form that 
this ethical disability research should take. Indeed, as a series o f articles within 
the past 6/7 year’s editions o f the journal Disability and Society demonstrate, the 
issue o f how best to engage in ethical disability research is not easily resolved 
and can be a highly emotive subject both for disabled people as research subjects 
and for researchers in this field.
In the light o f the emotive and important nature o f these debates, it would be 
impossible to avoid engaging in some discussion surrounding the central issues as 
they relate to this research. The following section o f  this chapter will consider 
these issues. The ethical section will then conclude with brief statement 
surrounding the adherence o f  this research to the British Sociological 
Association’s “Ethical Guidelines”5 and “Guidelines for Non-Disablist 
Language”6.
Chapter 2
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The ‘Independent Researcher ’ and the issue o f  emancipatory outcomes
In 1996 an article by Colin Barnes appeared in the journal Disability and Society, 
it was entitled: “Disability and the Myth o f the Independent Researcher”. In this 
article Barnes considered whether it was possible, or more importantly desirable, 
for researchers in the field o f  disability to remain independent from the aims o f  
the wider disability movement. He concluded that:
I f  disability research is about researching oppression, and I would 
argue that it is, then researchers should not be professing 
‘mythical independence ‘ to disabled people, but joining with them 
in their struggles to confront and overcome this oppression. 
Researchers should be espousing commitment not value freedom, 
engagement not objectivity, and solidarity not independence.
There is no haven or middle ground when researching oppression: 
academics and researchers can only be with the oppressors or 
with the oppressed. (Barnes, 1996:110)
In calling for this ‘partisan’ approach to disability research, Barnes echoes much 
o f the writing o f Mike Oliver on the emancipatory research paradigm within 
Disability Studies. For Oliver (1992) disability research, in addition to consulting 
seriously with disabled people, must seek to address the mechanisms for 
influencing policy. Unless research in this field is linked into policy-making 
structures so as to influence outcomes directly, then there is a risk that the 
research may constitute an abuse o f involvement for the disabled people who 
have participated in the project. Oliver is quite clear in his belief that disability 
research must advance beyond merely providing information that informs 
decision-making, to a position in which it provides the basis for important shifts 
in power. He is equally clear in his belief that good disability research must not 
be about the advancement o f  the career o f  the researcher, but rather about 
changing the lives o f disabled people.
In this regard, Barnes and Oliver have provided a powerful argument in support 
o f an approach to disability research that ow es much to the Critical Theory 
research paradigm outlined in the first section o f  this chapter. Their views have
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not, however, gone unchallenged. During 1996, again in the journal Disability 
and Society, two articles appeared, both o f which expressed the authors’ concerns 
with the out-and-out rejection o f  independence within research. In the first o f  
these articles, Mike Bury (1996) countered some aspects o f Colin Barnes’ notion 
that academics must either be with the oppressors or with the oppressed. For 
Bury, to strive for independence does not mean that the researcher must possess a 
complete absence o f commitment or accountability. Indeed, he argues that 
independence can mean quite the opposite, for many social researchers may be 
very committed to revealing social inequalities, the successes or failures o f  
certain social policies, or disparities in power. Remaining ‘independent’ for Bury 
(1996), however, means that there must “always be room for argument and 
counter argument, and crucially for researchers, to reveal matters that may be 
uncomfortable, for specific interest groups and even those funding the research.” 
(p .l 12) He goes on to argue that:
The idea that a particular section o f  the disability movement 
should control the research agenda on a ‘you are either for us or 
against us ’ basis as the final comment in Colin’s article implies, 
sounds like a thinly veiled threat. For example, research on 
representative samples o f  disabled people might reveal that 
relatively few  subscribe to the ‘oppression ’ theory o f disability, or 
find it relevant to their everyday experiences. Or research might 
reveal that activists identify with it more than others. (...) would 
Colin object to see negative as well as positive findings emerge 
from such research? (Bury, 1996:113)
Bury’s fear that an ‘orthodoxy’ was being established within Disability Studies 
was echoed by Tom Shakespeare (1996), in the second o f the ‘opposing’ articles. 
In his article Shakespeare writes with candour about his own research and admits 
to engaging in research practices and to possessing certain views that many 
within Disability Studies would fine ‘challenging’. He begins by questioning the 
notion that there needs to be a formalised connection between Disability Studies 
and the disability movement. He highlights the feet that in the case o f  lesbian and 
gay studies the connection between the discipline and the lesbian and gay 
political movement has been much less formalised, and indeed there has been 
dissent amongst some academics in the field from the ‘orthodoxy’ o f  the
Chapter 2
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movement. What has been vital, however, to the development o f lesbian and gay 
studies, is, according to Shakespeare, that whilst commitment has been clear, 
accountability has been more diffuse. Relating this to Disability Studies, 
Shakespeare (1996) states that in his opinion “there is a difference between 
accountability to one’s research subjects, and accountability to the disability 
movement or specific organisations within it.” (p.249) Further, Shakespeare 
(1996) states that:
Chapter 2
“I have major reservations with the concept o f  emancipatory 
research (...) I  am cynical about the possibility o f  research 
achieving major change (...) Ideas clearly have a role, but actions 
decide the day, and while it is possible to make the research 
process more balanced, grandiose claims for its revolutionary 
potential seem to me to be over-optimistic. Furthermore, whilst 
few  would now argue in terms o f  objectivity, a  notional 
independence and balance is still seen as critical to the academic 
endeavor. Given the political context, there is little point in 
developing progressive research which is rejected out o f  hand by 
government and media alike as being contaminated by ideological 
prejudice (...) academics cannot be perceived to have axes to 
grind. ” (p.252)
At first glance this statement might appear to be a rejection o f the emancipatory 
approach to research on the basis o f  some fairly practical concerns, i.e. that 
research that is perceived to be partisan will not have as much influence upon 
policy makers. In fact, Shakespeare clearly has some more profound difficulties 
with the notion that praxis must always be an essential part o f  disability research. 
He comments that he does not think that all research should be judged on  
instrumental grounds. Whilst he does not believe that researchers should have 
carte blanche to “parasite disabled people's experiences and develop careers on 
the back o f  disabled people’s lives” (Shakespeare, 1996: 253), he nevertheless 
defends the rights o f researchers to undertake research and to develop theory for 
its own sake. Equally, he also rejects the idea that for research to have 
emancipatory outcomes, that the findings must, therefore, be accessible and 
immediately comprehensible to disabled people. According to Shakespeare, if  
Disability Studies is to truly engage in a sociological understanding o f disability 
it will have to make use o f complex ideas and analyses which may be quite
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difficult to grasp. It is important he believes, to acknowledge within theory the 
“often complex, nuanced and difficult (Shakespeare, 1996: 252) nature o f social 
reality. Social research cannot always be therefore, simple and transparent in 
order to facilitate praxis. In arguing thus, Shakespeare is clearly at odds with 
Barnes and Oliver who have suggested that the only legitimate role for disability 
research is to produce knowledge that can be easily used by disabled people to 
challenge disablism within society and bring about positive changes in their lives.
With regard to this research considerable effort was made to follow the 
guidelines for good research practice as set out by authors such as Barnes and 
Oliver. For example, as already discussed, this research did consult seriously with 
disabled people and aimed to represent their views fairly; the respondents were 
given the opportunity to ask questions about the research and to identify key 
issues that they wished to discuss; feedback was given at each stage o f  the 
research to provide respondents with the opportunity to revise, or add to their 
existing comments; a more informal and less tightly structured interview 
technique was utilised in order that respondents should be enabled to truly speak 
out about issue in their lives; the comments o f respondents have been reproduced 
in this thesis verbatim, and have been given a prominent position within the 
findings chapter; the author has remained accessible and accountable to research 
respondents through-out the research.
Finally, with regard to the nature o f the theory generated by the research, and in 
contrast to Shakespeare’s view, a stance was taken that as far as possible, the 
majority o f  respondents must be able to understand the theories resulting from the 
research and even more importantly, how the theories were generated. It was 
thought that the first stage o f this process was to ensure that all participating 
organisations received a record o f their meeting. This was important because it 
allowed respondents to consider what had been their responses to the research 
questions, and to draw their own conclusions about how their views might inform 
the research. In the second document sent to each organisation, in which the 
findings o f  the whole research was outlined and in which verbatim quotations 
from many respondents have a prominent position, it was hoped that each
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respondent would be able to see how their view s ‘fitted into’ the overall 
conclusion. The feedback process w ill be considered in more depth later in this 
chapter.
Despite these important aspects o f  the research, however, certain aspects o f  this 
project do not seem to fit directly within the emancipatory approach as set out by 
Barnes and Oliver. Whilst in the initial stages o f this research this was a matter o f  
some concern, by the end o f the research this concern was less about the potential 
for criticism o f the research and more about the need to question some o f the 
existing research ‘orthodoxies’. As has already been stated, this research does not 
have the clear emancipatory outcomes as described by Oliver (1992), since it is 
not tied into policy-making structures. In the light o f  what might be viewed by 
authors such as Oliver as a failing on the part o f this research, Tom Shakespeare’s 
reservations concerning the emancipatory approach to disability research and his 
subsequent defence o f research which seeks to ‘develop theory for its own sake’ 
is, at first glance, reassuring, for he offers a way out for researchers who are 
finding it difficult to identify clear emancipatory outcomes in their work. One o f  
the arguments put forward in this research, however, is that it is not always 
necessary to seek this way out. Indeed, whilst I share Shakespeare’s unease 
concerning the orthodoxy within disability research, it is possible to argue that his 
analysis o f the alternative is not entirely convincing. Arguably, no sociological 
theory is, or should be, only o f  value in itself.
Sociologists have long prided themselves on their critical role in society. As 
Giddens (1993) has commented:
No sociologically sophisticated person can be unaware o f  the 
inequalities that exist in the world today, the lack o f social justice 
in many social situations or the deprivations suffered by millions 
o f people. It would be strange if  sociologists did not take sides on 
practical issues... (p. 23)
The history o f sociology demonstrates that understanding differences, concern 
with social inequalities and/or the potential for social change, are major and
honourable parts o f  what sociology is about. Whilst much o f this sociology is not
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tied directly to the formulation o f a particular policy, that is not to say that 
sociological theory has no influence upon society. Within Disability Studies 
itself, to deny the importance o f  the development o f theory that is not policy 
related, would be to deny the important influence o f  such theories as Goflman’s 
“Stigma” and Douglas’s “Purity and Danger” to understandings within this field. 
It can be argued that with knowledge com es understanding and having a clearer 
understanding o f the status quo must surely provide a more solid basis for 
empowerment.
In relation to this research it has always been a central aim o f the project to 
ensure that the disabled people involved in the research should emerge from the 
process in a more powerful position in that they would be able to use the 
understandings and knowledge gained from the research to both define and then 
act upon their own objectives. Whilst Shakespeare, therefore, in speaking out 
against some o f the orthodoxies o f disability research has given considerable 
support to calls for a much needed degree o f flexibility within disability research, 
he may not have been entirely correct to assume that the development o f theory 
unrelated to policy can never be accommodated within emancipatory research. It 
is an interesting reflection upon the power that key academics in a field can 
possess in shaping research practices, that an equally well-known author such as 
Shakespeare should construct an argument that proposes an alternative to the 
prevailing model o f emancipatory research, but does not advance to questioning 
whether or not there may be more flexible understandings o f the emancipatory 
research paradigm itself. As previously discussed within this chapter, writers 
such as Alvesson and Skdldberg (2000) have suggested that there might be a 
minimal version o f emancipatory/critical research. It is the argument here that 
this research can legitimately be termed ‘emancipatory’ on the basis o f  Alvesson 
and Skoldberg’s model.
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Who can do disability research?
The issue o f what constitutes a legitimate emancipatory outcome for research,
however, was not the only dilemma that needed to be resolved within the process
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o f this research. It was, in many respects, however, the least complicated problem 
to overcome. The final issue has proven more difficult to address. The first aspect 
o f this issue concerns the uneasy relationship between the researcher as a member 
o f the academic community and disabled people as an oppressed group. Despite 
disagreeing to an extent upon the desired outcomes o f disability research with 
regard to praxis, both Oliver (1996) and Shakespeare (1996), as already 
mentioned, have made clear their dissatisfaction with research that has been 
carried out essentially in order for the researcher to achieve career advancement. 
The first aspect o f this issue, therefore, is who the researcher is with regard to 
motive? This is clearly an issue within this research, for their can be no doubt that 
the desire on the part o f the researcher to achieve a PhD has been an important 
factor. Arguably, however, some aspects o f this ethical dilemma can be overcome 
so long as the research findings remain o f  some value in themselves.
The most insurmountable problem that occurs when undertaking disability 
research as part o f PhD is that by necessity, unless secondary data analysis is 
being used as the basis for the research, the sole responsibility for the collection 
o f the data and the authorship o f the thesis lies with the PhD student. The second 
aspect o f this issue, therefore, surrounds the relationship between researcher and 
research subject and who has been in control o f  the research? In the case o f PhD 
research, control over the research tends to lie with the researcher since 
abdicating research responsibility would, ethically speaking, necessitate joint 
authorship. This does not allow for what Humphrey (2000) has described as ‘the 
equality proviso’ to function within the research, a process defined as involving 
everyone becoming co-researcher and co-researched, or as already stated, the 
eventual abdication o f the researcher’s role as ‘researcher’. Since the equality 
proviso is held by many to be key to ethical disability research this author must 
remain uneasy surrounding this issue. It would seem that the only position that 
can be taken with regard to this matter is to admit to the shortcomings o f  this 
research with regard to the equality proviso, to propose that some flexibility be 
allowed into the PhD process o f the future, to allow for such uneasy asymmetries 
in power to be minimised, and finally, to hope that the attempts made in other 
ways during this research to act in accordance with the guidelines for good
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research practice in this field, will be noted. It is o f some comfort to this 
researcher that well respected authors in this field (for example, Zarb, 1992) have 
acknowledged that the pathway to ‘ideal’ emancipatory research is going to be 
long and hard and that along the way research will be carried out that will be 
considered to be less than ideal in one or more respects.
The final aspect o f this issue is, however, quite the thorniest. Over the past few  
years a heated debate has been going on within Disability Studies surrounding the 
role o f non-disabled researchers within the field. The final aspect o f this issue is 
therefore, whether non-disabled researchers are welcome within the field? It is 
clearly important that it is stated that the author o f  this thesis is not a disabled 
person. As a non-disabled researcher in this field it would, therefore, have been 
unethical to ignore this important insider/outsider debate. The following section 
provides an overview o f the key positions within this debate and how it relates to 
this research.
To be true to the insider/outsider debate within Disability Studies, it must be 
stated that the issue o f the role o f non-disabled researchers within the field is only 
part o f a wider debate about the role o f  non-disabled people within the disability 
movement as a whole. The reason why the issue o f  research ethics enters this 
debate is due to the focus upon the importance o f  the emancipatory research 
paradigm and the assumption that this methodology implies the need for empathy 
based upon shared experiences between the researcher and respondents and a 
partisan focus upon praxis as the desired outcome o f  such research. This last 
issue has been discussed in some depth earlier in the chapter, and will not be 
restated here. What has not been discussed, however, is the important question 
that arises from the prevailing model o f  emancipatory research, namely, to what 
extent it is necessaiy/desirable that:
I f  empowerment is to equate with an emancipatory approach, then 
reciprocity between researcher and researched must come to 
mean the exchange o f like with like -  women engaging in feminist 
research, disabled people in disability research. (Lloyd et al,
1996: 306)
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In tw o articles, Fran Branfield (1998, 1999) sets out her argument that it is 
essential that Disability Studies does not become “hijacked and reappropriated 
by non-disabled people” (1998:144). She has commented that:
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Disability studies is a subject for disabled people who are, 
precisely, its subjects, the people who make it; it is our affair. 
Disability studies are also a subject for non-disabled people; what 
it is should obviously concern them. They have to learn to make it 
their affair, to carry it through into their lives, but it must be 
understood that support and participation are not the same. 
(Branfield, 1999:402)
In both articles what is key to Branfield’s argument is the maintenance o f the 
dualism non-disabled/disabled, oppressor/oppressed. N ot everyone within 
Disability Studies, however, shares Branfield’s view. Barnes (1992a), who in 
many respects one would expect to share Branfield’s opinions, in fact offers a 
somewhat confusing argument, which, it can only be supposed, must reveal his 
unease with regard to Branfield’s position. He states on the one hand that:
(...) logic dictates that if  a researcher is to empathise with those 
being researched then it follows that their life history must be as 
near as possible to that o f  the people being studied. (Barnes, 
1992a: 117)
but on the other hand that:
I  am not convinced that it is necessary to have an impairment in 
order to produce good qualitative research within the 
emancipatory model (...) (Barnes, 1992a: 121)
Other writers have offered more direct opposition to Branfield’s position. Duckett 
(1998), whilst not being dismissive o f  Branfield’s views, does ask where such 
views will take Disability Studies? He perceives that it is a “particularly 
oppressive theoretical position she leads us towards, one that mirrors the 
oppression experienced by disabled people." (Duckett, 1998: 625) He further 
argues that maintaining such binary discourses is what sustains segregation. 
Branfield, he argues, may feel that this can be overcome by turning the tables on
such binaries by privileging the historically disempowered group, but “this would
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be shifting the focus o f  oppression whilst leaving the process o f  oppression 
intact. ” (Duckett, 1998: 625-6) Duckett then goes on to argue that clear-cut 
distinctions between disabled and non-disabled people are too simplistic and that 
differences within the disabled population must not be ignored for they bring into 
some doubt the assumption that the distinction non-disabled/disabled equates 
automatically to oppressor/oppressed. Duckett’s position is one that is echoed by 
Humphrey (2000) who has commented that this dualism can be used to support 
the idea o f  a ‘ghetto’ ofrfor disabled people.
For Humphrey, the idea o f the ‘politics o f  experience’ in which only those with a 
lived experience o f a particular form o f  oppression can possess the necessary 
prerequisite for understanding that oppression, can be taken too far. If pursued 
too far, Humphrey claims, it would mean, for example, that only those with 
spinal injuries would be able to undertake research with people with spinal 
injuries and so on. This, she claims would lead to the isolation o f  groups and an 
inability to develop a more “inclusive civil rights agenda or a more overarching 
theory o f  disability.” (Humphrey, 2000: 72) Humphrey (2000) has also warned 
that maintaining this dualism can:
(...) militate against a recognition that many currently non­
disabled people have been and or will become disabled in their 
lifetimes, that many carers and some professional service 
providers are also disabled people, and that the disabled identity 
may have been constructed in a way which limits its inclusiveness.
(P-70)
In many respects this quotation from Humphrey is key to this research because it 
echoes the theoretical position taken within this research towards the idea o f  
citizenship and disability. A s will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis, a 
more fluid and dynamic understanding o f citizenship as ‘personhood’, in which 
the identity o f every individual is seen to be vulnerable and contingent may 
provide the best way forward for understanding and changing attitudes towards 
many historically oppressed groups. What is implied by this theoretical stance, 
therefore, is that what is needed on the part o f  the researcher is not to possess the 
identical experience o f  oppression as their research subjects, but rather, to  be
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constantly aware o f the vulnerability o f their own personhood. In transcending 
one’s own fairly conditional identity it is possible to add to calls for the end o f  a 
range o f  oppressions without directly experiencing those oppressions. Thus, 
echoing much o f the anti-racist and feminist approaches to research, a researcher 
does not have to be black to recognise and deplore the injustice o f apartheid or 
more widespread racism, and following the same argument, the non-disabled 
researcher does not need to be disabled to appreciate the second-class citizenship 
experienced by disabled people. The argument put forward by this research, 
therefore, is that non-disabled people can and should engage in disability research 
so long as they maintain reflexivity at all times with regard to their motives, then- 
own identities and their research practices.
Some final comments:
Finally, it was an important part o f  this research to respect the physical, social 
and psychological well-being o f  respondents and to ensure that their 
confidentially and anonymity be maintained at all times. It has been the intention 
o f this research to abide by the British Sociological Association’s “Ethical 
Guidelines” throughout the process. In relation to the correct use o f  language, the 
position taken by this research is that, wherever possible, the terms used are those 
that have been identified by respondents as carrying the most respect. Where 
differences o f  opinion arose the British Sociological Association’s “Guidelines 
for Non-Disablist Language” was used to identify the most widely accepted 
terms.
Practical Issues
The purpose o f this final section o f  the chapter is to describe the practical 
methods employed during this research in the process o f  gathering, analysing and 
giving feedback on the empirical data. The following section is divided into four 
parts, the first three o f these are, as suggested by Berg’s (1989) schema, subject 
information, data collection and setting and analysis. The final, additional, part 
will consider the process o f  feedback.
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Subject Information 
Key points:
❖  Who were the respondents?
❖  H ow  were they selected?
❖  What information were they given about the research?
❖  What were they told about their participation?
❖  Were there any groups/individuals who refused to take part and why (if  
known)?
In relation to the questions ‘who were the respondents?’ and ‘how were they 
selected?’ the reader is referred back to chapter 1 in which these issues are 
considered in some depth. To summarize the argument made there, however, it 
was decided that an appropriate starting point would be to follow  Oliver’s (1997) 
definition o f  the disability movement as being constituted only by organisations 
o f  disabled people, not organisations for  disabled people. For this reason, only 
groups run by disabled people themselves were contacted about this research. 
This research diverges in one respect from Oliver’s definition, however, for it 
rejects the tendency on the part o f Oliver and others to equate the disability 
movement with the member groups o f the BCODP. Personal experience within 
the field suggested to this researcher that the BCODP does not encompass all 
groups run by disabled people, for disabled people, and therefore, whilst it is 
clearly a very important umbrella organisation, it cannot be equated with the 
movement.
Since it was thought that it would be useful to include within the research 
organisations from a number o f  different geographical settings, the following
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areas were initially chosen: London; the cities o f South Yorkshire, Lancashire 
and Manchester Region; and Cumbria. All groups which met the criteria as set 
out above, and which were located in one o f these locations, were contacted with 
a short letter. In this letter the focus o f  the research and the level o f  involvement 
required on the part o f  respondents was made clear. The letter also contained a 
brief statement regarding the ethical position o f  the research and provided an 
opening for any interested groups to contact the researcher to ask any questions 
before they considered becoming involved in the research. A slightly different 
style o f letter, but with a similar content, was sent to any groups who had as 
members, people with a learning disability. In writing this letter and in all 
correspondence with people with learning disabilities, an effort was made to use a 
style in keeping with the material produced by the organisation “People First” 
and the Joseph Rowntree Association’s “Plain Facts” series. (Both research 
letters can be viewed in the appendix.) In all, nineteen organisations were 
contacted, but only six organisations were found to be either suitable or willing to 
be involved in the research. The final spread o f groups covered the following 
areas: Sheffield, as a large, industrial city; Lancaster, as a smaller city with a 
more rural hinterland; and the whole o f  Cumbria, as an essentially rural area.
There were a number o f reasons why thirteen o f the organisations contacted did 
not become involved in the research. In some cases, despite numerous efforts, the 
organisation could not be contacted. It was a sad reflection upon the state o f  
funding for many disability organisations that several groups that were contacted 
were either in the middle o f major upheaval due to changes in funding, or had 
ceased to exist due to complete lack o f funds. In addition, after further contact, 
some groups were found to be unsuitable for inclusion within the research 
because they did not have a cohesive ‘membership’ as such and it was considered 
important that the organisations included within the research were those whose 
membership met regularly. This was considered to be important for tw o reasons, 
firstly, because it meant that arranging group meetings was less complicated, and 
secondly, because participating members o f group discussions were familiar with 
interacting with one another. The last point was thought to be important in the 
light o f the feet that many disabled people have had personal experience o f
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oppressive research practices, and many other disabled people remain wary of 
research in general. It was therefore hoped that holding discussion groups 
amongst groups of individuals who were familiar with one another would give 
respondents confidence.
Finally, there was also some direct reluctance on the part of some organisations 
to becoming involved with the research. In some cases this took the form of 
‘stalling’, in which a group never finally agreed to becoming involved, no matter 
how many times they were contacted. Sometimes it was suspected that this 
stalling may have been due to the effect o f gatekeepers. Since there was often no 
direct way to contact the individual members o f an organisation other than 
through their central office staff, there was always a risk that key members of 
staff would make a decision regarding the research on the basis o f their own 
motives and would not consult their members. One group, however, did directly 
respond to the research letter and explained that they were not willing to 
participate in the research because, as an organisation, they had made a decision 
not to support research being carried out by non-disabled people. (Please see 
Figure 2e fo r a list o f  the 13 organisations that were initially contacted hut did 
not subsequently become involved in the research. Figure 2e also gives details o f  
the reasons why each group did not become involved in the research.)
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Figure 2e.
N am e o f O rg an isatio n D etails
All groups w ere contacted between  
March 2000 and January 2001. Details 
below relate only to the position of 
groups at that time.
CHANGE, London Despite repeated correspondence  
final date for contact never given by 
group -  th is m ainly due to  
organisation m oving offices at tim e of 
research and other upheavals.
Spinal Injuries Association, London Despite repeated correspondence and
*------------ ------------------- ---------------------- • • -----
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by their request the sending of a set 
of questions for council m em bers to  
consider, no further response was  
received.
Action Disability Kensington and 
Chelsea, London
Forum fo r Living of Young Disabled  
People (Floyd P), London
Despite repeated correspondence  
final date fo r contact never given by 
group.
Despite repeated correspondence and  
by their request the sending o f a set 
of questions fo r m em bers to  
consider, no further response was  
received.
National League of the Blind and 
Disabled, Greater London
No reply to research letter. Published  
phone num ber no longer existing. 
Unable to  contact group.
DAN Leeds and Yorkshire Published phone num ber no longer 
existing. Unable to locate group.
DAN North W est and Manchester Published phone num ber no longer 
existing. Unable to  locate group.
Ideas in M otion, Liverpool Despite repeated contact with group  
and attending, at the ir request, a 
conference run by the group, final 
date fo r contact never given.
Down to  Earth, Bolton Organisation had ceased to  exist.
Greater M anchester Coalition of 
Disabled People
G roup declined to be involved in 
research being carried out by a non­
disabled researcher.
Ankylosing Spondylitis Group, 
Cum bria
Organisation unsuitable.
Y our Rights Y our Voice, Cum bria Met group to discuss becom ing  
involved in research but shortly after, 
group ceased to exist due to  lack of 
funding.
Allerdale Disability Association, 
Cum bria
Organisation unsuitable.
The response from this organisation raised an important question for the research:
to what extent were those organisations that agreed to becoming involved in the
research, representative o f  the feelings o f  all groups within the disability
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movement? This issue o f was o f wider importance, in the light o f  the fact that not 
only might there be differences in attitudes between participating and non­
participating groups, but also that the process o f  gaining access to research 
groups took the form o f ‘opportunity sampling’ i.e. the groups that became 
involved in the research were those that agreed to participate and were based 
within one o f the chosen areas. Such ‘opportunity’ sampling, whilst proving 
necessary, was not considered to be entirely ideal by this author because it did 
not guarantee the inclusion o f a cross-section o f the different substantive groups 
that form the disability community. The importance o f these different substantive 
groups should not be underestimated since, as will be discussed later in this 
thesis, there is evidence o f a hierarchy o f  privilege and power within the 
disability community, with working age, white, academically gifted, so-called 
‘able-disabled’ men being in the most privileged positions.
On a positive note, the participating groups in this research did include 
organisations o f people living with a particular condition/illness that radically 
reduces their physical ‘ability’ (Arthritis Care Support Group, Carlisle), an 
organisation o f  people with learning disabilities who experience difficulties 
intellectually (Speaking Up For Action), as well as several groups o f disabled 
people living with a range o f  physical impairments, some o f whom might be 
considered to be more ‘able-disabled’. Further, participating individuals were 
both male and female and although all adults, respondents ranged in age from 
mid-twenties to post-retirement.
Noticeably absent from the participating groups, however, were disabled people 
from ethnic minorities, deafTDeaf people and people with mental health issues. 
A s has already been discussed, time constraints did not allow for additional 
groups to be sought from each o f these substantive areas, so it was decided to 
investigate further into the views o f deafTDeaf people. It should be stated, 
however, that whilst the acknowledgement o f the shortfalls o f  the ‘opportunity 
sampling’ method is necessary, it is equally important to stress that in focusing 
upon micro-representativeness, this research was not seeking to be ‘definitively 
representative’ o f the entire disability community. Thus, the research remains
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accountable only to the groups and individuals involved. At the same time, 
however, it was also felt that the groups who had agreed to becoming involved in 
the research were not so atypical, that insight gained from working with them 
would be of no relevance to understanding the disability movement as a whole. 
Indeed, since all five organisations involved in the research matched the 
definition of groups that make up the disability movement as set out by Oliver 
( 1997), in other words they were run by disabled people fo r  disabled people, it 
was concluded that the resulting data would allow for tentative generalisations to 
be made.
Figure 2 f  lists the participating organisations and provides a brief description o f  
each:
Figure 2f.
Sheffield groups
1. Sheffield Forum of People with Disabilities (SFPD): A ‘politically’ 
orientated group of disabled people.
2. Speaking Up For Action (SUFA): A self-advocacy group of people with 
learning disabilities.
Lancaster group
3. Lancaster Disablement Information and Support Centre (Lancaster 
DISC): An organisation acting as a resource for other disabled people. 
Cumbria groups
4. Arthritis Care Support Group, Carlisle: A support group of people 
living with chronic arthritis.
5. Disability Action South Lakeland (DASL): An organisation acting as a 
resource for other disabled people.
6. Disability Association Carlisle and Eden (DaCE): An organisation 
acting as a resource for other disabled people.
Having agreed to participate in the research these organisations were then 
contacted again, as has been described in the first section o f this chapter, with 
more information about the research and a set o f questions that it was hoped 
would provide a framework for the group discussions. As has also already been
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discussed, it was made clear that these questions were only meant to be a guide to  
the general area o f  the research and groups were given considerable flexibility 
concerning which, if  any, o f the questions they wished to discuss. Slightly 
different questions were sent to SUFA since this is an organisation o f people with 
learning disabilities and it was anticipated that some people with learning 
disabilities might find some o f  the more abstract questioning, problematic. It is 
hoped, however, that what can be seen from the questions sent to this 
organisation is that an effort was made to avoid underestimating the level o f  
abstract understanding that many people with a learning disability do possess. 
Please see the appendix for a copy o f  the questions sent to SUFA.
Once the questions had been sent out to each organisation, the data gathering then 
began. Before this aspect o f the research is discussed, however, it is necessary to 
mention two further points. The first point is that, for reasons already stated in 
this chapter, an additional request for involvement in the research, an explanation 
o f  the central aims o f the research and a set o f questions was posted at the web 
based mail group “Deafinail”. As already discussed, the focus o f these questions 
was slightly different from those sent to the other disability organisations. It is 
also important to note here that there was only a small response to this posting on 
“Deafinail” and to date, there have been no responses from members o f the D eaf 
community. Those people who did choose to respond to the research questions all 
stated that they were ‘d eaf and did not see themselves as being a part o f  the D eaf 
culture. What conclusions might be drawn from this pattern o f  response will be 
considered later in this thesis.
Finally, there is the issue o f  the second round o f  group discussions, and how the 
participating groups were selected, the answer to which is straightforward. 
Further discussions were held at tw o organisations that had expressed interest in 
holding a further meeting to consider, in more depth, the issues raised in their 
first focus group discussion. With regard to the focus o f  these discussions, as has 
already been stated, some initial analysis o f  the data took place after the first 
round o f  interviews and this provided the researcher with an overall impression 
o f the central issues for further discussion. It was not the intention o f the
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researcher to enforce a focus for the second meeting however, and instead the 
transcripts or minutes o f  the first meeting held at each organisation were sent in 
advance to each group, in the hope that a review o f the previous comments that 
had been made would provide the basis for a further discussion. This was found 
to be a successful strategy.
Data collection and setting
❖  What was the setting for the data collection and what method was
employed? '
As has already been mentioned, following the posting o f a set o f  questions to 
each organisation, arrangements were made for a focus group discussion to take 
place with members o f each group. In each case, the organisation itself was 
responsible for gathering together a number o f members for the group discussion, 
and each group chose a venue for the meeting. The researcher then travelled to 
that location and the resulting discussions were recorded on audiotape. All 
respondents were asked whether they agreed to the use o f audiotape and were 
assured that the tape could be switched o ff at any point, according to their wishes. 
The same process was repeated for the second round o f interviews. This system  
worked well in all but one case, where on the researcher’s visit to an organisation 
it was announced that a group meeting had not been arranged, but instead a key 
member o f the organisation was willing to be interviewed individually. Whilst 
this interview at DASL, did take place, and data from this interview is included in 
this thesis, it must be stated that this interview did not benefit from some o f the 
advantages that a group discussion can bring to respondents and to the research 
itself.
Baker (1999) has identified the following advantages to the use o f the group 
discussion as a method o f data collection:
❖  Security -  individuals may feel less exposed and more comfortable when 
expressing opinions, i f  they feel that their opinions are shared with other
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respondents. They may also fee l that they need not defend their ideas, but 
can feel secure in their beliefs.
❖  Snowballing -  comments from one person within the discussion group 
often elicit comments from others.
❖  Spontaneity -  since no one person is asked to answer any particular 
question, then respondents will offer views and pick up upon what 
genuinely interests them. There is no requirement in a group discussion 
for everyone to be interested in, or have an opinion upon every question.
❖  Synergism -  more ideas and information is likely to flow from a 
combined interview environment.
❖  Serendipity -  discussion groups possess the potential for unexpected ‘out 
o f  the blue ' comments and ideas to emerge.
❖  Speed -  the group interview reduces the time needed for single 
interviews.
Group discussions, along with other qualitative approaches, can also provide a 
wealth o f  insights into experiences, attitudes and beliefs that would be hard to 
access via quantitative approaches. Further, as G oss and Leinbach (1996) have 
commented: “the stories produced in the collaborative performance (...) better 
reflect the social nature o f knowledge than a summation o f  individual narratives 
extracted in interviews. ” (p. 115) It should be noted however, that the definitions 
above relate to one particular type o f  group discussion/interview, namely the 
focus group. Gibbs (1997) has usefully explained the difference between group 
interviews and focus group discussions thus:
Group interviewing involves interviewing a number o f people at 
the same time, the emphasis being on questions and responses 
between the researcher and participants. (...) the key 
characteristic which distinguishes focus groups is the insight and
48
Chapter 2
data produced by the interaction between participants, (section  
entitled -  What are focus groups?) (My emphasis).
The key to a successful focus group, therefore, is the manner in which 
respondents interact with one another, asking each other questions and 
reconsidering their views in the light o f  the group discussion. In this way focus 
groups can generate large amounts o f  valuable and valid data within a shorter 
period o f  time than is required for many other methods. A s has already been 
discussed, focus groups are also o f considerable value where there are inherent 
power differentials between the researcher and the researched, as was the case in 
this research between the non-disabled researcher and disabled respondents, 
because a large degree o f control o f the discussion is devolved to the respondents.
There are, however, some drawbacks associated with the use o f  focus groups: 
firstly, the supposedly ‘empowering’ aspect o f focus groups may not apply for all 
respondents. Focus groups can be quite intimidating for shy or less articulate 
individuals. The researcher can do much to combat this problem by creating an 
atmosphere in which every individual’s contributions are encouraged and 
respected and by using positive and non-threatening body language and 
terminology. During this research, considerably effort was made by the 
researcher to facilitate the involvement o f every respondent in the focus group 
discussions. A  more intractable problem, however, lies in the possibility that 
group dynamics, about which the researcher is likely to be unaware, may lead to  
the ‘freezing out’ o f dissident voices. Such a process may even have meant the 
prevention o f  certain individuals from attending the focus group. Since the power 
to convene the focus group was left to each organisation, there is a real possibility 
that this problem may have occurred within this research. Whilst it was not 
possible to resolve the issue o f the potential for certain individuals to be excluded 
from attending the focus group, it was possible to find a solution to the problem 
o f the ‘freezing out’ o f dissident voices during the discussion. At the end o f every 
focus group respondents were given the contact details o f  the researcher, and 
were encouraged to get in touch by telephone, email or in writing should there be 
anything that they wanted to say privately, away from the group. No respondents
49
contacted the researcher in this way, but the option for them to do so was 
considered to be an important part o f the research method.
Other limitations o f  the focus groups have been summarised by Dwyer (2000: 
239) as:
❖  The interviewer has less control o f  a group when compared to an 
individual interview. It is important therefore to be aware o f  
detours in discussion and attempt to keep the discussion focused.
❖  The data generated can be more difficult to analyse.
❖  The successful negotiation o f focus group interviews is often 
dependent upon the skills o f  the moderator.
❖  Groups can be difficult to assemble.
❖  Focus groups are said to suffer from a lack o f  generalisability 
because samples are small andpurposively selected.
There is evidence o f some o f these drawbacks within this research, for example, 
as previously mentioned, it was not always easy to assemble groups. As has 
already been discussed, however, whilst some o f these factors have occurred 
during this research, not all have been considered to be drawbacks. The idea that 
the researcher might have less control over the discussion was not considered to 
be a problem within the research, since, as has already been discussed, attempts 
to reduce the inherent power imbalance between researcher and respondent had 
taken the form o f giving groups some control over the topics discussed. Equally, 
the idea that ‘micro-representativeness’ does not entirely rule out tentative 
generalisations has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, and is thought 
to apply to this research. Finally, in relation to the analysis o f  the data produced 
by the group discussions, no significant difficulties have arisen during the process 
o f  analysis. This last point is probably due to the method employed in the 
analysis o f the data, which was intentionally less structured than is often the case.
Before considering this mode o f analysis in more depth, however, a further aspect 
o f the data collection must be mentioned. As has already been discussed at some
length, data was also collected via the web-based mail group “Deafinail”. The
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data took the form o f a series o f emails that had been sent between a number o f 
participants in the mailbase group and the researcher, and the text o f these emails 
was saved. It must be acknowledged, however, that one o f  a number o f key 
dilemmas associated with the use o f  web-based communication within research 
(see BSA’s Ethical Guidelines for further details), is the problem that it is often 
impossible to ensure that respondents are who they say they are. For example, in 
the case o f this research, it has been necessary to accept as a matter o f trust that 
the respondents to the questions posted on “Deafinail” are truly Deaf7deaf people. 
There are, however, some key benefits to this method o f  data collection, which it 
was felt out-weighed the limitations. Firstly, the use o f the mailbase enabled the 
researcher to rapidly contact a very large number o f  Deafideaf people. Secondly, 
there are benefits to the use o f email where respondents may have difficulties 
with verbal communication. In such cases, email provides a way o f interacting 
with the researcher that is more like a conversation that more formal, written 
correspondence.
Analysis
After each group discussion, transcripts o f  the meetings were produced. These 
transcripts took one o f  two forms, as agreed with each group. In some cases a 
verbatim transcript was produced, in others detailed minutes o f the meeting were 
written. In the case o f the ‘minutes’ these were chronologically ordered according 
to the flow  o f  the discussion and were sufficiently detailed so as to provide a 
direct reference to everything that was said. This was considered to be important 
since there was insufficient time within the research to produce both detailed 
minutes and a verbatim transcript for each meeting, and so for the benefit o f  the 
researcher, the minutes needed to represent a clear record o f  the meeting to 
accompany the audio recordings. In the case o f  the emails written by members o f  
the “Deafinail” group these emails were collated to form another transcript. 
(Please see figure 2d for details o f  minutes and transcripts.)
At this point a decision needed to be made about to how to proceed with 
analysing the data. This decision was made difficult because there is a lack o f
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clear advice within the literature surrounding the best way to analyse focus group 
interviews/discussions. How to run focus groups, and the advantages o f  this 
approach have been the key themes in the literature in this field. Nevertheless, 
there does appear to be a predominant approach within the social sciences to the 
analysis o f the data emerging from group discussions, and that is to axial code the 
data and/or make use o f computer packages such as Nud*ist to assist in this 
process.
This approach to analysis was not considered to be appropriate in the case o f this 
research, however, for a number o f reasons. Firstly, axial coding, in which 
categories are related to each other via a combination o f inductive and deductive 
reasoning necessarily involves a process, be it manual or on the computer, o f  
‘cutting and pasting’, a process which fractures the text. Catterall and Maclaran 
(1997) have warned that such an approach runs the risk o f failing to capture or 
even recognize a number o f events in the unfolding story o f the discussion group. 
They list in particular the tendency o f  respondents to make contradictory 
comments; the tendency for respondents to alter their views during the research 
through dialogue with others; and the tendency for respondents to expand later 
upon comments made earlier in the discussion, adding new or even different 
explanations. They have also identified inadequacies in traditional approaches to 
coding and in the current computer packages, when seeking to understand the 
outcomes o f interaction within the discussion group.
For these reasons, therefore, neither axial coding nor computer-assisted analysis 
was used during this research. Instead, initial analysis took the form o f gaining 
familiarity with the text, something that May (2001) has identified as key to the 
analysis o f all interviews. A  process o f  annotation o f  the text, was the second key 
method o f  analysis. Such a method could be termed informal or open coding. 
Catterall and Maclaren (1997) claim that this form o f  analysis is “more likely to 
capture the whole moving picture” (para.4.4) In practical terms this meant 
reading and re-reading the scripts and listening repeatedly to the audio-tapes o f  
the meetings in order to make notes about key themes and thoughts about the 
data. Essentially, whilst reading the transcripts or listening to the tapes the
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question in the mind o f the researcher was: “What is this about?“ Labels and 
categories could then be written in the margins o f transcripts or minutes. These 
labels referred to the key concepts revealed within the comments o f respondents. 
For example, such categories included:
❖  Disablist Language
❖  The Disability Movement
❖  Disabled Identity/Disability Identity
❖  Ghettoisation/Separatism in the Movement
Familiarity with the data then allowed not only for key issues to be identified 
within focus groups, but also between focus groups. A s has already been 
discussed, the predominant theme o f  all the group discussions surrounded the 
issue o f  identity and how this related to the idea o f citizenship. A s has also been 
discussed previously, this theme was clearly identified after the initial analysis o f  
the first round o f  meetings and provided the basis for the second tw o group 
discussions. Analysis o f these final two meetings then took the same form as 
stated above.
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Whilst this informal approach to coding may appear to echo the grounded theory 
approach, there is, however, one important difference. According to the grounded 
theory approach, informal coding results in both concrete and fairly abstract 
categories emerging. The abstract categories, according to this approach, may 
often emerge out o f  the minds o f the researcher and help to generate theory. 
Whilst, as can be seen in the list above, many o f  the categories used in this 
research were fairly abstract, these categories did not come from the mind o f  the 
researcher, but instead arose straight from the data in abstract form. This is 
because the respondents themselves spent considerable time talking about 
abstract concepts and so there was no need for the researcher to apply abstract 
categories onto the data.
The final aspect o f the data analysis was to relate the findings to the existing 
theories in the field. At this point care needed to be taken in order to avoid over
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interpretation o f the data, and the related risk o f distortion. This process was 
made easier by the spontaneous way in which codes had emerged from the data, 
as discussed above. It was then quite a straightforward process to write up the 
findings in such a way as to give voice to the respondents and to remain truly 
accountable to them. It is hoped that this is what has been achieved within 
chapter 6.
Feedback
After the completion o f this thesis it is envisaged that an outline o f the central 
findings o f  the research will be sent to each o f the participating groups. The first 
part o f the feedback process took place during the analysis o f the findings. At that 
point, a letter o f thanks together with either a verbatim transcript or a detailed set 
o f minutes, as agreed, was sent to each organisation. Any comments concerning 
the documents were welcomed since it was considered to be important that each 
group approved the record o f their meeting. In the case o f the group run by 
people with learning disabilities, they stated that since they regarded their 
involvement in the research to have been an important example o f self-advocacy, 
that they wished their group discussion to be written up into a report that could be 
used by the organisation. Such a document was produced and presented to the 
group for approval. An anonymised version o f this report can be found in the 
appendix.
In addition as part o f the process o f feedback, one group invited the researcher to 
give a talk to the group about the initial findings o f  the research. This invitation 
was taken up by the researcher.
Concluding comments
It has long been acknowledged that when research is being carried out with/on 
oppressed groups, there must be transparency with regard to the position o f the 
research/er. Research practices that, no matter how inadvertently, add to the 
oppression o f  the research subjects, must be avoided. The aim o f  this chapter has
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been to state in some detail, the theoretical, ethical and practical processes that 
formed part o f  this research. It is hoped that this chapter demonstrates that self­
reflection on the part o f  the researcher has been an important part o f  the research 
process.
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Chapter 3
Citizenship
Introduction
Duty is the cornerstone o f a decent society. It recognises more 
than self. It defines the context in which rights are given. It is 
personal but it is also owed to society... It draws on a broader and 
therefore more accurate notion o f  human nature than one 
formulated on insular self-interest. The rights we receive should 
reflect the duties we owe. With the power should come 
responsibility. (Blair, 1995: 5)
A modern notion o f  citizenship gives rights but demands 
obligations, shows respect but wants it back, grants opportunity 
but insists on responsibility. (Blair, 1996: 218)
Citizenship involves providing for family members, being a loving 
parent, playing by the rules or looking out for a neighbour in 
need. It's about having a sense o f responsibility, obligation and 
duty. (Duncan Smith, 2002: quote from speech given at Toynbee 
Hall on Iain Duncan Smith's first anniversary as Party Leader.)
The purpose o f the proposed Equality Act is to extend the life 
chances o f people disadvantaged through belonging to groups 
discriminated against by British Society. These people have 
suffered the whiplash o f rejection and the knowledge that they are 
not valued as individuals. To right this wrong, and to make 
meaningful the concept o f  citizenship, o f  living in a civilised 
society, we need the statutory remedy o f true and enforceable 
equality before the law. (MacLennan, 2000: quoted in Liberal 
Democrat press release)
As the above quotations demonstrate, the rhetoric o f  ‘Citizenship’ is a favourite 
tool o f politicians. Clearly, for the concept to be so utilised, ‘citizenship’ must be 
widely accepted to be a good thingl Centuries o f  theorizing have, however, 
demonstrated the difficulty in establishing a widely agreed definition about what
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exactly the notion o f citizenship entails. In writing this overview o f some o f the 
central academic theorizing on citizenship it became clear that it is difficult, if  not 
impossible, to separate out discussions o f citizenship from wider debates 
surrounding notions such as democracy; liberty; justice; human rights 
discourses; the nature o f the polis; the nature o f the ‘se lf; identity; ‘difference ’; 
and ‘struggle ’. It is not possible within the limits o f this chapter, or this research 
to consider each o f these areas in depth, as indeed they warrant a fuller account. It 
is important to note however, that such issues impact greatly upon citizenship 
debates and at times I will refer to such areas where they impact upon matters 
under consideration.
To provide a short overview o f the structure o f  this chapter: the first section will 
briefly consider the major issues resulting from those theories that I have termed 
the ‘Ancient’ and ‘Classical’ approaches. It is not my intention to consider these 
theories in great depth however, for whilst providing the framework for much, if  
not all, subsequent theorising, they are increasingly being seen to be redundant in 
themselves. The second and third parts o f  this chapter will consider the modem  
and contemporary approaches to citizenship theory, respectively. Further, 
contemporary citizenship theorising can be usefully separated into three major 
categories: the pluralist approach; the reflexive account: and the post-structuralist 
approach and these will be considered in turn. (The historical framework, as set 
out above, for considering citizenship theorizing is shown in fig. 3.a)
Ancient and Classical Theories o f Citizenship
Theorizing on citizenship has a very long tradition, stemming back to the Ancient 
Greeks. Indeed, citizenship had its first institutional expression in the Athenian 
polis between the 5th-4th centuries BC (Faulks, 2000). This long-standing 
tradition o f theorizing has had profound effects upon the manner in which we 
understand the relationship between the individual and the state/society more 
generally. In Ancient Greece the optimum relationship between the individual 
and the state was embodied in the notion o f  the ‘citizen’, which literally meant 
‘member o f  the state’ (Heywood, 1994). For the ancient Greeks, the ‘s e lf  was
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only as robust as the polity to which it belonged. Aristotle stated that citizenship 
was a core element o f what it means to be human. This was a view o f the 
individual that saw each person as intricately interconnected with society. In a 
manner that appears to echo much o f Giddens’ (1984) notion o f the ‘duality o f  
structure’, the ancient Greeks viewed individuals and society as each being 
coterminous o f the other.
Further, the ancient Greek notion o f citizenship is also infused with a morality 
that considered those who did not live up to the expectations o f  citizenship to be 
inherently ‘selfish’. For the ancient Greeks, beyond the confines o f the 
household, there was only the polis. McAfee (2000) highlights this fact by noting 
that the Greek word for someone who is uninterested in public life is ‘idiotes’ i.e. 
an ‘idiot’, thus the word ‘idiosyncratic’, which literally means to hold only to 
one’s own self. Aristotle echoed this sentiment when he famously argued that to 
refuse to take part in the running o f a community is to be either a beast or a God! 
Meier (1990) has also concluded that this sense o f  morality is key to 
understanding the ancient Greek notion o f  citizenship. Meier has questioned why 
it was that the citizens o f ancient Greece worked so hard, often in a military 
capacity, in their duties as citizens but for so little in return? He concludes that 
the activity on the part o f citizens was partly due to social pressures but also 
because fulfilling one’s duties as a citizen was also thought to make you a better 
person and as being opposite to acting out o f  self-interest.
The context in which the notion o f citizenship was bom, therefore, was the small- 
scale, organic community o f the ancient Greek, and in particular, the Athenian 
polis. The content and ‘depth’ o f this citizenship was greatly influenced by the 
fact that it was not a purely public matter. For the ancient Greeks, the values o f  
active citizenship should be internalised within the individual citizen. In many 
respects, this ancient view o f citizenship is diametrically opposed to much 
subsequent theorising, perhaps most acutely to the classical liberal approaches o f  
Hobbes and Locke. For the ancient Greeks, the se lf is "’fleshed out’ by the city -  
that is, the polis brings about a richer subjectivity -  and politics is the collective 
search for the good life. ” (M cAfee, 2000: 6) This theorising on the ‘se lf is in
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stark contrast to the theorising o f the classical theorists, particularly o f the liberal 
tradition. Classical theorists considered ‘selves’ to be substances o f sorts, which, 
may or may not, according to their desires, engage in the polis. Thus whilst the 
ancient Greeks considered citizenship to be about the combined struggle by 
citizens for the good life, for the classical, liberal theorists, politics is a struggle 
between citizens in a climate o f scarce resourses, and is, therefore, an essentially 
antagonistic process.
Although it is often stated that the classical theories o f citizenship mark the 
clearest opposition to earlier, ancient theorising on citizenship, this process o f  
change within citizenship theorising in fact began during the medieval period. It 
is not my intention here to consider this period in any great depth, but it would be 
wrong to overlook the contribution that Machiavelli, for example, has made to 
thinking within this field. For Machiavelli, citizenship was not a manner o f  being, 
but rather it was a process, or a method by which those individuals deemed to be 
citizens could assert their interests. His notion o f protective republicanism was 
designed to ensure that public order was maintained (Faulks, 2000) and in this 
respect his work reveals a preoccupation with social order. Such a preoccupation 
continued to characterise later theories.
The classical models o f  citizenship did not, therefore, emerge out o f a vacuum. 
Chief proponents o f this classical approach to citizenship, Hobbes and Locke, 
were however, writing in a context that varied greatly from that experienced by 
previous theorists. One key point about the nature o f the ancient Greek 
citizenship that has not been previously mentioned here, is its inherently 
exclusive nature. Ancient Greece was an agrarian, slave-based society in which 
inequality had been naturalised: “citizenship was valued in part because o f its 
exclusive nature and as a mark o f superiority over non-citizens whether they be 
women, slaves or ‘barbarians’." (Faulks, 2000: 18) It was only with the 
development o f the liberal state, the beginnings o f which emerged in the late 
sixteenth century, that citizenship became infused with egalitarian and/or 
inclusive notions.
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Figure 3.a Changing Theories o f ‘Citizenship’
Ancient
Ancient Greek notions of Citizenship
Classical
The ‘Liberal’ thinking of Hobbes & Locke and the 
Liberal ‘Republicanism’ of Rousseau
Modern
R ight-w ing  Neo-
L ibcra lism /C onservative
N eo-L ibcralisin
H ayek , N ozick
N eo-R epublicanism
A ren d t, O ldfie ld , 
B a rb e r , P u tnam
Contemporary
Pluralist Reflexive Post-Structuralist
Kymlicka, Habermas Mouffc
Young
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From the seventeenth century onwards, most o f  the key liberal philosophers who 
contributed to the classical theories o f citizenship were concerned not with 
notions o f self-governance, but with the ‘social contract’ between each individual 
citizen and the state. There were a number o f different strands o f  thinking that 
can be encompassed within this ‘social-contractual’ tradition, ranging from the 
“essentially authoritarian prescriptions o f Hobbes to the essentially libertarian 
prescriptions o f Rousseau.” (Dean et al, 1999: 74) The essential element 
characterising all theories within this tradition however, is an understanding o f  
what is meant by a ‘social contract’. At its core this notion rests upon the idea o f  
a ‘contract’ as a formal agreement between two or more parties, and that by 
entering into a contract, moral and legal obligations come into play. As Heywood 
has stated: “A ‘social contract’ is an agreement made either amongst citizens, or 
between citizens and the state, through which they accept the authority o f  the 
state in return for benefits which only a sovereign power can provide.” 
(Heywood, 1994: 148) Amongst the classical theorists, however, there was little 
agreement surrounding the basis o f  this contract or the obligations involved.
For Hobbes (1973) and Locke (1965), the major question facing citizenship 
theory was how political authority could arise out o f  a society composed o f  
morally free and equal individuals. In short, they concluded that the right to 
govern rested upon the consent o f those being governed. Without such agreement 
between rulers and ruled, Hobbes and Locke feared a barbaric ‘state o f nature’ 
would result. The pursuit o f  power and wealth could not go unchecked or the 
result would be a war o f  all against all. In the light o f  such risks, ‘rational’ 
individuals would wish to enter into a social contract in which an agreed authority 
would be established and order achieved.
From what might be considered to be a somewhat authoritarian position, Hobbes 
argued in Leviathan (1973) that individuals are faced with the bleak choice 
between anarchy and absolutism. His central contention, upon which this rather 
gloomy conclusion is based, is that humans are fundamentally self-interested. 
The social contract that he envisaged involved the complete surrender o f  
individual sovereignty to a powerful political authority. For Hobbes, whose
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writing is likely to have been greatly influenced by his experiences o f  the chaos 
o f  the English Civil War, the existence o f a state, no matter how oppressive it 
may be, was preferable to the instability and disorder o f  the ‘state o f nature’.
It has been suggested, however, that in so theorising the relationship between the 
individual and the state, Hobbes in effect nullified citizenship. Critics o f  Hobbes 
such as Clarke (1996) have argued that in defending the right o f a monarch to 
possess absolute power, Hobbes’ theory terminates citizenship and politics. 
Instead o f  providing a model o f the relationship between the citizen and the state, 
Hobbes was in fact producing a model o f  the relationship between the subject and 
the state. Further, in relation to rights and obligations, Hobbes’ view o f  the 
citizenship is rather ‘thin’. For Hobbes, the state had only one major obligation to 
the individual citizen, to maintain social order. Conversely, the individual citizen 
was obliged to obey the state, but had few rights beyond that o f living in a 
socially ordered society.
This is not, however, to negate Hobbes’ contribution to theorising in this field. In 
many ways his theories mark the transition towards more highly developed 
notions o f  citizenship. Faulks (2000) identifies four key ways in which Hobbes’ 
work has influenced later theorists. Firstly, unlike the medieval notions o f  
citizenship in which rights were extended to groups, it is the individual that is 
seen to be in a direct relationship with the state. Secondly: “Hobbes believed that 
in terms o f  their abilities, as well as in their powers to upset the basis o f  social 
order, individuals were equal.” (Faulks, 2000: 22) This line o f argument 
provided the basis for the link between citizenship and equality that has 
characterised subsequent liberal thinking. Thirdly, although Hobbes had a 
personal preference for a monarchical system, this is not to say that his theory 
perceives the state and the sovereign as indivisible. Finally, by arguing for the 
concentration o f  power in the monarch, Hobbes was arguing for the concentration 
o f  the means o f  violence. This was important because Hobbes was suggesting a 
break from the feudal notion o f divided sites o f  power.
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An alternative, and some would argue, more balanced view o f  citizenship is to be 
found in the work o f Locke. Locke’s conception o f the relationship between the 
individual and the state involved two ‘contracts’. The first was essentially 
Hobbes’ ‘social contract’, in which individuals agreed to sacrifice a degree o f  
their personal freedom in order to ensure social order. The second contract was a 
‘contract o f  trust’, between a society and its government, in which the 
government became authorised to protect the natural rights o f  its citizens. The 
important point to note here is that for the first time there emerges a sense o f the 
reciprocal nature o f  the relationship between citizens and state. It is implied in 
Locke’s work that obedience to the state is conditional upon the state fulfilling its 
side o f the bargain.
As was previously discussed, however, this classical liberal approach with its 
fairly passive view o f citizenship as a series o f  rights possessed by the individual, 
stands in contrast to the more ancient approaches which saw citizenship as being 
a more active process engaged upon by citizens as part o f a republic. At this point 
it is interesting to consider the work o f Rousseau (1913) because his Liberal 
Republicanism is often considered to stand apart from the liberalism o f Hobbes 
and Locke on precisely this basis, that his is a view  o f a more active citizenship. 
At first glance, Rousseau’s theories do seem to be a little more optimistic than 
those o f  Hobbes and Locke, particularly with regard to his views on human 
nature. For Rousseau, in contrast to the views o f Hobbes and Locke, government 
should be based upon active citizenship, what he termed the ‘general w ill’, which 
reflects the common interests o f society over the selfish desires o f  each 
individual. Rousseau’s work is also often considered to represent an important 
first step away from the liberal tradition’s individualistic construction o f  
citizenship since he is clearly concerned with the process by which the desires o f  
the individual can be melded with the needs o f the community.
The extent to which Rousseau, however, should be considered as being an 
important part o f  the communitarian/republican tradition needs to be considered 
carefully. Rousseau did not manage to convincingly resolve the issue o f  
conflicting interests. In acknowledging that the individual will have ‘selfish
63
Chapter 3
desires’ he appears to be simultaneously acknowledging that there will be some 
degree o f  conflict between the individual’s desires and that o f the ‘general w ill’. 
Rousseau, however, side-steps this dilemma by arguing that the ‘general w ill’ is 
synonymous with each individual’s ‘real’ interests. Thus for Rousseau in 
fillfilling their duties and responsibilities, a citizen is obeying their own ‘higher’ 
selves. In this quest to meld the desires o f  the individual with that o f  the 
community, Rousseau arguably negates individual rights. In his famous dictum 
Rousseau stated that ignorance or selfishness might blind individuals to the fact 
that the general will embodies the desires o f  their ‘higher selves’, under such 
circumstances it would become necessary to be ‘forced to be free’. Critics have 
pointed to the fact that such ideas seem to be at odds with the notion o f  
government by consent. Ultimately, therefore, despite the apparently optimistic 
start to Rousseau’s theorising, his conclusions point to a much more pessimistic 
perception o f human nature. When Rousseau states that a ‘higher’ body or 
intellect, in the person o f the ‘lawgiver’, must determine the rules o f a society he 
is essentially mistrustful o f the individual’s capacity to determine the future 
democratically. This last point must bring into some doubt the extent to which 
Rousseau was really proposing an ‘active’ form o f  citizenship.
In essence then, what a consideration o f  both the classical ‘liberal’ model o f  
citizenship and Rousseau’s Liberal Republicanism provides is a view o f  a passive 
citizenship. According to Burchell (1995):
In the most common form o f  this story it is explained that with the 
rise o f  market society in early modem Europe the (...) ‘active ’ 
civic ideal was progressively replaced by a (...) 'passive ’ or 
‘liberal ’ ideal which crucially weakened or distorted the vitality o f  
the original civic impulse (...) (p.541)
Even Rousseau’s conception o f  the citizen, which was, in many respects, an 
attempt to rejuvenate the ancient model, was a corrupted version o f  the latter 
because, in the end, it relied upon an enforced return to ancient civic rectitude. 
Rousseau’s model is essentially both anti-libertarian, and utopian. This 
utopianism in Rousseau’s theorising can be seen to have an interesting parallel in
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the work o f Marx. Marx shared with Rousseau a utopian vision o f  a society in 
which each individual can achieve his/her ‘higher’ self. Whist he was heavily 
influenced by Rousseau, however, Marx did not agree the earlier theorist’s work 
regarding how this ‘fully developed’ society could be achieved.
Chapter 3
On the one hand, he notes, Rousseau’s version is founded on a 
conception o f  a  civic space dominated by the sphere o f  public 
altruism; on the other hand, the stuff from which Rousseau’s 
citizens had o f necessity to be created is the privatised bourgeois 
self o f  market society. Famously, Marx’s solution to Rousseau’s 
contradiction is the utopia without contradictions: the Communist 
societies in which the stunted and divided personalities o f  societies 
based on the division o f labour have at last been overcome. (...) 
O f course, to replace a contradictory utopia with a utopia without 
contradictions may be accounted no solution at all. (Burchell, 
1995: 548.)
Marx can thus be criticised for providing an equally unrealistic utopian vision o f  
society. His critique o f  Rousseau and the ‘liberal’ model o f  citizenship is, 
nevertheless, important because it highlights the classical theorists’ failure to 
engage with the issue o f  the inequitable distribution o f resources. For Rousseau, 
for example: ‘‘the nature o f  the authority vested in the state by the general will 
should at best temper rather than redress the imbalance o f  power between the 
poor and the rich.” (Dean et al: 1999: 75.)
This thorny issue o f the extent to which citizenship should aim to reduce social 
inequality has continued to plague citizenship theorists. Later, ‘modem’, theorists 
such as Rawls, Marshall and Berlin have followed on from the ‘liberal’ tradition 
o f Hobbes and Locke, but have focused specifically upon this problem o f social 
inequality identified by Marx. The general approach taken by these three theorists 
I have termed Social Liberalism. For these thinkers, a distinction should be made 
between absolute destitution/poverty and social inequality. In effect, the Social 
Liberalist approach is an attack on poverty but a legitimation o f inequality 
according to a system o f  meritocracy. That is not to say that all Social Liberals 
are concerned to the same extent with these issues, there are some important 
distinctions between their approaches: Rawls’ work is essentially an attempt to
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re-work social contract theory, whilst countering the Marxist critique amongst 
other issues. The work o f T.H. Marshall ([1963] 1998) on the other hand, also 
acknowledges the inherent tension between an egalitarian notion o f citizenship 
and the economic inequality that is a recognised part o f capitalism, but marks a 
more sustained shift away from the ‘liberal’ model o f  citizenship in search o f  
solutions to this problem. It is the argument here and in chapter 7, however, that 
it is Berlin’s work that represents the most convincing and subsequently 
influential Social-Liberal approach because o f his concern with issues o f  
pluralism.
Whilst the Social-Liberalist approach to citizenship has proven to be the most 
influential in terms o f  contemporary theorising, precisely because o f its focus 
upon the issue o f inequitable outcomes, that is not to say that all theorists have 
agreed that social inequality should be a concern within citizenship theorising. 
Indeed, almost at the same time as the Social-Liberal approach was being 
developed, two rival approaches emerged, the first being Conservative N eo- 
Liberalism and the second being Neo-Republicanism. Whilst it is not my 
intention here to go into any great depth on either o f these approaches since they 
have had significantly less impact than Social Liberalism, it would be wrong to 
over-look these theories completely for they both provide interesting arguments 
in opposition o f the idea that social issues should be allowed to impact on the 
civil sphere.
Conservative Neo-Liberalism is to be found in the work o f authors such as Hayek 
(1944) and Nozick (1974) and whilst it is tempting to suggest that this approach 
has not been o f  long-term significance theoretically, that is not to say that there 
have been no real consequences o f  the approach on peoples’ lives. The Thatcher 
government o f the 1980’s was highly influenced by what might be considered to  
be the more ‘populist’ form o f this Conservative Neo-Liberalism, namely the 
‘New  Right’.
The dominant characteristic o f  the Conservative Neo-Liberal approach is an
intense opposition to the idea o f  social rights. Hayek (1944) believed that
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inequalities affecting an individual’s private life are both inevitable and desirable 
within a free-market-economy. Democracy, he believed, had certain useful 
properties but it should only be allowed to function in those areas o f life that are 
not determined by the market. Nozick (1974) took this one step further, stating 
that any attempt to seek social justice via democratic means, is an infringement o f  
civil rights. The state should act only as a ‘night-watchman’, providing security, 
but in the most inconspicuous way possible and it should not be directly 
concerned with the material welfare o f  its citizens since this would inevitably 
mean that it was interfering in relation to the market’s role as distributor o f  
resources.
Before moving to consider Neo-Republicanism, however, there is one final point 
that should be raised concerning Conservative Neo-Liberalism and that is that it 
is often claimed by those who adhere to the principles o f  his approach that it is 
based upon a form o f citizenship akin to Rousseau’s vision o f  ‘active citizenship’. 
Setting aside the whole issue o f whether or not Rousseau’s model is really one o f  
active citizenship, there are also reasons to question Conservative N eo- 
Liberalism’s credentials with regard to active citizenship. As previously 
mentioned, successive Conservative administrations o f  the 1980’s and 1990’s 
drew heavily upon this Conservative Neo-Liberalism. Repeated attempts were 
made by the government at this time to reduce the state’s role in the funding and 
provision o f  welfare for its citizens in an effort to redefine the state in accordance 
with N ozick’s ‘night-watchman’ principle. Further, the idea o f  an ‘active citizen’ 
who was both individually and socially responsible and for whom state help was 
only a ‘last resort’ was an idea favoured by Margaret Thatcher ([1988] 1989) and 
Douglas Hurd (1988). The ‘active citizen’, it was claimed, would take 
responsibility for themselves and for their families. Beyond this, philanthropic 
activities were also encouraged in order to reduce the need for the state to provide 
for the welfare needs o f the less fortunate (Hurd 1988, Thatcher, [1988] 1989). At 
the same time, active citizenship also became associated with the consumer 
culture. To be an active citizen meant asserting one’s rights within the market as 
consumers, with such an ideology applying even to public services.
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The central problem with this approach, however, was that it both ignored and at 
the same time exacerbated the problem o f  material inequality. Individuals who 
failed to live up to the ideals o f active citizenship were increasingly stigmatised 
as being either ‘work-shy’ or part o f  Charles Murray’s (1994) ‘underclass’ if they 
failed to take responsibility for their own welfare, or ‘second order’ citizens if 
they failed to act in a philanthropic manner for the welfare o f all (Dwyer, 2000). 
The Conservative Neo-Liberals overlooked the fact that many disadvantaged 
groups did not have the resources to fulfil the responsibilities o f ‘active 
citizenship’. As will be discussed later in this chapter, this approach stands in 
stark contrast to the approach taken by the Social-Liberals who whilst not 
proposing an entirely egalitarian system o f equality o f outcome, certainly 
envisaged a considerably larger role for the state in guaranteeing those 
universally held rights that made such inequalities more tolerable and which 
enable active citizenship.
A truer sense o f  active citizenship is to be found in the Neo-Republican approach. 
This approach also cites Rousseau’s republican ideas as inspiration and believes 
in the importance o f commitment and participation in public life. The main 
difference between Conservative Neo-Liberalism and the Neo-Republican 
approach, however, is that the Neo-Republicans reject the idea o f the private 
pursuit o f  interest that so characterises the N ew  Right accounts o f citizenship. For 
authors such as Arendt (1958) rather than self-interest, what is actually at stake is 
public interest. At the heart o f  this approach is a fairly radical theory o f  
citizenship as participation in the public domain o f civil society, the challenge 
being to “preserve as much o f  the autonomy o f  the political field  as possible, to 
prevent politics from becoming privatistic or statist.” (Delanty, 2000: 33) In 
relation to the issue o f social inequality what this approach is therefore arguing is 
not that social inequality does not exist, but rather that the social issue should not 
intrude upon what must be a purely political domain.
Active citizenship, for the Neo-Republicans is about participation not just rights 
and duties. This was the central idea o f  authors such as Arendt (1958) and later, 
Oldfield (1990) and it was most powerfully expressed in Barber’s (1984) idea o f
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‘strong democracy’. Democracy, he claims, must be taken out o f the hands o f the 
elites and given back to citizens: “(...) strong democracy transforms conflict. It 
turns dissensus into an occasion for mutualism and private interest into an 
epistemological tool for public thinking." (Barber, 1984: 151) A  slightly less 
radical approach is taken by Putnam (1993) who claims that the value o f  
participation in civil society is not the ability to overcome conflict, but is instead, 
to promote the values o f trust, commitment and solidarity that allow democracy 
to flourish (Delanty, 2000).
Critics o f  this approach have suggested however, that the problem with all o f  the 
Neo-Republican theories is that they underestimate the level o f conflict that 
occurs within civil society on the basis o f  different identities and social 
inequalities and which must bring into some doubt the idea that solidarity is 
something that can be easily achieved. To this extent the approach may be 
somewhat utopian. There are, arguably, more profound difficulties with the 
approach however, and these stem from the Neo-Republican notion that 
citizenship should best be viewed as a commitment to achieving an unspecified 
common goal. The first problem is that in stressing the need for citizens to 
commit to participation some Neo-Republicans advocate fairly authoritarian 
measures to ensure citizens do actually participate. Oldfield (1990) states that it 
may be necessary for the citizen to be 'shamed, disciplined and sometimes 
terrorised into living “civic virtue” (...)' (p.47) By arguing thus, Oldfield opens 
himself up to the same criticisms that have been directed at Rousseau for 
negating the rights o f the individual. The second problem is that the N eo- 
Republicans prioritise the actual process o f  participation over the substance o f the 
common goal. Thus, whilst it is undoubtedly true to say that this approach 
represents an important precursor o f later models o f  citizenship as ‘engagement’ 
(Ellison, 1997, 2000), the Neo-Republican view  o f citizenship fails to adequately 
theorise the nature o f the rights being actively sought. The reliance upon 
somewhat substantive rationality within, not just the Neo-Republican approach 
but also wider citizenship theorising, is something that is only now being 
seriously reconsidered. As McLeod (1998) has commented from a philosophical 
perspective: “The typical noninstrumentalist position, by contrast, would be that
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for the action in the conclusion to be one it is rational for the agent to perform, it 
must serve an objective it is rational for the agent to pursue ( ...^ ’(paragraph 1) 
As will be discussed at some length later within this chapter and in chapter 7, 
understanding the nature o f  the contested citizenship is key to understanding the 
nature o f participation.
Modern/Social-Liberal Theories of Citizenship
Rawls
Since the publication o f his work entitled “A Theory o f Justice” in 1971, John 
Rawls’ ideas have inspired many subsequent theorists, whether they are 
sympathetic or critical o f his theories. Rawls’ credentials as ‘torch-bearer’ o f  the 
liberal tradition o f citizenship theorising, stems from his continuing use o f the 
classical liberal theorists’ idea that the ‘social contract’ is at the heart o f  social 
order. Rawls significantly diverges from earlier theorising, however, in two 
regards. The first is with regard to the extent to which he considers the liberal 
concept o f  a society based upon a shared state o f  ‘higher being’ in which true 
happiness for all is the desired goal, to be achievable. The second is with regard 
to his concerns with social justice and egalitarianism.
To understand Rawls’ notion o f  citizenship it is vital to consider his discussion 
upon the rights o f free and equal individuals, which forms the central part o f his 
theory o f  social co-operation. The central aspect o f  his theory is the idea o f  
‘justice as fairness’:
In justice as fairness, social unity is understood by starting with 
the conception o f  society as a system o f co-operation between free 
and equal persons. Social unity and the allegiance o f  citizens to 
their common institutions are not founded on their all affirming 
the same conception o f the good, but on their publicly accepting a 
political conception o f  justice to regulate the basic structure o f  
society. (Rawls, [1985] 1998: 70)
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There are several key points arising from the previous quotation. Firstly, for 
Rawls, the notion o f ‘justice as fairness’ is not intended to be a comprehensive 
moral doctrine, but rather a method for achieving an over-lapping consensus. 
Rawls ([1985] 1998) rejects the earlier liberal idea that all rational and well- 
informed individuals will have the same sense o f  what constitutes the ‘good’. 
‘Justice as fairness’: “must allow for a diversity o f  doctrines and the plurality o f  
conflicting, and indeed incommensurate, conceptions o f the good. ” (p.54) Having 
said this, however, Rawls was faced with the problem o f  how such diverse goals 
could be attained though co-operation and yet still benefit all?
To solve this problem Rawls employs a somewhat abstract political theory o f  
democratic citizenship in which ‘political justice’ is the desired goal. To begin 
with, Rawls hypothesises a situation in which people have to assume a ‘veil o f  
ignorance’ in which they must not know the true nature o f  their position in the 
inherently unequal society. Having assumed this ‘veil o f  ignorance’, and the 
imaginary position o f equality, individuals will “evolve from their basic intuitive 
ideas o f  cooperation in a democratic society a framework o f  political justice. ” 
(Shafir, 1998: 7) The resulting concept o f political justice, or ‘social contract’, is 
made up from two principles:
(1.) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme o f  
equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
a similar scheme for all. (2.) Social and economic inequalities are 
to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions o f  fa ir equality o f  
opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit o f  the 
least advantaged members o f society. (Rawls, [1985] 1998: 56)
Rawls also states that (1) takes priority over (2). Thus, the first stage o f ‘justice as 
fairness’ w ill always be to ensure that the basic liberties o f  all have been 
safeguarded and that the rights o f  the least advantaged should always be the main 
consideration in a just society. After this, principle (2) can be viewed as the 
‘difference principle’ and amounts to a call for a meritocratic society in which 
there is equal opportunity to be unequal, providing that any resulting inequalities 
work to the advantage o f the least advantaged members o f  society. I would
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suggest that this marks Rawls’ response to criticisms directed towards the earlier 
liberal thinkers in respect o f their failure to take sufficient account o f  the 
inequalities that characterise capitalist societies.
The second part o f Rawls’ political theory o f democratic citizenship is concerned 
with the notion o f identity. As Shafir (1998) has noted, Rawls makes a distinction 
between an individual’s private and public identity:
Since rights are attached to an individual’s public identity as a 
free and equal citizen and not to one o f the features that determine 
her identity, such as religion or nationality, she is free to change 
her view o f the good life (eg. convert from one religion to another) 
without being deprived o f  these rights, (p.8)
This distinction between public and private identities allows for the toleration o f  
diversity and for the emergence o f an overlapping consensus despite oppositional 
doctrines. Here again, however, Rawls’ theory rests upon his notion o f the 
reasonable individual, for in order for this over lapping consensus to be 
sustained, citizens must take into account the need for co-operation and must not 
make excessive demands.
It is this final point that has provided the basis o f  much o f the criticism that has 
been directed against Rawls’ theory. M ost critics o f  Rawls have highlighted the 
normative nature o f his theory and have questioned his faith in the ability o f  
rational individuals to co-operate on the basis o f  mutual respect. Rawls him self 
acknowledged this problem with his approach in later work (see Rawls, 1993), 
but by the time he came to re-consider his position, the issue had been ‘taken 
over’ somewhat by the more pluralist/multiculturalist perspectives. To highlight a 
further problem with Rawls’ approach, I would add that his definition o f  co­
operation appears to rely upon a notion o f  competency, a term that is far from un­
problematic:
(...) since we wish to start from the idea o f  society as a fair system 
o f  co-operation, we assume that persons as citizens have all the
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capacities that enable them to be normal and fully co-operating 
members o f  society. (Rawls, [1985] 1998: 60)
The implications o f this notion o f competency will be re-considered in chapter 7. 
Marshall
Although it is not my intention to say much more about this notion o f competency 
at this point, it is interesting to note that it also underpins much o f  the theorizing 
o f  T.H. Marshall. T.H. Marshall was greatly influenced by the writings o f Alfred 
Marshall, the economist. Alfred Marshall provided a very similar definition o f  
citizenship to that o f Rawls, in the respect that he regarded citizenship to be a 
status that expressed the ability, or the competence to be a member o f  society. 
This definition was to greatly influence the writings o f T.H.Marshall ([1963] 
1998) who wrote that:
(...) societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create 
an image o f an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be 
measured and towards which aspiration can be directed, (p.102)
Turner (1986) has pointed out that in many respects Marshall’s work fits 
comfortably into a liberal democratic tradition, particularly with regard to 
Marshall’s emphasis upon equality o f opportunity whilst at the same time 
promoting universally held rights as the way o f making the resulting inequalities 
o f  outcome, more tolerable. Evidence for this is to be found within “Citizenship 
and Social Class” in which Marshall ([1963] 1998) makes clear his faith in the 
capacity o f education as the basis o f a meritocracy:
The right o f  the citizen in this process o f  selection and mobility is 
the right to equality o f  opportunity. Its aim is to eliminate 
hereditary privilege. In essence it is the equal right to display and 
develop differences, or inequalities; the equal right to be 
recognised as unequal. (...) the final outcome is a structure o f  
unequal status fairly apportioned to unequal abilities (...) (p.109)
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Further, he states that the status differences that result from this educational 
meritocracy can be regarded as legitimate in terms o f citizenship, provided that 
‘they do not cut too deep’. It is his level o f  concern for those experiencing 
poverty, however, that marks his theoiy as significantly different from earlier 
liberal theories.
In the work o f  Marshall, the concept (citizenship) was developed 
to answer a problem in liberalism. In capitalism, liberal values 
were successful in emphasising freedoms and individualism, but 
there was no easy answer to critics who pointed out that the 
classic freedoms (...) were ineffective tokens for the majority o f  
the population who lived in poverty. (Turner, 1993a: 176-7)
Marshall was, therefore, concerned with protecting individuals from the 
vicissitudes o f  capitalism. He believed that by developing the concept o f  
citizenship at both a practical and a theoretical level, it might be possible to 
remove or reduce some o f  the inequalities generated by the capitalist market 
system. As authors such as Dwyer (2000) and Mead (1997) have highlighted, 
however, what clearly indicates that Marshall w as not a social democrat as is 
often claimed, is that he was not ‘about’ social reform in a Marxist respect. 
Marshall’s intention was only to moderate the worst excesses o f  capitalism  
through the promotion o f  the idea o f  citizenship and in so doing to only modify, 
rather than remove, the social class system. As Mead (1997) has commented: "In 
part, equal citizenship compensates for social inequality and makes egalitarian 
social reform less imperative. ” (p.198)
Having stated Marshall’s overall aim, however, the question o f how he thought 
that his notion o f  citizenship would achieve the goal o f  protecting individuals 
from the vicissitudes o f the capitalist system, remains. Marshall began his 
theorizing by an historical analysis o f  the development o f  citizenship. According 
to  his theory, there are three major components o f  citizenship, namely, civil, 
political and social rights. In his essay “Citizenship and Social Class”, Marshall 
([1963] 1998) demonstrated how over the centuries these three elements o f  
citizenship have developed at their own pace and often disproportionately, to the 
extent that “it is only in the present century (...) that the three runners have come
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abreast o f  one another.” (p.95) Thus, the 18th century, according to Marshall was 
characterised by the development o f  civil rights; the 19th century by the 
development o f  political rights; and the 20th century by the development o f social 
rights.
It is not my intention here to go into very great depth surrounding Marshall’s 
definitions o f  civil and political rights since his understanding o f  these rights did 
not differ from widely held understandings o f these terms. In brief however, civil 
rights for Marshall, included such things as liberty, freedom o f speech, equality 
before the law and the right to own property. Political rights amounted to 
universal suffrage and more vaguely, the right to access the decision making 
process. It was his concept o f ‘social rights’ that really represented his 
contribution to citizenship debates, however, and moved citizenship theory 
beyond more ‘historical’ definitions o f  citizenship.
According to Marshall ([1963] 1998) then, the basis o f  his notion o f social rights 
stemmed back to the older Poor Law (pre-1834) which was the “last remains o f a 
system which tried to adjust real income to the social needs and status o f  the 
citizen and not solely to the market value o f his labour...[But] by the Act o f  1834 
the [new] Poor Law renounced all claim to trespass on the territory o f  the wages 
system, or to interfere with the forces o f  the free market.” (Marshall, p.99-100) 
So, the 19th century had actually marked a backwards step with regard to social 
rights. In fact, according to Marshall, the Workhouse and the minimal social 
rights that remained post-1834, became detached from the status o f ‘citizenship’ 
because paupers forfeited their civil right o f freedom (in practice), and, by law, 
they lost their political rights on entering the Workhouse. In addition, according 
to Marshall ([1963] 1998), a profound sense o f  ‘stigma’ clung to poor relief and 
“expressed the deep feelings o f  a people who understood that those who accepted 
relief must cross the road that separated the community o f  citizens from the 
outcast company o f  the destitute.” (p. 100)
For Marshall, then, the advent o f  proper social rights, which began to emerge in 
relation to education in the late 19th century and with the 20th century welfare
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state, were vital steps in countering the attack upon social rights that had occurred 
in the 19th century, and an important advancement in the notion o f citizenship. 
Indeed, his vision is somewhat utopian in this regard for, to use his much quoted 
comment, Marshall ([1963] 1998) believed that social rights represented: “the 
whole range from the right to a modicum o f economic welfare and security to the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life o f  a civilised 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society.": (p.94) This rather 
‘w oolly’ definition o f social rights has been criticised for its lack o f clarity with 
regard to the levels o f economic welfare and security envisaged. Marshall (1972) 
however, did clarify his position by stating that a distinction should be made 
between absolute destitution/poverty and social inequality. In effect, he argues, 
his approach is an attack on poverty but a legitimation o f inequality according to 
a system o f meritocracy. Arguably, therefore, it is not the ‘woolliness’ o f  
Marshall’s definition o f social rights that is the problem, but rather the manner in 
which he apparently overlooks major power differentials within society that 
affect individuals’ chances o f  success, and which, therefore, bring into some 
doubt the idea that we live in a meritocracy.
Equally importantly, however, Marshall’s theory has also been criticised as 
having normative connotations, for the notion o f a ‘civilised being’ carries 
implications for an image o f an ‘ideal citizen’. This point will be considered in 
more depth within later sections o f this chapter and within chapter 7. In addition, 
Delanty (2000) has usefully identified a further 5 major challenges to Marshall’s 
concept o f  citizenship. Firstly, there is the challenge o f  cultural rights. Writers 
such as Kymlicka ([1995] 1998) and Young ([1989] 1998, 1990), to name but 
tw o, have highlighted those types o f exclusion that cannot be accommodated 
within a model o f  social rights. Such discussions have led to the development o f  
‘the politics o f  difference’. Secondly, there is the challenge o f  globalisation and 
‘multiple modernities’. As Delanty (2000) comments, drawing upon Mann 
(1987): “(...) there is no singly developmental logic by which citizenship unfolds 
along a historical trajectory.” (p.18) The worldwide experience o f  citizenship 
has been very diverse. Thus, for example, in the USA social rights have been 
slow  to develop, whilst in the former USSR there was a strong recognition o f
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social rights. As Delanty highlights, the irony is that totalitarianism is not 
incompatible with social rights, take for example the experience o f Chile under 
the rule o f  Pinochet. Marshall’s framework for considering the development o f  
civil, political and social rights can be considered therefore, to be flawed once 
applied outside o f  the UK. Further, as Roche (2000), has highlighted, whilst not 
rejecting out-of-hand the continuing relevance o f  Marshall’s analysis as a point o f  
reference, nevertheless, globalisation can be seen to have led to the current crisis 
in a number o f national welfare states, thus bringing into question the manner in 
which Marshall’s notion o f social rights can be sustained:
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Firstly globalization tends to generate unemployment, and thus 
simultaneously raises the cost o f  welfare while undermining the 
tax base necessary to pay for it. Secondly although globalization 
depends to a significant extent on national and internationally 
based social compacts, arrangements and cohesion, (particularly 
between classes association with power in the realm o f  the state 
and the economy and their hegemonic influence over subordinate 
classes and groups), nonetheless it stimulates forces which are 
destabilizing and destructive o f  these national and international 
social orders. ” (p.13-14)
Thirdly, Marshall largely ignored the importance o f  participation as a dimension 
o f  citizenship. Citizenship, it has been argued, is not simply a strategy o f the 
ruling classes with which to control the masses. Citizenship can be an 
empowering concept and has precisely come about due to centuries o f  popular 
protest and mobilisation. Giddens (1982) has also criticised Marshall on this 
point stating that: “The extension o f citizenship rights in Britain as in other 
societies, was in substantial degree the result o f  the efforts o f  the underprivileged 
to improve their lot.” (p.171) This is an important point because it suggests that 
on many occasions the notion o f citizenship may undeipin/form the basis o f  
social movement activity and as such must be considered as a ‘contested 
concept’. This issue is one o f  considerable current interest and will considered in 
more depth in chapter 7.
Fourthly, there is the challenge posed by the de-coupling o f citizenship and 
nationality. Marshall’s notion o f citizenship was dependent upon a firm link
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existing between the nation and the state. For Marshall, the state provided and 
guaranteed rights, whilst the nation was the focus o f identity. Today, according to 
Delanty, we live in a ‘global age’ in which this link can no longer be assumed. 
The development o f  regional governments has caused a shift in sovereignty 
downwards whilst simultaneously, trans-national developments such as the EU 
have shifted governance upwards, away from the nation-state. The need for re­
thinking the ‘social’ aspect o f citizenship, in particular in the light o f  these 
changes to the national, transnational, and in the British case, most centrally the 
European dimension, has been clearly identified by a number o f  authors, but most 
notably by Roche (1987, 1992, 1995, 2000) and by Turner (1993a). Turner 
particularly focuses on the issue o f  international human rights. As an additional 
point here, it has been argued that Marshall’s explicit link between citizenship 
and the nation state has also negatively impacted upon many ethnic groups and 
has, in the case o f  the UK, led to a racialised notion o f  ‘Britishness’. Tariq 
Modood (1992) has said that:
The more distant an individual or group is from a white upper 
middle class British, Christian/agnostic norm, the greater the 
marginality o f  exclusion, (p.54)
Finally, Delanty points to the confluence o f public and private spheres. Marshall 
assumed that there would be separation between these two zones, equating as he 
did the ‘private’ with social class and ‘public’ with the state. For Delanty (2000) 
this was a highly reductionist stance for:
( ...)  there is more to civil society than the culture o f  entitlements 
and the administrative welfare state does not entirely absorb the 
public sphere, which also contains informal networks o f  
organisation and mobilization., (p.20)
Further, Lister (1997a/b), has argued that in maintaining a false public/private 
dichotomy, Marshall’s work has been a factor in the continuing oppression o f  
women. Marshall’s concept o f citizenship relied upon the ideal o f  full male 
employment and overlooked the important role women play in supporting the 
welfare system and the market economy via unpaid domestic work and the
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provision o f care for many o f the vulnerable groups in society, such as elderly 
people and children.
To Delanty and Lister’s challenges to Marshall’s theory can also be added the 
argument put forward by Offe (1984), that Marshall’s notion o f the social rights 
o f citizenship have merely acted to buy o ff dissent and as a form o f crisis 
management for capitalism. Whether this is a correct interpretation o f the 
intentions underpinning the construction o f the welfare state is unclear. It would 
certainly seem that the welfare state has not alleviated inequalities to the extent 
that Marshall envisaged. Further, authors such as Oliver and Heater (1994) have 
highlighted the conflict between social rights and civil/political rights. For Oliver 
and Heater, civil and political rights are ‘first generation rights’, being residual in 
nature. As such, they do not conflict with the underlying values o f the capitalist 
system, indeed they have at times been vital to the success o f this system. Social 
rights, however, are seen as being ‘second generation rights’ and ensuring that 
the necessary financial resources are made available to meet the costs o f  these 
rights is largely a matter o f  political will. Barbalet (1988) has argued similarly, 
pointing to the conditional nature o f social rights and questioning whether such 
rights can truly be regarded as citizenship rights.
Having stated these criticisms, however, it is only right to also note that twenty 
years after writing “Citizenship and Social Class”, Marshall (1981) did respond 
to at least some o f his critics. In this later lecture he focused upon power and 
rights and was essentially concerned to establish which types o f rights would best 
prevent the rise o f authoritarianism. To briefly summarise his argument: he 
believed that political rights could be easily undermined, and that social rights 
had not been designed for the exercise o f power at all, but instead reflect the 
strong individualist element in society in which individuals are best viewed as 
consumers and not as actors. It is only civil rights that, according to Marshall, 
truly relate to the individual as ‘actor’. Such rights, Marshall argues, are 
internalised by each individual at the early stages o f  socialisation. These civil 
rights then permeate the social body making them very difficult to attack and
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these rights can then be used to create groups, movements, associations and as the 
basis o f  social and political pluralism (Isin and W ood, 1999).
Marshall went on to usefully theorize power in relation to the civil rights 
movement in the USA. He concluded that the powerlessness o f Black people in 
the USA was not only due to lack o f rights, but also that the manner in which 
Black people possessed power, made them powerless. According to Marshall 
then, what the leaders o f the Civil Rights movement were calling for was “not for  
power over or redistribution but rather an effective share in the total power o f  
society, which we may now call the politics o f recognition.” (Isin and Wood, 
1999: 31) According to Marshall (1981): “The goal is a new kind o f society, truly 
multiracial or, should that prove impossible, then, some would say, composed o f  
independent and equal racial communities” (p.150) In this way, Marshall 
appears to have anticipated much o f the debate over multiculturalism and the 
politics o f difference, themes taken up most notably by Kymlicka ([1995] 1998) 
and Young (1990).
Berlin
Marshall’s later thinking with regard to the US Civil Rights movement resonates 
clearly with a lesser-known aspect o f  Isaiah Berlin’s work. It seems strange that 
the work o f Berlin (1958) is only very occasionally considered by sociologists, 
considering that his 1958 lecture “Two Concepts o f  Liberty” has very clear 
implications for citizenship theorizing. Berlin’s (1958) first form o f liberty he 
defines as negative liberty:
/  am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human 
being interferes with my activity, (p.7)
His second form o f liberty he terms positive liberty, and he defines this as 
deriving from the “wish on the part o f  the individual to be his own master.” 
(Berlin, 1958: 16) Although at first glance this form o f liberty may not sound 
very different from Berlin’s definition o f negative liberty, his subsequent
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discussion o f the two concepts results in a more distinct account. It becomes clear 
that by positive liberty Berlin was intending the notion o f resource systems that 
enable social actors to engage in active citizenship where they would otherwise 
be constrained. This point is o f considerable importance because for the first time 
within the liberal tradition, Berlin acknowledges fully that such things as lack o f  
material resources can radically reduce the ability o f individuals to engage in 
active citizenship. It is easy to see, therefore, how it can be argued that Berlin’s 
concept o f positive liberty both requires and underpins the idea o f a welfare state 
and advances considerably beyond Marshall’s quite minimal social rights.
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The aspect o f  Berlin’s (1958) work that seems to me to be most interesting, 
however, is not one o f  his two famous concepts o f  liberty but a lesser known 
concept that he defines at the end o f his work “Two Concepts o f Liberty”, albeit 
somewhat indistinctly, as “the desire for recognition” (p.43). In part VI o f this 
work, Berlin considers the ‘search for status’ and the following discussion, it 
seems to me, represents Berlin’s theorizing upon the ‘se lf. Curiously, Berlin’s 
(1958) theorising here is highly reminiscent o f the symbolic interactionist 
perspective o f  authors such as Mead:
(...) I  am a social being in a deeper sense than that o f  interaction 
with others. For am I  not what I am, to some degree, in virtue o f  
what others think and feel me to be? (...) My individual self is not 
something that I can detach from my relationship with others, or 
from those attributes o f  myself that consist in their attitude 
towards me. Consequently, when I demand to be liberated from, 
let us say, the status o f  political or social dependence, what I 
demand is an alteration o f the attitude towards me o f those whose 
opinions and behaviour help to determine my own image o f  
myself, (p.41)
What Berlin (1958) appears to be arguing here is that what those who are 
oppressed are demanding is not simply freedom o f action, or equality o f social 
and economic status/opportunity, the importance o f which he does not overlook, 
but the right to be regarded as “fully human” (p.42). In a very interesting article 
on the writings o f Berlin, Gary Reed (1980) discusses the importance o f this
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third, somewhat ‘hybrid’ form o f freedom and uses the idea o f the ‘stranger’ to 
explain the concept:
A free person is then one who is a member o f the kin; not a 
stranger. A second metaphor introduces the idea o f liberation, o f  
making free, by speaking o f a person born a stranger as if  he had 
grown up with the kin. This metaphor enables people to do by 
choice what at first only nature could do by birth: make a person 
free. A liberated person is one who is no longer a stranger, 
whether a stranger within (a slave) or without (an enemy). At this 
stage simple release o f a stranger from captivity is not yet called 
liberation, making free; a former captive remains a stranger 
unless by admission to membership he is made free, (p.371)
Although the terminology here may seem somewhat removed from present day 
concerns, the idea that an “unappropriated stranger is simply a slave without a 
master” (Reed, 1980: 372) can, I suggest, be useiully employed when 
considering the position o f many disadvantaged, stigmatised or exploited groups 
within society.
The other useful aspect o f  Berlin’s theorising on this third form o f liberty, is the 
manner in which he critiques the normative and monistic tendencies o f  other neo­
liberal thinkers such as Rawls. Berlin considered other neo-liberals to have relied 
too heavily upon universalistic definitions o f ‘what is right/good’ and in so doing 
had failed to resolve the dilemma o f what happens when people disagree about 
what constitutes the right or good. For writers such as Gray (1995) and Galipeau 
(1994), it is precisely this rejection o f  the universalistic philosophies favoured by 
other liberal thinkers, that is the basis o f  Berlin’s unique and important 
contribution to the field.
For Berlin, the idea, as found in the work o f both Rawls and Marshall, that there 
can be a universally accepted image o f ‘ideal citizenship’ against which “all 
human projects should contribute or tend, and against which they might be 
evaluated” (Gray, 1995: 8) is flawed, for as Kenny (2000) has written: “The 
principle o f  incommensurability suggests that there is no external standard, no 
‘super-value ’, according to which values can be rationally ranked. ” (p.1028) It is
Chapter 3
82
in this way that Berlin introduces the idea o f ‘value-pluralism’ and because o f  
this, I would suggest, his work should be seen to be, to an even greater extent 
than that o f  the later Marshall, an important precursor o f  more contemporary 
accounts o f  citizenship. Berlin’s work will be considered again as it relates to the 
findings o f this research, in chapter 7.
Contemporary Accounts o f Citizenship
The Pluralist/Multicultural Accounts
In the traditional liberal conception, as has already been discussed, citizenship is 
seen to be the embodiment o f universalist ideals. In this conception o f  
citizenship, all individuals who can legitimately claim to be citizens o f  a state are 
supposed to possess equal rights and equal responsibilities. For pluralist thinkers, 
however, this notion o f citizenship can act as a “powerful exclusionary 
discourse” (Faulks, 2000: 83), and needs modifying if  it is to be sustained within 
plural societies. The general approach taken by the pluralist thinkers is, therefore, 
that in addition to individual rights o f  citizenship, special group rights are also 
required. What is less clear is the extent to which some o f the chief proponents o f  
this approach to citizenship theorising agree about the form that this pluralist 
citizenship should take. Chief amongst the pluralist thinkers are Will Kymlicka 
and Iris Marion Young, for this reason I have chosen to focus my attention upon 
their work. This is not to say, however, that they are the only theorists working 
within this field, the work o f Pakulski (1997) and Stevenson (1997a/b), for 
example, is also o f  importance. Nevertheless, Kymlicka and Young are widely 
held to have made the most powerful contributions to this approach. Both 
Kymlicka and Young take as the basis o f  their theorising a critical stance towards 
the universalist notion o f citizenship. Both theorists perceive that in pluralist 
societies it is essential to consider group rights within the citizenship framework. 
Whilst proposing a relatively similar critique o f  universalist notions o f  
citizenship, there are differences, however, between the models o f  citizenship 
employed by Kymlicka and Young. The next section o f  this chapter will provide 
a critical appraisal o f their separate approaches.
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Kymlicka’s defence o f group rights is, he claims, firmly rooted in a liberal 
conception o f citizenship. In support o f this statement he has developed a 
multiculturalist perspective that requires social institutions to be reformed in a 
manner that allows for the “accommodation o f  the cultural distinctiveness o f  
multiple ethnic groups in a single state"  (Shafir, 1998:18) Such a perspective 
demands that the rights that have previously been bestowed only upon the 
individual citizen, as in liberalism, be extended to groups as well. This, Kymlicka 
claims would lead to a differentiated citizenship and should be seen as an 
extension of, rather than a threat to the liberal conception o f  citizenship.
To this end, Kymlicka proposes that there are three types o f differentiated 
citizenship: in particular he states that it is important to distinguish between the 
closely related representation rights and polyethnicity and the altogether 
different, self-government rights. For Kymlicka ([1995] 1998), group
representation rights generally take the form o f a demand for inclusion by 
disadvantaged groups:
Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger 
society, and the recognition and accommodation o f  their 
‘difference ’ is intended to facilitate this. (...) It has always been 
recognized that a majoritarian democracy can systematically 
ignore the voices o f  minorities. In cases where minorities are 
regionally concentrated, democratic systems have responded by 
intentionally drawing the boundaries o f  federal units, or o f  
individual constituencies, so as to create seats where the minority 
is in a majority. Proponents o f  special representation simply 
extend this logic to nonterritorial groups who may equally be in 
need o f representation (for example, ethnic minorities, women, the 
disabled.) (p. 169)
Similarly, according to Kymlicka, demands for polyethnic rights most often take 
the form o f requests for special rights to facilitate the participation o f  certain 
groups within the mainstream o f  society. Kymlicka cites, as an example, the case 
o f Sikhs who wished to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police but who faced 
problems because they were not allowed to wear turbans as part o f  their uniform. 
Modifying an institution such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in order to
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allow Sikhs to integrate into them as fully as possible is, according to Kymlicka, 
an important step in preventing Sikhs from withdrawing from mainstream 
society. Further, according to Kymlicka ([1995] 1998): “the fact that these men 
wanted to be a part o f  the national police force or the national military is ample 
evidence o f their desire to participate in and contribute to the larger community.” 
(p.170) Thus, in Kymlicka’s opinion, group representation and polyethnicity can 
promote social integration and political unity.
His third form o f differentiated citizenship, self-government, poses, he believes, a 
more “serious challenge to the integrative function o f c itiz e n sh ip (Kymlicka, 
[1995] 1998: 174) The basis o f  his fear is that demands for self-government 
suggest a desire to weaken the notion o f a permanent, unitary, ‘macro’ level 
political community. In other words, demands for self-government are very 
different from demands for representation rights, in which it is seen that certain 
groups are disadvantaged within the political community, or polyethnic rights, 
where there is a need to see the political community as culturally diverse. Instead, 
calls for self-governance suggest that there is more than one political community 
within one state. Such multination states, Kymlicka argues, are inherently 
unstable, since the tendency towards secession will always be strong.
This is not to say that Kymlicka is entirely opposed to secession, however, for he 
believes that where it is viable it may be desirable. In this he draws upon J.S. 
M ills’ argument that a stable liberal democracy will be based upon a nation-state, 
with a single national culture. Nevertheless, he claims that it may not always be 
desirable where the minority group would have problems developing a viable 
nation-state. In such cases, a way o f holding such a multi-nation state together, 
must be found. Unfortunately, as Kymlicka him self admits, it is not easy to find 
such a solution. He does consider, however, that the basis o f unity within states is 
likely to be dependent upon the development o f  a particular form o f  sentiment 
amongst citizens. These sentiments would take the form o f  a desire to be united, 
but at the same time to remain respectful o f  the deep diversity that constitutes 
their state. It must be said, however, that although Kymlicka claims that he is not
felling into the trap o f  proposing an overly legalistic definition o f  citizenship
85
which neglects more socio-cultural factors, in calling for the development o f  
certain ‘sentiments’ on the part o f  citizens, he does appear to be clinging 
somewhat to the normative and monistic liberal notion o f  a common citizenship 
so usefully critiqued by Berlin.
I think that the problem must rest upon Kymlicka’s definitions o f  culture and 
identity. Although he begins his theorising on differentiated citizenship by 
acknowledging that culture need not be tied to membership o f a national group, 
as previously mentioned with regard to representation rights, his subsequent 
theorising on the possible ways o f maintaining unity in a multi-national state, 
suggests that he has become preoccupied with the idea that the choices citizens 
make are meaningful only in the context o f  the nation (Faulks, 2000). In 
theorising thus, Kymlicka is clearly being far too reductionist o f  the complexity 
o f  culture, for the idea o f a national culture often stands in tension to social 
cleavages that can occur within one nation, such as class, gender, sexuality and so 
on.
Further, there is a fundamental flaw in Kymlicka’s understanding o f culture per 
se, for it is not as concrete a phenomenon as his theory suggests. Kymlicka makes 
some rather questionable assumptions about the nature o f culture. The first is that 
he tends to essentialise cultural difference between groups o f people. There are 
undoubtedly, differences between all people, but the manner in which society 
manipulates the concept o f  ‘difference’ in an essentialist manner in order to 
categorise some groups as ‘other’, needs to be problematised. In the first part o f  
his theorising, for example, where he talks about the idea o f  representational 
rights, Kymlicka appears to be making the assumption that differences such as 
gender or dis/ability are necessarily based upon cultural differences. Whilst a 
shared sense o f  cultural identity may be the basis o f  the formation o f  many 
groups, it need not be the basis o f all groups. Equally, to assume that any group 
exists on the basis o f  only one, predominant identity trait, is to essentialise both 
the nature o f  group formation and to be reductionist o f  the complexity o f  
‘identity’. As Fierlback (1998) has commented:
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( ...)  to assert that one simply knows that another person is defined 
predominantly by their culture or specific group traits rather than 
other factors seems as oppressive as refusing to believe that 
cultural characteristics are important at all. (p.99)
The further problem with Kymlicka’s approach is that in proposing group rights 
in a differentiated citizenship, he fails to tackle the problem posed by complex 
cultures. Where cultural groups do exist not all are as distinct and unified as 
Kymlicka appears to suggest. The culture itself may show differences according 
to such as factors as class, or gender. This issue and the contribution o f  
Bourdieu’s to theorising on this point will be considered in more depth in chapter 
7. Equally important, however, and only touched upon by Kymlicka, is the 
problem posed by any ‘illiberal’ cultures that involve cultural practices that 
disadvantage particular members o f the cultural group. Kymlicka fails to explain 
how he believes it to be possible to achieve a multicultural unity based upon 
shared ‘sentiments’ when the cultural practices o f one group are fundamentally in 
conflict with the practices o f another.
A s previously stated, in many respects the goal o f  Iris Marion Young is very 
similar to that o f Kymlicka in that she seeks to critique those theories o f  
citizenship that have tried to suppress group differences. She differs from 
Kymlicka, however, in that she does not seek to develop a modified liberalist 
approach to citizenship, but instead rejects the earlier approach entirely. Central 
to Young’s approach is the argument that the universalistic sense o f citizenship 
that had underpinned liberalism “by separating the public sphere o f 'reason 'from 
the private realm o f ‘desire ’ and the body, elevates the dispassionate notions o f  
‘collective interest ’ and ‘equal citizenship ’ as expressed in the idea o f the ‘civic 
public’ over and against the particularised interests that comprise the aspirations 
o f  groups and individuals.” (Ellison, 1997: 705) The result o f  this liberalist 
approach to citizenship, Young claims, has been to suppress or deny the 
differences between groups in the public realm and instead to demand o f each 
citizen the denial o f their very identities when exercising their rights and duties. 
In other words, as Faulks (2000) has commented, Young perceives liberalism as 
standing “not for equality between different individuals but the domination o f  the
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ideal o f equality over difference: the diversity that characterises society is 
sacrificed in the name o f an abstract and unattainable conception o f  citizenship." 
(p.85)
According to Young this insistence on the part o f  the liberal thinkers that equality 
and liberation can only be achieved by ignoring differences has had three 
oppressive consequences. The first consequence o f  this liberal approach has been 
a focus upon a process o f  assimilation, in which formerly excluded groups are 
brought into the mainstream. So influential has this idea been, that it has largely 
gone un-challenged, even by other pluralist thinkers such as Kymlicka. For 
Young (1990), however, assimilation “always implies coming into the game after 
it has already begun, after the rules and standards have already been set, and 
having to prove oneself according to those rules and standards'' (p.164) 
Needless to say, it is the privileged groups that determine these standards. In so 
doing, however, they genuinely consider themselves to be determining a 
culturally neutral ideal o f  common humanity. This is clearly not the case, for 
norms determined by the dominant group will always be culturally biased. This 
then, according to Young (1990), is the second problem with the liberalist 
approach to citizenship for “the ideal o f  a universal humanity without social 
group differences allows privileged groups to ignore their own group specificity." 
(p .l 65) This, according to Young, leads to the final oppressive consequence o f  
liberalism. The tendency to denigrate any groups that fail to live up to the 
supposedly neutral, but in feet culturally biased standards as set by the privileged 
group, in turn can lead to “an internalised devaluation by members o f  those 
groups themselves. (...) The aspiration to assimilation (thus) helps produce the 
self-loathing and double consciousness characteristic o f  oppression." (Young, 
1990: 165)
The answer to these problems, according to Young, is to reject assimilationist 
ideals entirely and to embrace instead what she terms the ‘politics o f  difference’. 
This new politics would, she argues take the form o f a rejection o f the 
“appropriation o f  a universal subject position by socially privileged groups" by
which they force “those they define as different outside the definition o f  full
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humanity and citizenship.” (Young, 1990: 169) Echoing Goffinan’s notion o f  
‘stigma’, Young proposes that the root cause o f this tendency on the part o f  the 
dominant group to essentialise difference, is their fear o f making the boundaries 
permeable between themselves and those they determine to be ‘others’.
For Young the alternative to this essentialised notion o f difference is a notion o f  
difference as ‘variety’. In this way group differences can be seen to be merely 
functional means o f comparison between groups, with dominant groups such as 
white people being seen to be just as specific as Black people, men as women, 
homosexuals as heterosexuals and so o a  The other important aspect o f this new  
form o f politics, Young argues, is that it is also a contextualised understanding o f  
difference. According to this argument, depending upon the groups compared and 
the context, differences may become more or less salient. Young (1990) gives the 
following example:
(...) in the context o f  athletics, health care, social service support, 
and so on, wheelchair-bound people are different from others, but 
they are not different in many other respects. Traditional 
treatment o f  the disabled entailed exclusion and segregation 
because the differences between the disabled and the able-bodies 
were conceptualised as extending to all or most capacities, (p. 171)
In many respects, therefore, the great value o f  Young’s work is that it provides us 
with this basis for a more fluid and contextualised notion o f difference. There are, 
however, some problems associated with the manner in which Young then sets 
about utilising her understanding o f  difference to develop a model o f  democracy. 
She states that: I
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I  assert, then, the following principle: a democratic public should 
provide mechanisms fo r  the effective recognition and 
representation o f  the distinct voices and perspectives o f  those o f  
its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such 
group representation implies institutional mechanisms and public 
resources supporting (1) self-organization o f  group members so 
that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective 
understanding o f their collective experience and interests in the 
context o f  the society; (2) group analysis and group generation o f  
policy proposals in institutionalised contexts where decision
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makers are obliged to show that their deliberations have taken 
group perspectives into consideration; and (3) group veto power 
regarding specific policies that effect a group directly, such as 
reproductive rights for women, or land use policy for Indian 
reservations. (Young, 1990:184)
Whilst this may at first glance appear to be an appealing notion o f democracy, it 
would seem, however, that it is based upon a number o f  questionable 
assumptions.
Taking her second point first, since in some respects it is perhaps the least 
problematic, is would nevertheless seem likely that she is being overly optimistic 
here. Many disadvantaged groups have already had experience o f “decision 
makers (being) obliged to show that their deliberations have taken group 
perspectives into consideration”, but have found that this ‘consultation’ takes the 
form o f mere ‘rubber stamping’. This is a point that will be returned to later in 
chapters 6 and 7 in relation to the findings o f  this research. In defence o f  Young’s 
ideas, however, it can be argued that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with her 
notion o f  consultation, it just needs to be put into proper effect.
Point (1) in the schema is more problematic, however, for it is clear that Young 
believes that the self-organisation o f group members in order that they achieve 
collective empowerment is both possible and desirable. Although the work o f  
Bourdieu will be considered in more depth in chapter 7, it is important to note at 
this point that much o f  his work on the nature o f groups appears to contradict 
Young’s work. Firstly, according to Bourdieu (1987), no matter how many 
resources are available to a number o f  individuals occupying similar positions, it 
does not necessarily follow that they will mobilize as a group. In other words, 
simply because a number o f  individuals can be identified by others as being 
‘similar’ in some way, does not mean that they can be categorised as a group or a 
community. Secondly, although Bourdieu would probably agree with Young that 
where groups have mobilized, they gain collective empowerment, he perceives 
risks associated with this process. He highlights the fact that in the process o f  
becoming such a ‘practical group’, chief advocates or spokespeople emerge. He
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concludes that a paradox then arises, for whilst an individual who so identifies 
themselves with a group becomes empowered and gains recognition, they are at 
the same time relegating their individual powers to those who claim to speak on  
behalf o f the group. Collective empowerment may, therefore, mean individual 
disempowerment.
In relation to point (3), here Young clearly falls into the same trap as Kymlicka. 
Giving powers o f veto to groups in relation to policies that directly affect them  
can be a positive step. It may, however, allow for the continuance o f  practices 
and behaviours on the part o f minority groups that may be regarded as illiberal by 
the majority. Both Kymlicka and Young fail to explain how this potential conflict 
could be overcome. This may not be unintentional on their parts, however, for 
ultimately, problems such as this must rest upon ethical dilemmas that are not 
easily resolved. For example, there is an important debate currently taking place 
in the world o f  genetics between geneticists who would like to find ways to 
eliminate congenital deafness, and some D eaf people who oppose the 
development o f  such technologies on the grounds that such moves are akin to 
genocide.1 Whilst it is not my intention to go into any depth on this matter since it 
warrants significantly greater attention than can be afforded here, it is nonetheless 
important to highlight how giving D eaf people the right to veto moves to 
eliminate congenital deafness, immediately sets up a dilemma in relation to the 
rights o f  the unborn child to not be born deaf. In the light o f  such continuing 
debates, it is the argument here that theories that bypass ethical dilemmas need to 
be reconsidered.
Having stated the above there is, however, an even more problematic assumption 
underpinning the idea o f  the ‘politics o f  difference’. The problem is that Young 
(1990) relies upon the idea o f the social group as culturally determined: “A social 
group is a  collective o f  people who have affinity with one another because o f a 
set o f  practices or way o f  life.” (p.186) The problem is that whilst Young does 
admit that other collectives can and do exist on the basis o f  other factors, these
1 For more information on this debate please see: <http'//www.deafgene.info/designer.htm> and related 
links.
Chapter 3
91
she terms interest groups and ideological groups, she does not believe that such 
groups should be allowed specific representation. The reason for this can only be 
that Young is prioritising cultural issues over any other. The tendency on the part 
o f  Young to focus primarily upon issues o f cultural recognition and in so doing 
fail to give sufficient attention to issues o f redistribution, for example, has been 
highlighted by writers such as Nancy Fraser (1997) who states that social 
inequality must still be considered to be one o f the key impediments to a true 
democracy. This aspect o f Young’s work will be considered again in relation to 
the findings o f this research in chapter 7.
It is not entirely surprising, therefore, given the significance o f some o f the 
problems associated with the pluralist account o f citizenship, that alternative 
approaches have emerged. I have chose to focus upon two alternatives to the 
pluralist account. The first approach I have termed a ‘reflexive’ account o f  
citizenship, and is most clearly articulated in the work o f Habermas. This theory 
has been developed to counter the tendency on the part o f  some pluralist thinkers, 
such as Kymlicka, to focus upon citizenship as being based upon nationally held, 
shared ‘sentiments’. This approach highlights the effects that 
globalisation/cosmopolitanism has had upon the notion o f citizenship and calls 
for a more “reflexive transformation o f  existing national conceptions o f  group 
membership.” (Delanty, 2000: 65) The second account is probably best termed 
‘post-structuralist’, and is to be most notably found within the work o f  Mouffe. 
This approach has been developed to challenge the pluralist assumption that 
“individual persons can have singular, integral, altogether harmonious and 
unproblematic identities” or that “collective identities as based on some ‘essence ’ 
or set o f  core features shared by all members o f  the collectivity” (Calhoun, 1994: 
13).do actually exist
The Reflexive Account o f  Habermas
Habermas’ contribution to the citizenship debates begins with his work on the 
political realm, where he distinguishes between the ‘lifeworld’ and the ‘system’. 
Habermas developed the distinction between these two zones o f  action within the
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second volume o f his "Theory o f  Communicative Action". McAfee (2000) 
usefully defines Habermas’ notion o f  the ‘lifeworld’ and the ‘system’ thus:
Chapter 3
( . . .)  the lifeworld (...) consists o f  the background assumptions, 
cultural norms, expectations, and meanings that we use to 
interpret and make sense o f  our experience and to co-ordinate our 
actions with others. The system on the other hand, is society 
conceptualised in terms o f  the division o f  labour and functions 
into separate spheres o f actions and goals (e.g., the banking 
system, the political system, the educational system), each with its 
own predetermined ends and selected means for achieving them.
(p.85)
Habermas (1984) then went on to integrate these two concepts into an analysis o f  
society in which society is seen as both a tlsystem that has to satisfy the 
conditions o f maintenance o f  socio-cultural lifeworlds” and a “systematically 
stabilized nexus o f action o f socially integrated groups.” (p.xxix) Even as he so 
theorized, however, he simultaneously identified an increasing trend towards the 
differentiation, or what he termed the ‘decoupling’ o f the lifeworld and the 
system. Habermas saw this as being the inevitable outcome o f Modernity. In 
particular, he saw this passage to Modernity as being characterised by the move 
away from more traditional forms o f society towards a society characterised by 
various aspects o f life becoming increasingly independent o f the normative 
structures in society, such as traditions, culture and kinship.
In some ways, Habermas perceived this move towards Modernity to be a good 
thing, for it had ended the authoritarian traditions and conventions that had 
previously governed society and led to a more rational society o f  
‘postconventional’ morality. Habermas did not consider this move to be without 
risk, however, for these changes rendered the lifeworld vulnerable to colonisation 
by the system, as reasoning previously only appropriate to systems is applied to 
social life. The result, Habermas feared, was that Modernity has not made society 
more just. McAfee (2000) summarises Habermas’ concerns thus:
While the prerogatives o f  citizenship have been expanded to more
and more people, the tasks o f  citizenship have been distorted into
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the role o f  consumer. Likewise, capitalism has not made the labor- 
for-wage relationship better in any real way, instead it has 
transformed the identity o f  worker into that o f  consumer. The 
colonization o f the lifeworld turns citizens into clients and workers 
into consumers, thereby minimizing opportunities for overcoming 
capitalism’s and Modernity’s injustices, (p.88)
Despite such theorizing, Habermas was not entirely pessimistic about Modernity, 
for he saw the rise in communicative rationality and the existence o f the ‘new’ 
social movements to be precisely about challenging the manner in which the 
lifeworld is encroached upon by the system. In this respect Habermas’ work has 
had profound influence upon social movement theorizing, particularly upon the 
work o f writers such as Touraine and Melucci.
In his work, subsequent to “The Theory o f Communicative Action”, Habermas 
has sought to further develop the notion that certain mechanisms can prevent the 
system encroaching upon the lifeworld. What Habermas calls for is the re­
kindling o f democracy, in which the will o f  the people guides public policy. In 
particular, Habermas states the need for ‘discoursive democracy’, which he 
perceives to be a deliberative process within public communication. In other 
words, Habermas believes that the solution to the previously stated problems o f  
Modernity is to foster the right conditions so that public opinion can have public 
influence. In contrast to his earlier work however, Habermas has now somewhat 
re-stated his position, for whilst he still largely locates discoursive democracy 
within the communicative domain that is the public sphere, he also locates it in 
the “partly institutionalised political culture o f civil s o c i e t y (Delanty, 2000: 41)
The idea o f a discoursive democracy has not gone unchallenged, however, for the 
question o f how a consensus can be reached within a heterogeneous society 
remains. Feminists such as Meehan (1995) have highlighted the fact that the aim 
o f consensus actually closes o ff many o f the differences that characterise society. 
Habermas countered these criticisms by stating that such problems can be 
overcome by the ‘public use o f reason’. Delanty (2000) has commented that 
Habermas’ notion o f ‘discursive democracy’ seeks to:
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( ...)  render positions reflective. (...) To adopt the public 
perspective is to accept a third-person perspective, which is 
neither the perspective o f  the opponent nor one’s own vantage 
point. The public perspective is the genuinely intersubjective 
perspective, reducible to neither se lf nor other, (p.42)
Thus, Habermas’ notion o f consensus differs from that o f Rawls, for example, 
because it does not rest upon the normative assumption that decisions can be 
made on the basis o f  an overlapping sense o f  the ‘common good’. In fact, 
Habermas rejects this idea and states that in complex societies characterised by 
cultural pluralism, it cannot be taken for granted that a background consensus 
exists. In Habermas’ (1998) notion o f consensus, therefore, it is not assumed that 
different parties will necessarily reach an overlapping consensus, but rather that a 
reflexive position can be reached that looks for the critical appropriation o f both 
positions.
I would suggest, however, that Habermas’ position is equally, if  differently 
normative in approach, when compared with the work o f more liberal thinkers, 
such as Rawls. Many Feminist writers reinforce this criticism o f Habermas’ 
work, for example Fraser (1989) who has highlighted the fact that Habermas fails 
to adequately theorize the notion o f power. Differentials in the power possessed 
by different groups will affect the degree o f autonomy they possess within the 
public sphere. Attention, therefore, must be paid to the ‘pre-discoursive’ space. 
Thus, whilst Habermas’ work has been highly influential within contemporary 
citizenship theorizing, particularly with regard to his theories o f communicative 
ethics, other aspects o f  his work are more contentious. In particular, the question 
o f the extent to which this reflexive position can realistically be achieved from 
within a society characterised by a large number o f social cleavages and related 
power differences, continues to be a major issue within the citizenship debates.
It seems to me, however, that the great strength o f  Habermas’ theorising lies less 
with the fine details o f how this discoursive democracy could be made to work in 
practice. The strength o f his theory lies instead in the manner in which he locates 
this discursive democracy largely within the state, whilst simultaneously rejecting
95
the idea that this citizenship is in itself necessarily rooted in a particular cultural 
community. I think that he is also right to reject the idea, as seen in the work o f  
Kymlicka, that certain ‘shared sentiments’ need to be developed by citizens. 
Indeed, Habermas is clear when he states that since each individual possesses 
multiple ‘selves’, that the idea that uniform cultural communities ever exist, must 
be placed into some doubt.
For Habermas, all that is needed is a shared sense o f obligation between members 
o f a polity that is solely political, and in no way cultural. This, he claims, would 
take the form o f minimal shared identity, a kind o f ‘common denominator 
commonality’ that is based only upon the legal frameworks as set out within the 
constitution o f a state. In this way, it seems to me, Habermas is paving the way 
for a more cosmopolitan notion o f citizenship. Indeed, he states: “Only a 
democratic citizenship that does not close itself off in a particularistic fashion 
can pave the way for a world citizenship (...)" (Habermas, 1996: 514) In this 
way, borders at every level, between neighbourhoods, regions or states, are seen 
as only existing for administrative purposes, not as barriers between ‘us’ and 
‘them’.
By de-coupling the notion o f  citizenship from nationality or cultural heritage in 
this way, Habermas (1996) (see also Habermas, 1992) is thus providing a way o f  
integrating states, as is happening within the EU, for example, on the basis o f  a 
shared civil society, rather than a shared sense o f culture. Further, by uncoupling 
nation-state and citizenship discources, there is more o f a chance that citizens will 
sense that their responsibilities reach beyond their immediate locality (Faulks, 
2000), from the local to the global.
The Post-structuralist Approach o f Mouffe
Again in the work o f Mouffe, the essential focus is democracy. M ouffe’s vision 
o f  democracy is one that sees the tension between universalism and particularism, 
not as something that needs to be resolved, but rather as constitutive o f  the 
democratic process itself. As in the later work o f Habermas, in which he proposes
96
Chapter 3
that the individual is best understood as having multiple selves, Mouffe perceives 
the social agent as an ensemble o f  subject positions. In other words, M ouffe’s 
notion o f ‘citizenship’ rests upon her understanding o f the identity o f the subject 
as being; “always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection 
o f  those subject positions and dependent on specific forms o f identification.” (Isin 
and W ood, 1999:11)
Since Moufife is a feminist writer, she is essentially talking about feminist 
politics, nevertheless, her thoughts can easily be applied to other groups. Thus her 
rejection o f what she regards to be the essentialist idea that certain qualities or 
functions that are commonly associated with women are central to women’s 
identity as women, can be applied to many other groups engaged in ‘struggle’. 
Equally useful is her idea that ultimately, there is no need to hold to any kind o f  
essentialist concept o f identity in order to make political action possible or to 
support any kind o f democratic politics. Indeed, according to Mouffe, what 
feminists should be doing is seeking to find a common cause with other groups 
that have been denied the democratic ideal o f  equal citizenship, thus as McAfee 
(2000) states: '‘The goal, fo r Mouffe, is for such oppressed people to join together 
as a  “we" to gain hegemony over “them", all those oppressors.’ (p.118) Thus, in 
relation to her conception o f citizenship, Mouffe is suggesting that “radical 
democratic citizens depend on a collective form o f identification among the 
democratic demands found in a variety o f  movements: women, workers, black, 
gay and ecological as well as other oppositional movements.” (Isin and Wood, 
1999:11)
In this way, she proposes that the way forward is to develop a ‘radical and plural 
democracy’, in which there is a non-essentialist conception o f  the subject, and 
identity is seen to be determined by identification with groups rather than as an 
essential property o f  the subject (M ouffe, 1993). Thus, for M ouffe, politics will 
always be a ‘struggle’, an antagonistic process between such groups. Focusing 
thus on groups, Mouffe does not support the idea o f  the ‘self-regarding 
individual’ o f  liberalism, nor does she believe that an allegiance to the ‘common 
good’ is possible, no matter how desirable it may be. This leaves her with the
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central problem, however, o f how to then theorise a concept o f citizenship that 
does not perceive individual liberty to be incompatible with the political 
community.
M ouffe’s answer is to reconsider the nature o f  the polis. She draws upon the 
work o f  Oakeshott (1975), who makes the distinction between universitas and 
societas. In the former, the polity is composed o f individuals with a shared 
purpose, in the latter, the polity is seen to be composed o f individuals with shared 
interests. Mouffe proposes that her notion o f  a ‘radical democracy’ is best 
understood as a radical societas, in which conflict and antagonism play a crucial 
part. In other words, in M ouffe’s view, individuals cannot be considered to be 
peacefully pursuing their interests, but should instead be considered to be 
engaging with each other over the meaning and definition o f their common 
interests. There will never be, therefore, a homogenous unity in such a societas, 
for there will always be a need for an ‘other’.
The form o f citizenship arising out o f  this definition o f  a radical societas, is one 
that is clearly opposed to the more classical approaches to citizenship theorising. 
For Mouffe, the citizen is neither the passive possessor o f rights, as in the work o f  
Hobbes for example, or someone who agrees to submit to the rules prescribed by 
the ‘general will’, as Rousseau proposed. Instead, Mouffe (1992) proposes that 
this notion o f  citizenship is best understood to be “not a unitary subject but as the 
articulation o f  an ensemble o f subject positions, constructed within specific 
discourses and always precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection o f  
those subject positions.” (p.237) The existence o f  these multiple subject positions 
has already been documented in many movements demanding democratic, 
citizenship based rights, for example, in the Black, gay and ecological 
movements.
M ouffe’s work has not gone un-criticised, however, particularly with regard to 
her tendency to label any theory that takes identity categories seriously, as 
‘essentialist’. In relation to M ouffe’s attacks on what she regards to be 
essentialism within feminism, many feminist theorists would counter her
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criticisms by stating that they are not talking about a supposed female essence, 
but rather about the manner in which women have been historically, socially and 
culturally constructed. McAfee (2000) has stated that it is important to 
distinguish between essentialism and nominalism:
Are we talking about women de re or women de dicto? Is it a 
matter o f  what woman is in herself or o f  what she is called? O f 
how she is ‘naturally ’ versus how she’s been constructed socially?
Many feminists are careful to make distinctions between, for  
example, what a women is biologically and what she is taken to be 
culturally, (p. 119)
Nevertheless, it can be said that the importance o f M ouffe’s work lies, not in its 
attack on essentialism, but rather in the manner in which it highlights the 
inadequacies o f any theory that takes a particular aspect o f  a person’s identity and 
claims that it is more pertinent than any other.
Conclusion - future developments?
This chapter has sought to provide a critical overview o f  some o f  the key 
citizenship theories that have been developed over time, from the ancient to the 
contemporary accounts. As I think is clear from the discussion, it is debateable to 
what extent any o f the existing models account for the nature of, or provide a 
realistic ideal for, the citizenship o f ‘Later Modernity’. In the complex and often 
unstable world o f  Later Modernity, whilst much cannot be said with certainty, I 
would argue that the following can be held to be widely apparent. Firstly, it is no 
longer possible to talk about a sense o f  citizenship that is ‘universal’. Secondly, 
understandings o f citizenship based upon the idea o f  ‘national communities’ must 
also be placed in some doubt. Thirdly, whilst rejecting universalistic 
understandings o f  citizenship, it is equally impossible to develop a theory o f  
citizenship that relies upon developing the recognition o f  a stable set o f  
‘differences’.
Whilst the development o f theory within this field must be on-going, some 
existing models have gone further than others in providing the basis for future
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theorising. What I take from Berlin, Habermas and Mouffe, in particular, is a 
sense in which citizenship is still about social engagement, and in particular that 
it is still firmly linked to democracy and the struggle for a common goal. Further, 
what is common in their approaches is an understanding o f  citizenship as being 
about the development o f  new forms o f social and political practices that are 
themselves the result o f the formation o f new social alliances across a range o f  
different ‘communities’. That understanding the process o f  engagement is key to 
developing a new theory o f citizenship is a new idea proposed by Ellison (1997, 
2000). Further discussion o f the work o f  Berlin, Habermas, Mouffe and Ellison 
can be found in chapter 7.
There are however, some new contributions to the citizenship debates that 
advance beyond the traditional parameters o f citizenship theorising and into 
realms that have not previously been considered by theorists in this field. The 
idea that has remained unquestioned for so long, that citizenship is connected 
with competence, is now being deconstructed by authors such as Jenkins (1998) 
and Silver (2002) and this marks an important step in terms o f understanding the 
‘citizenship’ experiences o f  many disadvantaged or stigmatised groups. More 
central to the argument in this thesis, however, Jenkins (1998) has called for an 
understanding o f  the ‘materiality o f identity’. In this respect his views clearly 
resonate with those o f feminists such as Ruth Lister (1997a) who has shown how  
traditional approaches have relied upon a disembodied notion o f citizenship. For 
such theorists, the rights and responsibilities that are part o f being a citizen 
cannot be divorced from an understanding o f the importance o f the body.
In terms o f  ‘bringing the body’ back into sociology Foucault’s (1979) work has 
clearly been highly influential, if  equally greatly criticised, for in writing about 
the body as a site o f  power, he grounded what may seem at first glance to be 
fairly esoteric theorising on materiality, in the actual, everyday processes o f  
power. As previously mentioned in relation to Lister’s work, such ideas have 
been usefully taken up and modified by feminists. One branch o f feminism has 
been particularly influential in this regard however, and that is the theorising o f
Chapter 3
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postmodemist/poststructuralist feminists such as Butler (1993). Butler (1993) 
states that:
(...) what constitutes the fixity o f  the body, its contours, its 
movements, will be fully material, but materiality will be re­
thought as the effect o f  power (p.2)
A s part o f this re-thinking o f  materiality, Butler (1995) calls for a questioning o f  
the ways in which certain paradigms serve to disempower and erase that which 
they seek to explain, ‘ effecting a violent reduction o f the field to the one piece o f  
text* (p.37). Such theorising has clear implications in terms o f challenging the 
social model o f disability and the work o f authors such as Oliver (1996), who as 
will be discussed later in this thesis, perceive that the inclusion o f ‘impairment’ in 
theorising on disability, runs the risk o f diluting the social model’s potential in 
terms o f praxis. Using the arguments put forward by Butler, to truly challenge 
discourses o f  power in terms o f disability, it is important to understand that 
‘impairment’, whilst having an undeniable, basic, biological definition, is also 
imbued with diverse social meaning (Fawcett, 2000).
In terms o f citizenship theorising per se, however, it is Turner ([1996] 2000) who 
has most famously developed this connection between a Sociology o f  the Body 
and citizenship. In order to break with this earlier theorising he proposes a 
Sociology o f the Body which requires consideration o f  the following:
1. an elaborate understanding o f the basic notion o f embodiment, 
which would be a method o f systematically exploring the 
complexity o f  the body in terms o f  its corporality, sensibility, and 
objectivity;
2. an embodied notion o f social agency in the theory o f  social 
action and a comprehensive view o f  how body-image functions in 
social space;
3. a genuinely sociological appreciation o f the reciprocity o f  
social bodies over time -  that is, an understanding o f  the 
collective nature o f embodiment;
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4. a thoroughly historical sense o f  the body and its cultural 
formation;
5. a political understanding o f the body in relation to governance, 
with special reference to what we might term corporeal 
citizenship, namely sexual regulation and surveillance o f bodies 
by state legislation on reproductive technology, abortion, 
adoption, and parenting.
(Turner, [1996] 2000: 487)
He then uses his sociology o f the body to develop an embodied understanding o f  
citizenship as personhood, where each person is both seen as, and is aware of, 
their own vulnerabilities. How he does this and the implications o f his theorising 
will be considered in more depth in chapter 7. Ultimately, however, Turner 
(1993a/b) proposes, along with some other key thinkers (Soysal, 1994, Delanty, 
2000), that there are now good grounds for suggesting that another discourse, that 
o f  human rights with is foundation in understandings o f  the de-centred and 
contextualised self, may provide the most sustained challenge to the idea o f  
citizenship, and may indeed, mark the end o f the concept entirely. The extent to 
which Turner provides a convincing alternative to the notion o f citizenship will 
also be considered in more depth in chapter 7.
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Disability in Society, Today
Chapter 4
Introduction -  a brief history of theorising on disability
Prior to the 1970’s to have an impairment was regarded as a ‘personal tragedy’ 
and this thinking existed not only within the wider public sphere but was also a 
major influence upon service providers and policy-makers. As Barnes et al 
(1999) have commented, these prejudices and stereotypes had profound and 
unfortunate effects upon the lives o f disabled people:
It seemed to dictate a life as a passive ‘victim ’ characterized by 
social exclusion and disadvantage, and by dependency on 
assistance from family and friends and a ‘safety net’ o f  state 
welfare benefits and services, (p. 10)
Curiously however, despite social science’s history o f exposing social 
inequalities, the position o f disabled people in society had generated little 
research and had prompted almost no theoretical interest. Further, during the 
1970’s strong objections began to emerge against the small amount o f  research 
and theorising that had taken place during the 1960’s, most notably in the work o f  
Parsons on the sick-role and Goflman on stigma.
Parsons and Goffman
For Parsons (1951), for a society to function properly all o f  its members must 
play their appropriate roles. Health is viewed as the ‘normal’ state and is linked to  
optimum capacity. In contrast, illness is regarded as being akin to a form o f social 
deviance since it is a disruptive and ‘abnormal’ state. Since illness along with 
deviance o f all types is viewed as a threat to the smooth functioning o f the 
system, it must be managed and controlled. The first part o f  this management o f
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illness, Parson’s termed the ‘sick role’ which he perceived to be a form o f  
sanctioned social deviance, controlled and managed by the medical profession. 
For Parsons, power imbalances between doctor and patient are necessary to serve 
the interests o f  society and such relationships are entirely benign.
As previously stated, however, Parsons’ work and his notion o f the sick-role have 
been heavily criticised. Firstly, it has been argued that the sick-role is an ‘ideal 
type’ which, whilst being o f some benefit when seeking to understand acute 
illness, does not relate as successfully to the experience o f long-term or 
permanent impairments/conditions. Secondly, this sick-role theorizing has been 
criticised for failing to take a more critical stance towards the role o f  doctors and 
other therapeutic professionals. The sick-role model tends to assume that the role 
o f these health care professionals is to seek to ‘normalize’ the disabling 
consequences o f a particular illness, in a manner that clearly reflects the 
psychological notion o f  ‘adaptation’. As Albrecht (1992) has commented, this 
“idealised process seems too facile” (p.74). Many disabled people have rejected 
this perceived role o f the health care professional, claiming that it has led to them 
being treated as objects and being manipulated against their wishes into abnormal 
lifestyles. Further, Oliver (1996) has proposed that such thinking is the result o f  
the ‘psychological imagination’ and rests upon assumptions made by non­
disabled people about what it is like to have an impairment.
This notion o f illness as a form o f social deviance is also to be found in the work 
o f  Goffinan, although he elaborated the idea rather differently. In his famous 
work “Stigma”, Goffinan (1968) broadly defines the term as ‘abominations o f the 
body’ and goes on to list as examples such things as physical deformities, 
differences according to ‘race’ or religion and faults o f  character. In each case, 
the notion o f  the ‘normal human being’ becomes a normative system for grading 
those who are perceived to have a ‘stigma’ and for categorising them as being 
‘not quite human’. Goffinan then went on to consider how people seek to manage 
their ‘spoiled identities’, for example, how people with an acquired disability 
manage their re-identification, or how those with a more visible ‘stigma’, the 
discredited, differ from those with a less visible ‘stigma’, the discreditable.
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The current consensus within Disability Studies appears to be that in moving 
theory on from Parsons in this way, Goffinan’s work must be considered o f  
considerable value. Equally, however, it is clear that Goffinan’s work has left 
Disability Studies with a number o f  important questions which are yet to be 
adequately resolved, such as: “How far can disabled people resist the process o f  
becoming ‘stigmatised’?” “To what extent can individuals create their own 
identities?” and “When both intellectual and physical differences are equally 
visible, why do such differences possess such contrasting meanings?” (Barnes et 
al, 1999)
Critics o f  Goflman, however, have highlighted the following: on the one hand 
Scambler and Hopkins (1986) have proposed that there is evidence to suggest 
that the ‘felt’ stigma or anxiety o f  disabled people may, sometime, be greater than 
the actual discrimination experienced. On the other hand, Gussow and Tracy 
(1968) and Ablon (1981) have argued that theories that focus upon such things as 
anxiety may be providing an inaccurate, ‘doom and gloom’ account o f  
stigmatised identities. Indeed, Booth and Booth (1994) provide evidence to 
suggest that negative labels and being treated as ‘sub-human’ can sometimes be 
rebuffed. In the light o f such complexity, Goffinan’s account must be viewed 
sceptically.
“Enter the two main contenders” -  Medical Sociology versus Disability Studies
After Parsons and Goffinan, tw o fresh approaches to the sociological 
understanding o f illness/disability emerged partly, at times, as a result o f  further 
development o f their ideas, but also resulting from those criticisms o f their work 
previously stated. The first approach is that o f  Medical Sociology which has 
sought to develop an interpretative account o f illness that moves away from those 
definitions o f  impairment that have been established by the medical 
professionals, and to explore instead the symbolic and material interactions 
between the disabled individual and wider society. Research in this area began by 
considering such things as the interactional difficulties experienced by people
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with chronic illness (Strauss and Glaser, 1975). The focus o f  Medical Sociology 
then moved on to consider such things as the range o f financial, medical care 
based and employment barriers facing people with chronic illness. From such 
research emerged the notion o f the ‘handicapping’ environment.
More recently, the emphasis in Medical Sociology has been upon the active way 
in which disabled or chronically ill individuals adapt and make use o f various 
coping strategies in order to gain control over their lives. Key to this research 
have been the terms coping and competence. Medical Sociology has highlighted 
the manner in which disabled people strive to retain a sense o f their own 
competence. Such research has also been concerned with the ways in which both 
lay and professional attitudes towards disabled people, can radically constrain 
disabled people’s abilities to make use o f a number o f central coping strategies.
For Jenkins (1998), a contextualised understanding o f personhood is central to 
understanding the notion o f competency since the competence o f  an individual is 
always, to some extent, determined by their performance with regard to an 
arbitrary and culturally determined selection o f aptitudes. This is not to say, 
however, that Jenkins is denying the reality that (incom petence can, and does, 
reside at least in part in the physiology o f embodied persons. Indeed, one o f the 
strong points o f Jenkins’ approach is that he does not ignore such things as the 
effects o f  impairments. He does, however, stress that w e need a social framework 
in which to understand these issues.
Writing from a Bioethics perspective, Silver (2002), has made a useful link 
between theorising such as Jenkins’ on competence and how understandings 
gained through such analyses can be used to further the rights o f  individuals in 
terms o f autonomy. For Silver, competency rests upon the notion o f autonomy. 
Thus, to be competent one must be autonomous. The problem then arises that 
traditional approaches to autonomy tend to focus upon its instrumental rather than 
intrinsic properties. According to Silver, medical professionals have tended to 
focus upon the instrumental properties o f  autonomy alone, thus avoiding the 
potential moral problems that can emerge when a person’s intrinsic autonomy
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clashes with what the medical professional considers to be their ‘best interests’. 
Silver (2002) proposes that instead o f focusing on the instrumental properties o f  
autonomy in this way, that instead: “( ...)  the standard o f  competency we ought to 
employ is as follows: is the person making her own decisions, is she shaping, 
however well or badly, her own life. If she is, she is competent, because she can 
be autonomous.” (p.462)
In other words, Silver states, we need to reject the notion o f  ‘relative 
competence’. This notion o f ‘relative competence’ is clearly akin to Jenkins’ 
notion o f  the arbitrary and culturally determined nature o f competence. Silver 
(2002) then takes this critique o f relative competence one step forward, however, 
by commenting that:
I  would argue that no amount o f  these relative incompetencies 
should amount to rendering a person incompetent in the sense that 
we are discussing: incompetent to make decisions that normally 
everyone has a right to make. That sort o f  competency should not 
depend on your ability to make a decision well, but on your ability 
to make it at all. (p.464)
What is new and thought provoking about Silver’s approach therefore, is the way 
in which he links the issue o f competency with autonomy and ultimately with 
human rights discourses.
Currently, however, some new and even more contentious strands o f theorising 
have emerged from within Medical Sociology. The phenomenological approach, 
as usefully described by Hughes and Paterson (1997), has been viewed by many 
within the field o f disability as striking at the very heart o f the Social M odel o f  
Disability, the model which dominates Disability Studies. This phenomenological 
approach to disability reflects the wider trend within Sociology over the past 10 
years, in which the ‘body’ has been rediscovered and ‘bodiliness’ has 
increasingly been seen to be centre-stage. The phenomenological approach to 
disability considers there to be an important link between this sociology o f the 
body, and theorising on disability and calls for an ‘embodied’ notion o f disability. 
Drawing upon the work o f  both Bryan Turner (1984, 1992, 1994, 2000) and
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Terence Turner (1994), this approach proposes that the Cartesian 
compartmentalism that had led to the separation o f impairment and disability, be 
abandoned in favour o f a “realignment between body, self and society.n 
(Bendelow and Williams, 1995:156)
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In this respect, this trend in Medical Sociology was somewhat overdue, for, some 
thirty years previously, Merleu-Ponty (1962) commented that social action is not 
only intersubjective, but also intercorporeal. Further, within the field o f  disability 
itse lf writers such as Jenny Morris (1991) had complained that the Social Model 
o f Disability denies the existence o f  pain and affliction, experiences that are truly 
‘embodied’. Nevertheless, this phenomenological approach to disability remains 
as yet little more than an important strand within Medical Sociology, and is 
strongly opposed by many within Disability Studies'. The basis for the opposition 
to this approach is, in many respects, understandable, for as will be discussed in 
the following section, many disabled people consider references to ‘bodiliness’ as 
being inextricably linked to the idea o f ‘suffering’, which is, in turn, linked to the 
personal tragedy model o f disability. This model has been widely accepted to be 
disempowering and victim blaming.1 2 The challenge for theorists who favour the 
phenomenological approach to disability is, therefore, to overcome such fears and 
to persuade people that:
A phenomenological approach to suffering in which the 
reversibility o f  impairment and disability made it possible to think 
o f  suffering as a concept which reflected the mutual engagement 
o f pain and oppression may be a way o f reflecting the fact that 
disabled people do suffer. However, at the same time, by 
foregrounding the concept o f  oppression, suffering is removed 
from its connotative association with a charitable response to 
tragedy. To recast suffering as a dialectical concept on the 
threshold between pain and oppression not only politicises the 
medical, but exposes the disablist basis o f  the charitable response. 
(Hughes and Paterson, 1997:336)
1 For example, see Finkelstein (1996) who argues that to consider impairment is to dilute the efFectiveness of 
the Social Model.
2 See Swain and French (2000) for a useful discussion on the disempowering aspects of the ‘tragedy model’.
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It w ill be interesting to see whether such an important new development will 
bring about the end o f the historical division between Medical Sociology and 
Disability Studies. Certainly, there is already evidence that several writers from 
Disability Studies are trying to break away from key orthodoxies o f  the field and 
some interesting connections between their work and the phenomenological 
approach to disability will be discussed later in this chapter. The major issue that 
continues to divide Medical Sociology from Disability Studies, is, however, the 
extent to which the material world disadvantages disabled people. Whilst many 
medical sociologists consider Disability Studies to have provided an over­
socialised image o f disability that does not move beyond ‘outdated’ Marxist 
accounts (Bury, 1997), writers within Disability Studies have criticised Medical 
Sociology for foiling to engage with the material world and the manner in which 
material difficulties disadvantage many disabled people.
For Disability Studies, the central focus o f research in this field must be upon the 
barriers and constraints placed upon the lives o f  disabled people by a ‘disabling’ 
society. The central inspiration o f this approach has been the ‘Social Model o f  
Disability’, the origins o f which lie firmly within the campaigns by disabled 
people against discrimination and material disadvantages during the late 1960’s 
and into the 1970’s. Probably the first step was taken by Hunt (1966) who 
highlighted the way in which powerful groups within society categorise disabled 
people as abnormal and in so doing perpetuate the notion o f disability as both a 
personal tragedy and as something to be greatly ‘feared’. Further, he exposed the 
ways in which disabled people are perceived as being economically useless. Hunt 
then went on to become a key figure within the wider disability movement, since 
he was central to the formation o f UPIAS3, an organisation that was run by and 
fo r  disabled people and which maintained a very critical stance towards those 
organisations that were merely run for  disabled people.
In 1976, UPIAS published “Fundamental Principles o f  Disability” in which the 
organisation made it clear that it is ‘society’ (sic.) that disables people with 
impairments. Whilst it would not be true to say that this publication denies the
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3 Union o f the Physically Impaired Against Segregation.
109
Chapter 4
reality o f impairment, nevertheless, the focus is upon the manner in which 
‘society’ increases the dependency o f disabled people and prevents them from 
participating equally within the economic and social sphere. This notion o f  
disability as a form o f  social oppression then became the dominant theme within 
Disability Studies and is clearly the precursor o f the later more materialist 
accounts o f disability provided by Abberley, Finkelstein and Oliver amongst 
others.
For Abberley (1993), work on disability can be usefully compared to research 
undertaken on the subjects o f sexism and racism. This focus upon the notion o f  
social oppression led Abberley to conclude that it is social relations that create 
the material disadvantages that, in addition to impairment, generate disability. 
What is less well developed in Abberley’s work, is a picture o f who it is that is 
supposed to be benefiting from the oppression o f disabled people. He is clearly 
edging towards a Marxist account o f disability, referring as he does to 
‘capitalism’ as being the victor when it comes to the social oppression o f disabled 
people, but he takes this little further.
Finkelstein, on the other hand, provides a much more developed materialist 
account o f disability. For Finkelstein (1980), disability can be viewed as a social 
problem that is directly linked to changes in the mode o f production. His theory 
rests upon the idea that changes in technology are key to understanding changing 
attitudes towards disability. Thus, it was only with the advent o f industrial 
capitalism that disabled people became excluded from the workplace. New  
technology meant that disabled people could not ‘keep up’ and this became the 
basis for segregation. This idea is clearly echoed in the work o f  Oliver (1990), 
although he is considered to have advanced the concept somewhat, to produce the 
most highly developed materialist account o f disability. For Oliver:
( ...)  definitions o f disability, as o f  other perceived social 
problems, are related both to economic and social structures and 
to the central values o f  particular modes o f  production. He 
explains the emergence o f  the individualistic and medicalised 
approach to disability in terms o f  the functional needs o f  capital, 
especially the need for a workforce that is physically and
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intellectually able to conform to the demands o f  industrialization.
But it is not simply the mode o f  production which precipitated the 
development ofpersonal tragedy theories o f  disability, but also the 
‘mode o f thought’ and the relationship between the two. (Barnes et 
al,1999: 84)
By this, Oliver is suggesting that it was not simply the mode o f production that 
altered during the process o f  industrialisation, but also that there was an 
important shift in ideology. He proposes that the first ideological shift, towards 
individualism, was brought about by the growth o f  the free market economy and 
the spread o f  wage labour. The second ideological shift he considers to be the 
médicalisation o f the mechanisms o f  social control, which led to the development 
o f the concept o f ‘able-bodiedness’, a standard against which ‘normality’ can be 
judged.
The strength o f this Social M odel o f  disability has been, therefore, to give 
udisabled people the confidence to campaign for rights in a way that was 
uncompromisingly based on social oppression.” (Campbell, 2002: 473) Further, 
in maintaining a clear focus upon the manner in which disability is socially 
produced, this model has moved away from bio-medical models and towards an 
understanding o f disability in terms o f  current debates on citizenship/social 
exclusion. So powerful has been the emancipatory capacity o f this model, 
however, that criticising the approach is something that has been viewed as 
highly contentious.
Nevertheless, there are some important criticisms o f  the Social M odel that do
need to be addressed. Oliver’s account, for example, has been criticised for
failing to consider adequately the very different experiences o f  disability and for
ignoring the role o f  impairment in the disabling process. Pinder (1997) highlights
what is the central problem in this field, namely that the Social M odel o f
Disability is not just an academic model, but has been the central feature o f
disability politics since the 1970’s. For Pinder (1997) the central tension is
“between the search for clear-cut, univocal messages crucial for the success o f
any political movement, and the necessarily more complex and subtle reality o f
peoples’ lived experience.” (p.304) Shakespeare and Watson (1997) admit that
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there has been a great reluctance on the part o f key writers in Disability Studies to 
address the issues o f impairment, for example, because it is seen to weaken the 
Social Model. They state that: “Debates are necessary, and recognising 
difference within the disabled community is o v e r d u e (Shakespeare and Watson, 
1997: 299) Furthermore, they comment that the tendency within the disability 
movement to silence dissent in favour o f “marching to the beat o f  a single drum” 
(Shakespeare and Watson, 1997: 299) should be resisted. What is ironic, 
however, is that their overall conclusion demonstrates exactly the same attitude 
that they are criticising:
Obviously individual disabled people may not always agree with 
the radical agenda or analysis, just as individual women have 
often not supported feminism. But this does not mean that disabled 
activists, any more than feminists, are wrong. (...) We suggest, 
therefore, that while academics and activists can debate amongst 
ourselves, our main efforts must be to fight for a social model 
analysis in society as a whole, and to take the insights and 
evidence we have gathered into other disciplines and areas o f  
public discussion. Rather than putting energy into internal 
arguments, we need to challenge the continuing complacency o f  
the intellectual establishment, and to win the battle for a social 
model understanding o f society and our lives. (Shakespeare and 
Watson, 1997:299)
This attitude is perhaps, understandable considering the emancipatory emphasis 
that has been placed upon the Social Model and the extent to which many 
disabled people have gained strength from the concept. Shakespeare and Watson, 
as key figures within Disability Studies are, no doubt, highly conscious o f  the 
fear that is felt by many disabled people when faced with the possibility that the 
Social Model might be weakened. As Shakespeare (1992) has commented: “/o 
mention biology, to admit pain, to confront our impairments, has been to risk the 
oppressors seizing on evidence that disability is really about physical limitations 
after all.” (pAO)
Despite these fears there is a growing body o f literature within Disability Studies 
that does openly question the predominant doctrines o f  mainstream Disability 
Studies. The earliest critiques o f mainstream Disability Studies arose during the
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early 1990’s when Feminist writers such as Jenny Morris (1991) highlighted the 
fact that accounts o f disability tended to be male dominated and constructed. 
Morris, along with a number o f  others, have written convincingly about the 
‘double disadvantage’ faced by disabled women which results in them being 
placed in a worse position, economically, socially and psychologically, than 
either disabled men, or non-disabled women. This critique was later extended to 
consider Disability Studies’ failure to adequately theorise the position o f Black 
disabled people and other minority groups such as gay and lesbian disabled 
people.
Such issues have become the ‘hot topics’ in Disability Studies and have been key 
to current debates surrounding the issue o f  impairment and the body, which are 
echoed in some o f the current trends in Medical Sociology, as previously 
discussed. The work o f authors such as Begum (1992) and Harraway (1991) have 
been particularly influential. Begum’s notion o f the ‘dominant body ideal’ and 
how this leads to the construction o f defective bodies, and Haraway’s (1991) 
related idea that “(n)either our personal bodies nor our social bodies may be 
seen as natural.” (p.10), have greatly supported the argument made by disabled 
feminists that the experience o f impairment must be included in any analysis o f  
disability. There is therefore, a growing awareness within Disability Studies that 
the Social M odel provides a picture o f  the body as having no history, and o f  
impairment as being entirely opposite to disability because it is not socially 
constructed. As Hughes and Paterson (1997) have commented, this dominant 
model must be questioned for it:
ualso posits a body devoid o f  meaning, a dysfunctional, 
anatomical, corporeal man obdurate in its resistance to 
signification and phenomenologically dead, without intentionality 
or agency. ” (p.329)
There are, therefore, two key challenges facing Disability Studies today, the first 
being the need to theorise the ‘body’ adequately from a disability perspective. 
The second challenge is overcoming the resistance to such theoretical 
developments by key figures within the field. Both Oliver (1995, 1996) and
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Finkelstein (1996) have argued forcefully against the idea that understanding the 
‘body’ is key to understanding disability. For them, considering the body and 
impairment ‘fudges’ the critical issue o f  causality and the source o f  disability. 
That is not to say however, that either theorist entirely ignores the issue o f  
impairment, Oliver (1996), for example, calls for a Social Model o f  impairment 
to stand alongside the Social M odel o f  disability. His argument is that, whilst 
non-interchangeable, these two models might together produce a social theory o f  
disability. Ultimately however, whilst his argument here may seem appealing, it 
nevertheless perpetuates the distinction between impairment and disability. In 
addition to this theoretical opposition to placing the ‘body’ at the heart o f  
theorising on disability, other writers have claimed that such an approach reduces 
the opportunity for political and cultural praxis by disabled people. Barnes (1999) 
has commented that the new trend in theorising, which he believes arises from 
the liberal arts and cultural studies, “seems to be written by a particular sort o f  
academic luwie who write mainly for themselves and other academics rather 
than for a wider audience: consequently, it is replete with obscure and esoteric 
jargon, virtually inaccessible to all but the most dedicated o f readers and, most 
importantly, politically benign and pragmatically irrelevant." (p.580)
In the light o f  such resistance to the idea o f an embodied notion o f disability from 
within Disability Studies it is unclear, therefore, whether significant 
advancements in this theorising will occur from within this field, or whether such 
ideas will find more fertile ground within Medical Sociology. What is clear, is 
that in both Medical Sociology and Disability Studies there is a significant and 
growing minority o f  authors who are keen to move beyond materialist accounts 
and to acknowledge the value that contributions by a range o f theorists in the 
fields o f semiotics, critical theory, post-structuralism, feminism and 
phenomenology can make to understandings o f disability. Some o f these issues 
will be considered in more depth as they relate to the findings o f this research in 
Chapter 7.
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The *reality’ o f life for disabled people
Whilst the aim o f  the first part o f this chapter was to provide an overview o f  the 
main theories o f  disability, the aim o f this next section is to consider the 
empirical evidence to support the widely accepted notion that disabled people 
occupy a position in society that is characterised by discrimination and 
disadvantage. The body o f research that has been carried out on the lives o f  
disabled people is large and encompasses most, if  not all, areas o f  experience. 
Given the extent o f this research, it would be impossible within the confines o f  
this chapter, or thesis, to adequately consider all issues. For this reason, two key 
areas have been chosen, and it is hoped that these will, when considered together, 
provide the reader with an overview o f the current position o f disabled people 
within society. These two areas are: equal opportunities: and the ‘coming out’ o f  
disability.
Before considering the first o f these areas, however, it must be stated that care 
must be taken when using the term ‘reality’ when describing the lives o f disabled 
people, for there is a risk that in describing a collective reality for all disabled 
people, the wide variety o f experiences o f disability are reduced to some sort o f 
common denominator (Corker, 1999). With this risk in mind, an effort has been 
made to avoid universalising the experience o f disability and wherever is 
appropriate, to mention differences.
Equal opportunities
Whilst the issues relating to equal opportunities for disabled people are wide 
ranging, injustice within the following spheres appear to have generated the most 
anger amongst disabled people, and are the most well documented:
❖  Education
❖  Income and employment
❖  The inaccessible environment
❖  Family life
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Education
It is widely accepted that historically, children with perceived impairments have 
been socialized in such a way as to foster low  self-expectations o f success in 
education or in work:
Besides perpetuating the age old myths and ignorance 
surrounding both impairment and disability, the special school 
system consistently fails to provide disabled school leavers with 
the skills and confidence necessary for adulthood in a world 
increasingly geared towards the needs o f a mythical non~disabled 
majority. (Barnes, 1997: introduction)
Groups o f disabled people calling themselves ‘survivors o f  the special school 
system’ have argued forcibly for the complete abolition o f the special school 
system and their calls have not gone entirely unheeded. The current drive towards 
‘mainstreaming’ is precisely because o f  a growing acceptance by government and 
educationalists that the special school system disadvantaged/s disabled children.
In terms o f evidence to support these claims, it is clear that the educational 
attainments o f young people who have gone through special needs education are 
indeed considerably less than for the average student in mainstream education. 
As a consequence, disabled children leave school with fewer qualifications and 
skills than their non-disabled peers. For example, Thomas (1997) found that just 
4% o f  pupils in special needs schools attain grades A-C at GCSE. These findings 
have been explained in a number o f ways: partly, it is suggested, it is due to the 
fact that children who have been labelled as having ‘Special Educational N eeds’ 
(SENs) experience a much narrower curriculum than their non-disabled peers. It 
is also thought to be because special need schools enter less than a third o f  pupils 
for GCSE’s. Finally, whilst it might be tempting to argue that lower attainment is 
due to a lesser ability on the part o f  pupils, there is also evidence that the low  
expectations o f  teachers constrains the performance o f  disabled children.
Interestingly, despite such evidence there have been arguments in favour o f  
special needs education. These arguments have come not least from many parents
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and some disabled young people. In particular, D eaf people and their 
organisations have consistently argued in favour o f  schools for the Deaf. They 
argue that D eaf children require regular contact with their D eaf peer groups and 
D eaf adults as role models, in order to combat oppression and to develop a strong 
and positive self-identity. According to such D eaf organisations, forcing D eaf 
children into mainstream education denies them access to the D eaf community 
and D eaf culture. Arguing from a more materialist standpoint many other parents 
and disabled children have stated that they consider special needs education to be 
preferable to mainstreaming on the basis that only special schools and the 
teachers in such establishments have the necessary facilities and training required 
for educating disabled children. Such groups have also argued that too often only 
‘lip service’ is paid to the integration o f disabled children into mainstream 
schooling, with the result that such children find themselves educationally and 
socially isolated.
As previously stated, however, ‘inclusive education’ is now the favoured 
approach to educating children with special educational needs. The moves 
towards mainstreaming began as far back as 1978 with the publication o f  the 
Wamock Report. This report was a direct response to early criticism that was 
directed against the special school system and was important in that it argued for 
special needs provision within mainstream schooling. The 1981 Education Act 
and subsequent legislation clearly built upon the Wamock Report, but according 
to many critics, was imperfect in certain key respects. Firstly, pupils with severe 
learning disabilities remained apart from mainstream schooling; hearing and 
visually impaired children were largely excluded from the new initiative; and 
finally, the increased costs involved in providing mainstream schooling for 
children who had been labelled as having SENs resulted in a tendency on the part 
o f  Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to avoid statementing too many children, 
allowing some children genuinely in need o f support to ‘slip through the net’. 
The later 1993 and 1996 Education Acts did seek to address some o f these issues
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and to promote more clearly the idea o f an inclusive policy, but doubts have 
continued surrounding the extent to which all the issues have been resolved.4
Some critics have suggested that such problems demonstrated that the 
government, despite appearances, was not really giving sufficient support to 
mainstream schooling for disabled people. It is certainly the case that education 
as an issue was omitted from the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Critics o f  
the government’s actions at that time suggested that whilst it may have been true 
that key policy makers shared with many parents o f  disabled children a concern 
that mainstream schooling may disadvantage some disabled children, it was also 
the case, however, that there were concerns surrounding the effects that 
integration may have upon mainstream schools, particularly in the light o f  the 
increased importance o f  performance indicators and league tables o f educational 
attainment.
Since 1995, however, some major advances have taken place in terms o f  
‘mainstreaming’. In 1998, the Labour Government announced an increase in 
resources for inclusive education as part o f  its Action Programme for Special 
Educational Needs. There are now two main sources o f government funds for 
inclusion, the Schools Access Initiative and the special educational needs element 
o f the Standards Fund. £220 million is being made available through the Schools 
A ccess Initiative over the period 2001-2004s. In 2001 the government also 
introduced the Special Educational Needs and Disability Discrimination 
(Amendment) Act, which set out the responsibilities o f  Primary, Secondary, 
Further and Higher Education institutions to engage in non-discriminatory 
practices in terms o f disabled students and to further the inclusion o f  disabled 
people into non-segregated educational settings. This act also made clear the 
responsibility o f the teacher-training agency to ensure that an awareness o f the 
needs o f  disabled children is an integral part o f  teacher training.
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Personal experience as a teacher within the secondary school system leads this author to believe that the 
problem o f  children who have special educational needs ‘slipping through the net’ is a continuing issue 
because o f some LEAs’ attempts to reduce their published figures o f numbers o f  children considered to have 
such needs.
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In the same year, an investigation into the Schools Access Initiative was carried 
out for the ‘Within Reach’ campaign for inclusive education run jointly by Scope 
and the National Union o f Teachers (NUT). This investigation found that 65% o f  
schools felt that students with special educational needs were making more rapid 
academic progress whilst within mainstream schools6. This report in combination 
with other campaigns by the NUT, suggests that teachers are now much more in 
favour o f  inclusive education than they have been in the past.
In the light o f this increase in funding, improved legislature and the apparently 
supportive attitudes o f teachers, the CSIE7 has stated that the only real remaining 
barrier to inclusive education is a continuing lack o f commitment to transfer 
funds from segregated to mainstream settings by certain LEAs. In a report 
published on their website8, the CSIE states that whilst the national percentage o f  
5-15 year olds in special schools across England has fallen from 1.39 % in 1997, 
to 1.32 % in 2001 (part o f a slow, but steady trend towards inclusion), there are 
worrying variations in approaches to placing disabled students according to LEA:
In 2001, for example, a disabled pupil in Manchester was more 
than seven times as likely to be placed in a segregated special 
school than a child in the London Borough o f  Newham (...) which 
has actively pursued a policy o f  inclusion fo r  18 years (...) A 
group o f  41 out o f  England’s 149 LEAs actually increased their 
percentages o f  pupils in special schools between 1997-2000.
(CSIE: http://inclusion.uwe.ac.uk/csie/stats02.htm)
Clearly, therefore, whilst major improvements have occurred in terms o f  
mainstreaming in some English regions, disabled children in certain areas remain 
disadvantaged.
There is one further debate surrounding mainstreaming that has yet to be 
resolved, however, and that surrounds the evidence to support the idea that 
disabled children and other children with special educational needs do make 
better educational progress within mainstream schooling. Clearly, as the NUT
6 “Within Reach 3: An Evaluation o f the Schools Access Initiative.” (2001) downloadable from the NUT 
website at:
7 Centre for Studies on Inclusive Education.
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report suggests, many teachers believe that such children are benefiting from 
being a part o f  a mainstream school, but there is as yet little hard evidence to 
support this belief. A recent report by the Audit Commission entitled “Special 
Educational Needs. A Mainstream Issue” (2002) stated the following:
In contrast to the national focus on attainment, little is known 
about the outcomes achieved by children with SEN. A lack o f  
monitoring o f  their achievement and a lack o f performance 
measures make it difficult to recognise the good work in many 
schools, or to identify where children are poorly served.
Schools feel pulled in opposite directions by pressures to achieve 
ever-better academic results and to become more inclusive. 
National performance tables and targets fa il to reflect the 
achievement o f  many children with SEN. Government needs to 
find a way o f  recognising and celebrating the achievements o f  
these pupils and their teachers, often against considerable odds. ”
(P-41)
O f course, since the publication o f this report, the government has introduced a 
‘value-added measure’ in secondary school tables and will be introducing the 
same measure for primary schools from 2003. This measure is intended to show  
the progress o f  students between key stage 3 and GCSE/GNVQ examinations and 
key stages 1 and 2. Whilst this is clearly a step in the right direction, it still does 
not give detailed enough information on the particular progress o f  children who 
have been statemented as having special educational needs. Thus, whilst 
substantial improvements to educational provision for disabled children and 
young adults have been made, particularly over the past few years, it would 
appear that there are still issues that need to be addressed.
Income and employment
In October 2000 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation published a report, written by
Tania Burchardt, entitled “Enduring economic exclusion: disabled people,
income and wealth.” In the current political climate characterised by a second
term o f  a N ew Labour government (a government which prides itself on being a
champion o f social justice) the findings o f this report make for uncomfortable
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reading. As Fig.4a clearly shows, employment rates amongst disabled people 
remain low, at around 40%, a figure that is about half the level of employment for 
non-disabled people.
Fig.4a Employment rates o f  disabled and non-disabled men and women (NB.
‘figure 1 ’ in title o f graph refers to position in original report)
Figure 1: Employment rate! of disabled and non-disabled men and wom en
From Burchardt.T (2000) (JRF Findings) Enduring economic exclusion: disabled people, income and wealth 
viewed on the JRF Website: 18.01.03
In 1999, disabled people made up half of those who were unemployed but who 
said that they would very much like to work. Yet, even after allowing for the fact 
that some disabled people cannot, or do not wish to be employed, non-disabled 
people are still four times more likely to gain employment than disabled people. 
Maintaining employment after becoming disabled is another area where disabled 
people experience major disadvantages. Each year around 3% of those in work 
become ‘limited in daily activities’, o f whom approximately half also report 
disability within the following or subsequent year. Of these, one in six lose their 
employment in the first year after becoming disabled. Given that disabled people 
make up a large and growing percentage o f the working-age population, between 
12 and 16% depending on the definitions used, this means that a significant 
number o f individuals are being discriminated against.9 *
By means o f explaining this situation, it is tempting to point to the smaller 
proportion o f disabled people who have good educational qualifications and to
9 Figures from Burchardt,T (2000) (JRF Findings) Enduring economic exclusion: disabled people, income
and wealth viewed on the JRF Website:
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argue that this makes many disabled people less attractive to potential employers. 
It is undeniable that this may often be one o f the factors influencing rates o f 
employment amongst disabled people. There are other factors, however, for 
example, it is well documented that many employers make negative assumptions 
about disabled people in terms of perceiving them as unreliable workers. The 
damaging impact o f this assumption upon the job prospects o f disabled people is 
well recognised. The young persons’ careers advice service Connexions10 has an 
area o f its website dedicated to tackling such negative assumptions, as does 
Scope. Connexions is concerned, amongst other issues, with raising awareness 
amongst employers about the fact that, overall, disabled people have less sick 
leave than non-disabled people. Scope also highlights the fact that disabled 
people are no more likely to be generally ill than their non-disabled colleagues11. 
Scope is also currently running a major campaign about the issue of employment 
for disabled people entitled: “Ready, Willing and Disabled”. The slogan for this 
campaign, which is shown below in fig.4b, stresses the fact that it is not only 
disabled people who lack qualifications who are disadvantaged within the labour 
market, but also those who have qualifications which should put them on an 
equal footing with many non-disabled people:
Fig.4b12 Ready, Willing and Disabled
10 GCSEs 
2 A-levels 
1 degree
114 job applications 
24 job interviews 
1 disability
0 job
The basis o f this campaign is a survey into the attitudes o f employers to disabled 
people, and the results, as documented by Daone and Scott (2003), demonstrate 
the persistence of certain negative assumptions about disabled people as workers. 
The survey found that 19% of employers said that the fact that they had never
12 Daonc, E and Scott, R (2003) Ready, Willing and Disabled - Executive Summery and Recommendations 
fo r  Employers Viewed at:
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worked with a disabled person before, and so did not know what to expect, would 
prevent them from employing a disabled person. A further 11% o f  employers said 
that they would not employ a disabled person because their clients or customers 
would not want to be served by a disabled person.
There have been many attempts to explain this persistent discrimination faced by 
disabled people in the labour market. The dominant approach within Disability 
Studies, however, has been to employ a materialist framework when 
understanding this problem. Wolfensberger (1989) suggested that the social 
construction o f disability and dependence is a covert function o f  the ‘human 
service industries’. According to his argument, whilst the stated purpose o f  
institutions such as the education system and the health care system are to 
rehabilitate people back into the community, their hidden agenda is to create and 
sustain large numbers o f dependent and devalued people in order to secure 
employment for others. In other words, the social construction o f disability 
functions to keep disabled people out o f the labour market and thus reduce 
competition for jobs.
Wolfensberger’s work was not as radical however, as the assessment o f  the 
situation provided by some earlier British authors such as Hunt (1966). In 
analysing the position o f disabled people in the labour market, Hunt similarly 
proposed that disability should be viewed as a social construction o f capitalism. 
Disabled people, he argued, become the ‘unfortunates’ who cannot benefit from 
capitalism and are perceived as ‘useless’ because they cannot work. As a 
consequence, disabled people are marked out as a minority group and placed in a 
similar position to other oppressed groups such as Black people or homosexuals, 
because, like them, they are regarded as being ‘different’. Hunt concluded that 
industrial capitalism increased prejudice against disabled people and that this 
prejudice in turn expresses itself in discrimination and oppression. Hunt’s view  
was later echoed in the work o f Abberley (1997) who highlights the important 
role that work plays in the process o f  social inclusion. Abberley, however, went 
on to develop a somewhat more nuanced approach than Hunt, writing that it
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would seem that historically, the rights o f the human ‘being’ have come second 
to the universalising o f  human ‘doing’.
The importance o f  the work o f theorists such as Hunt and Abberley, has been to 
propose an understanding o f the position o f disabled people within the labour 
market in terms o f both material considerations and cultural perceptions. Their 
views that the cultural perceptions o f  disability are not only the result o f  the 
material inequalities characteristic o f  industrial capitalism, but are also some o f  
the central mechanisms by which such inequalities are maintained, is clearly 
supported in the work o f  Colin Barnes (1992b). Barnes (1992b) provides 
extensive evidence for institutional discrimination, which he claims comprises a 
“complex system o f  hostile environments and disabling barriers” (p .l). He 
highlights, amongst others, such issues as:
❖  Medical screening — despite some occupational health expert’s scepticism  
regarding the value o f such screening, such tests remain central to a large 
number o f employers’ recruitment procedures. The historical link between 
doctors and disabled people has perpetuated the widespread belief that 
impairment is the same as illness. Employers generally associate ill health 
with poor performance and excessive absenteeism, they are therefore 
wary o f employing people with a history o f illness, and by association, 
people with impairments.
❖  ‘Vital abilities’ -  the majority o f employers continue to describe most o f 
the work in their establishments as unsuitable for disabled people to 
undertake, especially in relation to what they describe as the ‘vital 
abilities’ required to do the job. Since the need for many o f  these so- 
called ‘vital abilities’ would not stand objective analysis, this must be 
viewed as another example o f  the discriminatory attitudes o f employers.
❖  ‘Appearance’ -  Jones and Longstone (1990) discovered that 10% o f  all 
vacancies displayed in Jobcentres stated that applicants were required to 
be o f ‘clean and tidy’ or o f ‘generally good’ appearance. Many disabled 
people are significantly disadvantaged in this regard either because they 
are unable to afford a ‘smart’ set o f  clothes suitable for an interview, or
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because for some disabled people their ‘unconventional’ body shape 
makes sourcing suitable clothing a problem. Such difficulties should be 
understood by employers and taken into account when considering a 
disabled applicant, but in reality the problem is exacerbated by the 
emphasis that many male employers place upon the physical 
attractiveness o f prospective employees. Morris (1989) found that some 
employers in the service sector felt that the sight o f  a disabled woman 
disturbs some clients.
Based upon Barnes (1992b)
What is clear from Barnes’ list however, is that materialist accounts, whilst 
important, cannot entirely explain the position o f  disabled people in the labour 
market. When, for example, Barnes considers the impact that some disabled 
peoples’ ‘non-conventional body forms’ may have on their job prospects he is 
clearly pointing to evidence o f the power o f stigma. It would seem likely 
therefore, that whilst materialist ‘dual market’ theories may well provide a major 
explanation for the position o f  disabled people in the labour market, especially 
during times o f high unemployment, other factors must also play a part in 
perpetuating discrimination against disabled people during times when the job 
market is more buoyant. The impact o f stigma and other processes by which 
disabled people and disabled bodies are deemed to be ‘abnormal’ w ill be 
considered again in chapter 7.
These major barriers facing disabled people who wish to enter the labour market 
are not, however, the only employment problems feeing disabled people. For 
disabled people who do work there is also the issue o f  underemployment and the 
particular problems associated with sheltered employment. All to often, the only 
type o f work that is available to disabled people is poorly paid and requires only 
low  skills. Such underemployment is undemanding and is both psychologically 
and financially unrewarding. People who have been labelled as having ‘severe’ 
impairments often experience this problem most acutely. For such individuals, it 
is often the case that the only work available is in sheltered employment, in
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organisations such as Remploy. Such workers are some o f the poorest wage 
earners in the country.
In the face o f such problems, the British government has historically opted for a 
fairly minimalist and voluntaristic policy response. O f those initiatives that have 
existed, few  have been rigorously enforced. For example, enshrined in the 1944 
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, is the requirement that all employers o f  
twenty or more employees must employ a 3% quota o f disabled people. The 
failure o f employers to support this quota has been largely ignored by successive 
governments. Indeed, there have only been 10 prosecutions since the quota was 
introduced, the last case having been brought in 1975 and with the maximum fine 
for employers remaining unchanged from the level set in 1944 o f £100 (Barnes et 
al, 1999). To make matters even worse, much against the wishes o f disabled 
people, the quota scheme was entirely abandoned in 1994. In addition, new  
initiatives have often been criticised for being ill-conceived. The new policy 
initiative o f  the 1990’s, the move away from sheltered employment and towards 
‘sheltered placements’ in mainstream places o f work, for example, has been 
greatly criticised for exacerbating the problem o f  underemployment, doing little 
to combat employer discrimination and for failing to improve the chances for 
disabled people to move into ‘proper’ mainstream employment.
In addition, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, heralded by the government 
as one o f the most advanced anti-discrimination legislation documents is 
fundamentally flawed in relation to workplace discrimination. Whilst the Act 
does cover issues relating to recruitment, terms o f  employment, promotional 
opportunities, training and dismissal procedures, unlike the legislation pertaining 
to ‘race’ and sex discrimination, discrimination against disabled people is only 
illegal if  it is ‘unreasonable’. As Roulstone (2000) has commented: “The belief 
that the power o f  employers is substantially countervailed by the DDA has to be 
acknowledged as untenable. ” (p.440)
Critics such as Roulestone (2000) have also suggested that even the most 
welcome new development, the N ew  Deal for disabled people, is unlikely to
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deliver the enhanced employment opportunities envisaged, since the underlying 
power relations o f employment remain largely unchallenged. Heenan (2002), 
however, has questioned Roulestone’s critique o f N ew  Deal, suggesting that 
whilst it may not be a perfect system, there are, nevertheless, many positive 
aspects o f the scheme. She demonstrates through empirical research with disabled 
respondents that there are many disabled people for whom the scheme has made a 
real difference to their lives. Thus, whilst the disadvantaged position o f  disabled 
people in terms o f the labour market remains, small steps in the right direction are 
being made in relation to the lives o f  some disabled people.
One o f the most profound and persistent implications o f  this injustice faced by 
disabled people with regard to the labour market, however, can be seen in relation 
to the average incomes o f disabled people. Figure 4.c clearly demonstrates that 
disabled people remain poor in relation to the general population. What is also 
clear from these figures is that the greater the severity o f  impairment, the lower 
the income. This situation persists despite a number o f  specific benefits such as 
the Disability Living Allowance and other additional tiers o f  benefits that have 
been put in place with the aim o f reaching further down the impairment severity 
scale. Whilst such policies have contributed to a substantial decrease in the 
numbers o f  disabled people in the bottom tenth o f the income distribution, 
nevertheless, it is still clear that those with the most severe impairments remain 
significantly disadvantaged and in real terms were less well o ff by 1996-7 than 
they had been in 1985 (Burchardt, 2000).
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Fig. 4c. Disabled people's average income, taking account o f  extra costs (M l
‘figure 2 ’ in title o f graph refers to position in original report.)
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From Burchardt.T (2000) (JRF Findings) Enduring economic exclusion: disabled people, income and wealth 
viewed on the JRF
Positive developments have not, therefore, been sufficient to counter the wider 
trends towards inequalities both between disabled people and in relation to 
disabled people’s position in society as a whole. Indeed, the continuing 
disadvantage experienced by many disabled people in terms o f income is part o f a 
wider problem facing the UK. In terms o f international comparison, the 
expansion of social security systems and/or safety nets in most countries has 
mitigated, to some extent, the observed trend o f increasing income inequality 
over the past 20-30 years. When compared internationally, for example with 
other countries within the EU, Australia, Canada Japan and the United States, the 
UK, however, has seen a below average increase in growth o f social security 
transfers as percentage o f GDP (1979-around 1994), despite a continuing increase 
in income inequality. Other countries with a below average growth rate include: 
Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United States. Countries with an above average rate o f growth in social security 
transfers include: Canada, France, and the four Nordic countries (Caminada and 
Goudswaard, 2000). In many respects these figures are not surprising given the 
fact that the Scandinavian welfare model, for example, acts within a market 
economy in which inequalities in income distribution and the concentration o f 
wealth and power are allowed less free play than is the case in the UK and
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elsewhere. It is difficult to avoid reaching the conclusion that despite having a 
more ‘left-wing’ government, UK social security policy continues to be 
influenced by a more conservative neo-liberalist ideology. Thus, despite the 
current government’s increased targeting o f  social protection benefits to those in 
the most need13, including many disabled people, overall, income inequality 
continues to rise, further disadvantaging socially excluded groups o f  which 
disabled people are but one.
The Inaccessible environment
Appropriate and decent housing is something that most people feel should be a 
basic entitlement in society, but changes in UK government policy have led to a 
virtual ‘ghettoisation’ o f lower income groups. Government spending on the 
education and health care systems has risen by over 30% since 1981, but the 
reverse is true for investment in housing. Policies such as the last Conservative 
governments’ ‘Right to buy initiative’ and privatisation schemes, have greatly 
reduced the availability o f  socially rented housing, leading, according to some 
commentators to a housing crisis14. Disabled people have been particularly 
affected by this housing crisis because their position as one o f the lowest income 
groups in society means that they are often reliant upon socially rented housing. 
The reluctance on the part o f private landlords to offer accessible homes and the 
pressure that this is putting upon local authorities to  provide suitable housing has 
been acknowledged by the government, and yet they have done little to 
encourage either public or private house builders to build to accessible standards. 
The result is that the development o f ‘special needs’ housing has been 
insufficient and uneven.
Over the past 25 years, the number o f local authority ‘completions’ (or approvals 
to build) o f  wheelchair-adapted homes in England has decline dramatically. This 
is largely due to the transfer o f  housing stock to Housing Associations, and the 
‘right to buy’ initiative. At the same time, there has been a modest, if uneven,
13 Please se e '
“Expenditure on social protection benefits in real terms by function, 1990/91 and 2000/01.” 18/09/03
14 Please see the current UNISON campaign: “Hands Off Our Housing” :
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increase in the provision o f accessible housing by housing associations. As Harris 
et al (1997) have discovered, however, the problem has been that there is 
evidence to suggest that a mismatch between tenants and housing association 
dwellings has resulted in only a quarter o f  wheelchair adapted homes actually 
being occupied by a wheelchair-user, whilst over half o f  wheelchair-using tenants 
are living in non-wheelchair-adapted dwellings!
Apart from the issue o f housing, disabled people also face considerable barriers 
within the wider built environment. Disabled people’s requirements are poorly 
articulated and/or represented in the design or development o f  the built 
environment, a problem that is largely explained by the fact that UK planning 
legislation is weak and is often not enforced properly. By way o f  explanation for 
this, social geographers have pointed to the socio-spatial construction o f  
inaccessible environments, whilst many within sociology have recognised that 
life and society are not only constituted in time and history, but are also located, 
contextualised and reproduced in space. Kitchen and Law (2001) talk about the 
‘landscapes o f exclusion’ faced by disabled people, which are created by 
‘‘particular power geometries and shaped by notions o f  citizenship and social 
justice.” (p.287) In an earlier article, Kitchen (1998) draws upon Imrie (1996) 
when he comments that:
Environments that exclude disabled people are rarely ‘natural’; 
they are produced through individual social interactions combined 
with state policy, building regulations, and architectural and 
planning practice, (p.346)
Kitchen (1998) identifies the following as examples o f implicit or thoughtless 
designs that contribute to the ‘landscape o f  exclusion’: steps with no ramp; cash 
machines that have been placed too high on walls; inaccessible out-of-town  
shopping centres; disabled toilets becoming storerooms; and obstacles being 
placed so as to block accessible entrances. Kitchen’s (1998) conclusion is that as 
an active constituent o f  social relations, space is socially produced to exclude 
disabled people in two main ways: firstly, spaces are currently organised to keep 
disabled people ‘in their place’; secondly, spaces are social texts that convey to
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disabled people that they are ‘out o f place’. Kitchen’s argument is reinforced by 
the work o f Imrie and Kumar (1998) whose research demonstrates that many 
disabled people feel estranged and oppressed by facets o f the built environments 
and generally feel powerless to do anything about it. Whilst there have been some 
recent amendments to building regulations to acknowledge disabled people’s 
rights to access public buildings, the inaccessible built environment remains a 
major barrier to the inclusion o f disabled people into society.
Finally, a key part o f this inaccessible environment which cannot be overlooked, 
is the problem disabled people face in relation to transport. In 1989 the Disabled 
Persons Transport Advisory Committee (DPTAC) estimated that between 10 and 
12% o f Britain’s population experience problems with the “unfriendly features o f  
the transport environment (DPTAC, 1989: 1) Over the intervening 10 years 
improvements to the transport environment have been taking place, not least due 
to the immense efforts in campaigning that has been undertaken by many key 
disability organisations (eg. Direct Action Network). Nevertheless, change has 
taken place slowly and even though the Department o f  Transport now fully 
supports the principle o f accessible public transport, it is likely to be many years 
before such things are commonplace.
Family life
The final issue to be considered within this section is that o f  family life for 
disabled people. For most people, the family is one o f the central, if  not the 
central institution in their lives. It is only fairly recently, however, that family life 
for disabled people has attracted the attention o f social researchers. What 
research has been done in this area has broadly concluded that the presence o f a 
disabled person within the family has profound implications for the relationships 
and opportunities o f  the family as a unit. Such broad conclusions can be 
misleading however, for the issues relating to the family lives o f  disabled people 
are very complex and the diversity o f experiences both between individuals and 
groups cannot be ignored. Further, such conclusions can be misleading if  they 
focus upon the disabled member o f a family as the ‘problem’ and fail to consider
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how the low  level o f service provision for disabled people may be compounding 
the problems faced by many disabled families.
Over the past twenty years the position o f the disabled family has undergone a 
number o f  radical changes associated with exposure to a range o f factors, the 
most important being the move away from institutionalisation and the drive 
towards care in the community. Few disabled activists or commentators have 
questioned the ethics behind such a change; the reality o f community care has, 
however, been more problematic. In general, local authority social services, 
especially those for physically disabled people have received low priority in 
comparison with other user groups. The focus o f  local authorities, according to 
writers such as Hudson (2000), has been more upon the deinstitutionalisation o f  
people with a learning disability and upon concerns surrounding the needs o f the 
increasing numbers o f frail elderly people. Given this low  priority accorded to 
services for physically disabled people, it is inevitable that a range o f  problems 
have been identified. Hudson (2000) has identified these problems as including: a 
lack o f  strategic interagency work in terms o f planning, information and 
assessment for people with physical disabilities; service users have not been 
regularly and actively involved in planning services strategically for the 
community or for themselves as individual users; poor levels o f  information 
available to service users about services.
These final two points made by Hudson surrounding the lack o f control 
experienced by disabled people in relation to the services that impact upon their 
lives, is echoed by other authors such as Priestley (1999) and Wood (1991). 
W ood (1991), a disabled writer, has attacked the philosophy o f  community care 
as it is set out within the White Paper “Caring For People”. He claims that this 
approach to community care emphasises ‘care’ over concepts like choice or 
control Priestley (1999) shares W ood’s view stating that: “the construction o f  
disability as dependency has been a recurrent and pervasive feature o f  
community care policy making” (p.44) He further highlights how some authors 
in this field have gone so far as to argue that the surveillance o f  disabled people, 
particularly disabled women, by professional groups as part o f  community care,
132
Chapter 4
can be understood in Foucauldian terms as disciplining and controlling. Under 
such analysis, community care takes on an almost sinister aspect.
Having stated these broad criticisms o f community care the aim o f the following 
section is to consider how such issues impact upon different types o f  disabled 
family. The first type o f  disabled family exists where there is a disabled child. 
Over the past twenty years there has been a major trend towards disabled children 
living with their families, not within institutions. Today, less that 2% o f all 
disabled children live within institutions (Smyth and Robus, 1989). Whilst few  
would argue against such moves, the distress caused by institutionalisation being 
w ell understood, such a trend has not always been matched by the necessary 
increase in support available to these families. It seems unethical to talk in such 
terms, but it is nevertheless the case, that the situation for many disabled families 
is now  exacerbated by the increased life expectancy o f many severely disabled 
children. There are clearly some serious moral issues that need to be addressed by 
all those who determine policy and resources in this area, for if  such increases in 
life expectancy are to be the source o f  great joy, then adequate funding must be 
given to the already stretched community based services in order that they can 
adequately support families.
The result o f such service inadequacies is growing strain within the disabled 
family, particularly upon mothers. As with all ‘caring’ much o f the responsibility 
for looking after disabled children within a family falls to the mother. Whilst 
many women find the role o f caring for a disabled child rewarding, many others 
find the role very stressful, especially if  the child’s impairment takes the form o f 
often being ill. In such a situation, the physical and emotional effort involved in 
day-to-day parenting is extended beyond what would normally be expected. This 
problem is exacerbated by the apparent lack o f childcare for disabled children. In 
a recent survey carried out by “Contact a Family”, an organisation for families 
with disabled children, 1000 o f the 1,870 parents who responded stated that they 
had had to reduce their hours or give up work altogether because o f childcare
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problems15. The current government’s recent introduction o f ‘flexible working’ 
from April 2003, as part o f  The Employment Act 2002, may help to alleviate 
some o f these problems. According to this new initiative, employers must 
consider requests for such things as flexitime, home working, term-working, and 
job-sharing, fairly  and are only able to refuse if  there is a clear business reason. 
Ultimately, however, the onus is on employers to be ‘fair’ and so there may still 
be a battle to persuade employers to back the new initiative. In addition to this 
new strategy, improvements to the availability and affordability o f  childcare for 
disabled children are still needed.
Whilst the effects upon family life that result from having a disabled child can 
vary depending upon the family’s existing circumstances and networks o f  
support, more often than not disabled families find themselves very much alone. 
Research by Glendinning (1986) found that:
Parents consistently pointed out how the onus lay with them to 
initiate such contacts as and when they felt they needed to. This 
often causes them considerable difficulty (...) Parents were 
reluctant to be seen to need help, and were unsure about how that 
expressed need would be judged by professional or administrative 
officials, (p.13)
The fear o f being perceived by service professionals as having failed as parents 
can, therefore, act to perpetuate the isolation o f the disabled family.
Where the picture may at first glance seem ‘rosy’ as in families where informal 
care seems to be succeeding and parents are determined to look after and protect 
their disabled child, there is evidence that siblings o f the disabled child may 
suffer from unintentional neglect. In the worst cases, where informal care is not 
succeeding, McCormack (1992) reports that the extra stresses faced by disabled 
families have resulted in increased levels o f  family breakdown and divorce, 
certain families faring particularly badly: the divorce rate amongst UK couples 
with children with learning disabilities, for example, being 10 times the national 
average. Further, it is a sad fact that disabled children are still more likely to be
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abandoned than non-disabled children, have considerably less chance o f  
subsequently being adopted and even more disturbingly, evidence suggests, are 
more at risk from the dark side o f family life in the form o f physical and sexual 
abuse.16
For disabled adults, family life is often no easier. It is w ell documented that 
disability within marriage can put a major strain upon the relationship. Parker 
(1993) interviewed married couples where one partner was disabled; such 
couples indicated their uncertainties about giving and receiving support, in 
particular, with personal tasks. She further suggests that providing intimate care 
is harder for those who are in a close sexual relationship or where sexual relations 
have been restricted by a disability. Feminists have suggested that these problems 
are experienced by women most acutely, as part o f  the relationships o f  
surveillance, subordination and control that operate not only within the public 
domain, but also within the private domain o f the family. Analysing the disabled 
family in this way, feminists have suggested that even when actions are construed 
by the dominant party to be about ‘love’ for the disabled individual, those actions 
may have more to do private patriarchy (Barnes et al, 1999).
Women may also be more disabled than men in comparable situations in another 
key respect, that is, with regard to the ways in which they are de-gendered. It has 
been widely recognised that service providers tend to give a lower priority to the 
needs o f  disabled women in general terms, but where service provision does exist 
it tends to be designed in ways that replace women’s role within the family, 
instead o f empowering them to retain control o f  domestic arrangements. Further, 
one o f  the most basic rights o f womanhood is the right to reproduce, but both 
historical and contemporary attitudes towards disabled women as mothers, 
suggests that society is unsure about whether to grant disabled women this basic 
human right (see Kallianes and Rubenfield, 1997).
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Fears have been expressed surrounding what is perceived by many to be the risk 
o f  childbearing to disabled women in terms o f exacerbating their impairments or 
in terms o f  transmitting their impairments to a child. This second point has 
become an even greater issue in the light o f  recent technological advances such as 
genetic counselling and prenatal screening. Such attitudes place a great pressure 
upon prospective disabled parents. Even more stress, however, is felt by those 
disabled people who do become parents. Disabled women have highlighted the 
enormous pressure placed upon them to be ‘good enough mothers’ not only by 
health and social welfare professionals, but also by family and friends. As has 
already been mentioned, this pressure can be understood in Foucauldian terms as 
a system o f  discipline and control, in which disabled mothers experience greater 
surveillance than their non-disabled peers.
With regard to mothering and parenting more generally, people with a learning 
disability undoubtedly experience this surveillance most acutely. While disabled 
women who do not have a learning disability feel the pressure to prove 
themselves to be ‘good enough’ mothers, more often than not people with a 
learning disability are denied even the opportunity to prove their competence. 
Parents with a learning disability are widely considered to lack the skills required 
to ensure the well-being and development o f their children. This is a view  that 
has persisted despite some strong evidence from authors such as Booth and Booth 
(1994,1998) to suggest that such black and white thinking must be avoided:
Our research challenges such a summary judgement by showing 
that child outcomes cannot be predicted on the basis o f  their 
parents’ label alone. Some children (...) become well-adjusted 
adults who make their own way in society and bring up families o f  
their own. Others (...) are corralled into a melancholic and 
shrivelled existence. Understanding their stories means looking 
beyond the capacities and limitations o f  their parents. (Booth and 
Booth, 1998:101)
Verdict -  inequalities o f  opportunity
What is clear from the discussion above is that systematic inequalities continue to
exist between disabled and non-disabled people in each o f the major public
136
Chapter 4
spheres -  education, employment and in relation to issues o f access. What the 
previous discussion also demonstrates, however, is the extent to which public 
attitudes towards disabled people impact upon the private world o f the disabled 
family. Further, when considered in its entirety, what the research discussed 
above clearly demonstrates is that moral issues surrounding what kinds o f lives 
are valued within a society and are considered to be worthy o f inclusion within 
the ‘mainstream’, continue to structure the lives o f  disabled people. In the final 
part o f  this chapter, the ways in which disabled people and groups have 
themselves been challenging these issues through such things as the disability 
identity, the disability movement and disability culture will be considered.
The *coming out * o f disability
The fact that disabled people are devalued and stigmatised by society has been 
w ell documented by a large number o f authors (see Karpf 1988, Morris, 1991, 
Ross, 1997), but arguably, chief amongst these authors are Colin Barnes and Tom  
Shakespeare. Barnes (1992c) provides one o f the most powerful analyses o f  this 
process o f  stigmatisation through his discussion o f the disabling imagery used by 
the media. According to his argument, such images as they appear in films, 
books, in the press and on television, form the “bedrock on which the attitudes 
towards, assumptions about and expectations o f disabled people are based. " 
(Barnes, 1992c: 19) For Barnes (1992c), these disabling images include:
❖  The view o f the disabled person as a ‘curio’
❖  The view o f  the disabled person as a ‘super cripple’
❖  The view o f the disabled person as an object o f ridicule
❖  The view o f the disabled person as a burden
❖  The view o f  the disabled person as their own worst and only enemy
❖  The view  o f  the disabled person as incapable o f participating fully in 
community life
❖  The view o f the disabled person as an object o f  violence
❖  The view o f the disabled person as sinister and evil
❖  The view o f the disabled person as sexually abnormal
Chapter 4
137
Perhaps the most profound and frequently occurring disabling image, however, is 
that o f  the disabled person as pitiable and pathetic. For Barnes, this entirely 
negative view  o f  disability is recurrent in all media depictions o f disability and is 
key to perpetuating the myth that disability is synonymous with suffering. 
According to his analysis, such a view o f disabled people succeeds in focusing 
attention upon the medical aspects o f impairment whilst diverting public attention 
away from the social factors that disable people. Further, such attitudes towards 
disabled people are revealed, Barnes claims, by the frequent use o f patronising 
and offensive language such as ‘the plucky’ and ‘the brave’, or the ‘victim’ or 
‘unfortunate’ to describe disabled individuals.
M ost interestingly and controversially, perhaps, Barnes also identifies one final 
disabling image, that o f the disabled person as ‘normal’. Whilst he admits that in 
some respects the appearance o f such images in the media recently is an 
important step, he nevertheless identifies three risks associated with this imagery. 
Firstly, in emphasising ‘ability’ not impairment, such images essentially deny the 
reality o f  impairment and undermine the positive disability identity which many 
disabled people are seeking to celebrate. Secondly, there are limits, Barnes 
claims, to this notion o f disabled people as ‘normal’, for after all, ‘normal’ people 
are rarely dependent upon the goodwill o f  others in order to survive. Thirdly, the 
focus o f  this new approach within the media tends to be about stressing the 
‘normality’ o f certain individuals with impairments, rather than questioning how  
society disables. Thus, for Barnes even seemingly positive new developments in 
public attitudes towards disability can in fact be little more than a re-packaging o f  
familiar attitudes.
Shakespeare echoes Barnes in his belief that disabled people remain devalued and 
stigmatised within society and most recently he has been tackling the issues 
raised by advances in medicine and genetics. For Shakespeare (1998), the 
problem with the ‘new genetics’ is that it fails to consider impairment as part o f  
the human condition. Instead, according to Shakespeare, such new technologies 
further disadvantage disabled people by perpetuating the idea that disability is a 
purely medical problem which can and should be dealt with in purely medical
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terms, so avoiding the issue o f the social construction o f disability. Further, as he 
also highlights, there are some major ethical dilemmas associated with seeking to 
eliminate disability, for the underlying logic to such an approach must be that a 
disabled person’s life is not worth living. Whilst there are clear implications o f  
this in terms o f disabled people’s rights to life, the other effect o f such attitudes is 
to further disadvantage those individuals who acquire a disability in their 
lifetimes.
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The drive to use genetic and obstetric techniques to remove 
disabled people from the population fails to consider the millions 
o f  people developing impairments as a result o f  accident or 
disease during the life-course. Resources would be better spent on 
creating an inclusive and barrier-free society, and promoting the 
civil rights and independent living o f disabled people. Society 
should value disabled people, alongside all human life. 
(Shakespeare, 1998: 679)
Given therefore, that the dominant culture is replete with these disabling images, 
the challenge for many disabled people has been how to develop counter images 
and values which are empowering and which promote the idea that society should 
value people with impairments. The following discussion will focus upon two 
main areas: firstly, issues relating to disability identity politics; and secondly, 
issues relating to the thorny question o f  the extent to which disabled people can 
be considered to be a part o f an alternative culture, in opposition to mainstream 
culture.
Disability identity politics
In 1996, a very interesting chapter by Susan Peters appeared in Len Barton’s 
(Ed.) “Disability and Society: Emerging Issues and Insights.” In this chapter, 
Peters (1996) examined the current state o f  the politics o f  the disability identity 
and concluded that there is no ‘positive’ identity o f disability:
People with disabilities have largely assimilated these tarnished 
images in society and the academy. Accepting the idea that we are 
the Other, we continue to search for ways that will garner our 
acceptance in ‘mainstream’ society -  mostly through political
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strategies and legal mandates -  while at the same time denying 
our personal and multiple identities, (p.219)
Y et, only one year later, in 1997, Gilson et al wrote:
The transformation from tentative affirmation o f  disability identity 
to proclamation o f  disability pride reflects the increasing 
importance o f  self-determination. A confident, positive disability 
identity within a broad, inclusive disability community has 
emerged. The benefit to disabled people to determine and relate 
their own stories is increasingly evident, (p.16)
Clearly there is little agreement surrounding this issue o f  a positive disability 
identity.
O f those who share Gilson’s view, Shakespeare (1993), Morris (1991) and Oliver 
(1990, 1997) are probably the best known authors. All three authors see the 
development o f  a politicised disability identity as having the potential to bring 
about radical improvements in the lives o f disabled people. Such thinking has led 
both Shakespeare (1993) and Oliver (1997), to make the not unsurprising link 
with new social movement theorising, Oliver in particular claiming that the 
“Disability movement is a N ew  Social Movement!” (my italics). Shakespeare and 
Oliver’s new theorising, however, whilst o f considerable interest and importance 
in furthering our understanding o f the disability movement is as yet not fully 
developed and herein lies the problem. It is difficult to avoid concluding from 
some o f  Oliver’s work that his personal desire to see the disability movement as a 
new social movement is clouding his academic judgement somewhat. In an 
earlier paper written with Gerry Zarb ([1989] 1997) Oliver analyses the extent to 
which the disability movement is a new social movement and concludes that: 
“the disability movement can, indeed, be considered as part o f  a  new social 
movement generally.” (p.207) (my emphasis) The word ‘generally’ is important 
here, however, for although clearly hoping to persuade the reader that the 
disability movement is a new social movement, Oliver and Zarb do admit that it 
does not share one o f the four major characteristics o f  a new social movement. In 
relation to the idea that new social movements are characterised by ‘post­
materialist’ or ‘post-acquisitive’ values being given precedence over those
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concerned with income, material needs or social security, Oliver and Zarb 
([1989] 1997) state:
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Whilst it is certainly true that the disability movement is 
concerned with issues relating to the quality o f  life o f  disabled 
people, it is also true that many disabled people still face material 
deprivation as well as social disadvantage and the movement is 
centrally concerned with this. It would be inaccurate to attempt to 
characterise the disability movement as stemming from a middle- 
class, disabled elite concerned only with their own quality o f  life 
(...) (p.206)
In other words, the disability movement’s concerns with some o f  the persistent 
social inequalities discussed earlier in this chapter, cannot be denied, and must 
bring into some doubt the notion that the disability movement is a new social 
movement. Indeed, Erevelles (1996) makes it quite clear that these post- 
materialist/post-structural values and disability make an “uneasy alliance” 
(p.523). In response to the post-structural idea that privilege should be given to 
the ‘space o f  the discoursive’ in order to produce many empowering possibilities, 
Erevelles (1996) points out that many disabled people have argued that these:
(...) imaginative meaning systems within discoursive spaces do not 
in any way alleviate the real material limitations that they face on 
a daily basis -  material conditions that have caused many o f  them 
to live lives o f  extreme poverty, (p.524)
Setting aside this issue o f  whether the disability movement is a new social 
movement, there do seem, however, to be a large number o f  authors who share 
the view  that fashioning a positive collective identity for disabled people is both a 
major part o f what the disability movement is and should be about. Barnes et al 
(1999), for example, have commented that;
Disabled people’s  self-organisation challenges the myth o f  
passivity and the objectification o f  disabled people. Disabled 
people, like children, are meant to be seen, and not heard; they 
are meant to be grateful, not angry; they are meant to be humble 
not proud. In challenging all these preconceptions and 
discriminatory ideologies, the movement is making progress
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everyday, even before attaining its central political objectives.
(p.178)
There is evidence, however, to suggest that the disability movement in the UK 
has not been entirely successful in developing this positive identity and group 
consciousness across the disabled population as a whole. One o f  the key 
stumbling blocks has been the division that exists between groups o f  individuals 
w ith different impairments. Whilst some authors have suggested that these 
divisions have largely been established arbitrarily by charities and traditional 
welfare organisations, others, for example Priestley (1995) have proposed that 
these differences are very real and cannot be ignored. For Priestley, the tendency 
on the part o f  many o f the key players in the disability movement, has been to  
emphasise commonality over difference. This, he warns is unwise for:
( .. .)  it is clear that all social movements based (necessarily) upon 
a commonality o f  interests run the risk o f alienating individuals 
and groups with unique personal experiences. In the present 
context, unique personal experiences o f  impairment may often be 
perceived as more immediate and important than the commonality 
associated with disablement as a form o f  social oppression. 
(Priestley, 1995:159)
In particular, Priestley draws attention to what he considers to be the legitimate 
concerns o f  many disability groups with special interests such as ethnicity, 
gender or sexuality, that their special interests may be perceived to be ‘optional 
extras’ to  the common experience o f  disability. Priestley’s point is taken further 
by Vernon (1999) who argues that so-called ‘simultaneous oppression’ or ‘double 
jeopardy’ has often been alleged to be the unique experience o f  a minority o f  
disabled people. In fact, according to Vernon, the experience o f  simultaneous 
oppression, is key to understanding disability itself; since the majority o f  disabled 
people are not a homogeneous mass o f disabled, white, heterosexual, 
middleclass, young men!
For Vernon, it is essential that the disability movement avoid making the 
assumption that other forms o f  oppression, for example, sexism, have already 
been ‘taken care o f  by other movements. She points to  the growing literature
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which shows that disabled people experience racism (Begum, 1992, 1994, 
Sharma and Love, 1991 and Stuart, 1992, 1993, 1994.); sexism (Fine and Asch, 
1988, Morris, 1989, 1991, 1996, Lloyd, 1992); heterosexism (Corbett, 1994, 
Hearn, 1988); ageism (Zarb and Oliver, 1993, MacFarlane, 1994); and class 
inequality issues (Priestley, 1995). She then highlights the manner in which 
different forms o f oppression can interact, for example, for many disabled people, 
their socio-economic or class position can have profound effects upon their 
options as a disabled person with regard to lifestyle. To make matters even worse 
for such groups, Vernon (1999) claims: “Being black and disabled can sometimes 
mean that you are neither fully accepted in the black community nor in the 
disabled community.” (p.395) This is a potential problem for all groups 
experiencing simultaneous oppression, and is, seemingly, yet to be adequately 
considered by the disability movement. Indeed, Fawcett (2000) drawing upon the 
work o f  Nancy Fraser (1995a) states that focusing on disability as ‘difference’ 
can in itself be used in a normative way to ‘gloss-over’ pervasive differences 
between disabled people, for example, between academically able physically 
disabled people and individuals with learning disabilities.
Fiona Williams (1996), however, again from a feminist perspective, suggests that 
whilst the above is undoubtedly true, it may sometimes be expedient to engage in 
the temporary ‘fixing’ or ‘freezing’ o f  differences in order to achieve key 
political and strategic goals. The challenge for the disability movement, however, 
in its quest to ‘freeze’ divisions within the disabled population even temporarily 
for political purposes, is to find an agreed disability identity behind which people 
are prepared to unite. Warren (1999) has commented:
(...) while users may be united by shared experience o f  forced  
dependency and a common goal o f  empowerment, it cannot be 
assumed that individuals agree about the identity to adopt in order 
to fight for that goal or the path o f  the battle: for example, some 
people reject the term ‘disabled’ as a stigmatising label, others 
object to the degree o f emphasis placed on physical access by the 
disability movement, (p.123)
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In the light o f  this absence o f  solidarity amongst disabled people, it unclear what 
form the battle for disabled people’s citizenship rights is truly taking.
A disability culture? 17
The debate surrounding the existence o f  a disability culture reflects this 
uncertainty with regard to disability identity and the disability movement. The 
debate is also made considerably more complex due to academic disagreements 
surrounding the whole notion o f  what is meant by culture. Perhaps the most 
useful definition o f  culture, however, is provided by Raymond Williams (1980, 
1981), who has been very influential within the field. For Williams, culture has 
tw o main aspects: firstly, the known meanings and directions into which 
members o f  a culture are socialised and which represent the traditional aspect o f  a 
culture; secondly, the new observations and meanings, which are offered and 
tested by a group, and which represents the creative aspect o f a culture. Thus, for 
Williams, the significance o f cultural practices and representations such as those 
in the media and other art forms, is that they are often one o f the key ways in 
which a culture is created and maintained, whilst always providing opportunity 
for change.
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The key point here, however, is that whilst Williams does stress the importance 
o f  forms o f representation, he does not equate ‘culture’ with the ‘arts’. This is 
important when considering the disability culture, because it would be a mistake 
to equate the disability culture, with the Disability Arts Movement. Undeniably, 
the Disability Arts Movement has played a very powerful role in communicating
17 Readers may note that no reference is made within this section to the particular experiences of those 
people with congenital hearing impairments who self-define as Deaf, rather than deaf, who use Sign 
Language and who consider themselves to be a part o f  a cultural minority. This omission was not 
unintentional. Clearly the Deaf culture does constitute a separate culture on the basis o f  a shared languugc 
and Deaf people’s arguments in favour o f viewing them as a cultural minority analogous to other minority 
ethnic groups is convincing.
The reason why this group has not been considered in more depth within this chapter, however, is because 
Deaf people have long resisted identification as disabled or impaired people and this has proved to be a 
major stumbling block to developing links between Deaf people and the disability movement. Since this is a 
very specific issue applying to only a very small proportion o f the disabled population, and does not reflect 
the views o f the many deaf people who do not identify themselves with the Deaf culture, or who do clearly 
define themselves as disabled people, it was not considered necessary to go into any depth with regard to this 
debate. For those who wish to know more about these issues, however, a good introduction to the debate has 
been provided by Mairian Corker (1998).
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the distinctive history, skills, customs, experiences and concerns o f  disabled 
people, which many people consider to be a distinctive lifestyle. The key 
question, however, is whether this distinct lifestyle expressed by Disability Arts 
truly represents a distinct disability culture?
There would appear to be two approaches to theorising disability culture, and 
there are some key problems with each. Firstly, there are those who consider 
disability culture to be about challenging the cultural representations o f  disability 
that exist within mainstream culture in order to achieve for disabled people the 
equal respect and value that is given to other members o f  society. Such a position 
with regard to disability culture clearly perceives that such cultural practices are 
not only about tackling stigma, but in so doing are also about increasing the 
equality o f opportunity and outcomes for disabled people.
Whilst not denying the importance o f such cultural challenges to mainstream 
prejudice, the question o f whether such cultural strategies represent true cultural 
difference is a thorny one. Chapters 6 and 7 will consider this issue in greater 
depth. It is important to note here, however that such issues have also led some 
people to question who actually belongs to the disability culture. Clearly, 
individuals who aim to become assimilated into the mainstream ‘normal’ world 
would not choose to identify themselves clearly with the disability culture, but 
there are also other groups, for example, people with a learning disability or a 
mental illness, who may also find that their cultural membership is unclear. 
Gilson and Depoy (2000) have highlighted the way in which the question o f who 
can be a part o f the disability culture is a constant source o f tension. They suggest 
that individuals within the disabled population may find themselves positioned 
against one another as political advantage is sought. This is hardly the basis for a 
shared cultural context.
The second approach to disability culture is similarly problematic. For many o f  
the authors in this field, Oliver and Morris being key examples, disability culture 
is about ‘celebrating’ disability as ‘difference’. This notion o f celebrating 
difference is very much connected with the idea o f  the positive ‘disability
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identity’, and as such is equally contested. For many, it is problematic to speak o f  
‘disability pride’ and the ‘celebration o f difference’ in relation to the lives o f  
people whose impairments are painful, debilitating or even fatal. Whilst many 
people in this field would agree that the quality o f  life o f  many disabled people is 
gravely affected by social factors, medical factors cannot be ignored and in the 
light o f  the diversity o f  experience with regard to impairment, it would seem  
overly optimistic, if  not insensitive, to talk about celebrating disability across the 
disabled population. The tendency on the part o f  a number o f key theorists in this 
field to ignore the very real reasons why some disabled individuals may feel 
unable to celebrate their difference is one o f the key problems facing disability 
theory today.
Perhaps much o f  the discussion above can be summarised by saying that one o f  
the key problems facing those who consider there to be a disability culture is the 
extent to which they perceive this culture to be ‘exclusive’. For many 
commentators, there is a growing risk that in the manner in which key figures are 
defining disability culture, a ‘confining social identity’ (Gilson and Depoy, 2000) 
is being created for disabled people. Whilst on a positive note establishing such 
clear cultural boundaries may create belongingness, they may also create 
symbolic incarceration.
Conclusion
As the various sections o f this chapter demonstrate, despite some major 
improvements in the lives o f disabled people, systematic structural inequalities 
between disabled and non-disabled people remain, as do the persistent negative 
attitudes towards people with impairments. Such prejudicial attitudes may 
themselves be responsible for confirming many o f these traditional patterns o f  
inequality.
Despite this gloomy conclusion, there is some hope for the future with regard to 
the position o f disabled people in society. Advances in Medical Sociology and 
Disability Studies, emancipatory research paradigms, and the collective power o f
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disabled people in challenging the dominant views on disability, have already 
brought about some important changes in the lives o f  disabled people. In the 
future it is to be hoped that such progress will continue, and that Disability will 
be recognised by disabled and non-disabled people alike as a civil rights issue. 
Whether or not we will ever witness the true ‘coming out’ o f  disabled people is 
questionable, however, for as has been discussed in the later sections o f  this 
chapter, the ways in which issues such as impairment, gender, ethnicity, sexuality 
affect experiences o f  disability have created divisions within the disabled 
population, significantly weakens the notion o f a collective disability identity or 
culture.
Chapter 4
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Social Movements
Introduction
Setting aside the debate regarding the term ‘post-modernity’, few social theorists 
would disagree that over the past century, society has undergone a wide variety 
o f changes that when considered cumulatively bring into some doubt the idea that 
we inhabit a ‘modem’ society. For example, ‘struggle’ and unrest are no longer 
focused within a homogenous ‘working class’. Instead, divisions within the 
socio-econom ic groupings and blurring o f the boundaries between groups have 
become widely understood resulting in a questioning o f the whole notion o f  
‘class’. What has come to be known as Late/r Modernity is now characterised by 
a variety o f forms o f  unrest that can alternatively be seen as either resulting from 
the breakdown o f ‘class’ as the major social cleavage, or as further hastening the 
decline o f  class-based ‘politics’. Issues relating to gender, sexuality, ‘race’, 
dis/ability, ecologism , and a wide variety o f other belief- and value-based 
systems have now come to the fore. The proliferation o f such social groupings at 
first glance appears to make the idea that we live in a ‘movement society’ 
increasingly plausible. The term must be used with caution however, since it is 
unclear whether any agreement has been reached regarding whether or not all 
movements within a ‘movement society’ are based upon this proliferation o f  
unrest, or what are the central factors necessary to transform a ‘struggle’ into a 
‘movement’.
Nevertheless, there can be seen to have been tw o broad traditions o f social 
movement theorizing, roughly equating to an American and a European tradition 
(see Fig.5.a). Further, the 1960’s proved to be a watershed with regard to 
theorizing in this field and led to a break with traditional views on social 
movements. Those theories developed before the late 1960’s I have termed ‘First 
Phase Theories’ and those that came after, the ‘Second Phase Theories’. This
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chapter will begin by considering the First Phase Theories. The first phase o f the 
American tradition centred on the Collective Behaviour approach to social 
movements, and, I would argue, is best exemplified in the work o f  Herbert 
Blumer. For this reason, I will begin by considering Blumer’s contribution to 
social movement theorizing. This is not to say, however, that the collective actor 
approach was the only first phase American theory. It would be wrong to 
overlook completely the structural-functionalist perspective o f  Parson’s, for 
example. This approach has been heavily criticised however, for regarding 
collective movements as irrational actors, and collective action as being solely 
the product o f malfunctions o f the social system. This approach, other than being 
the subject o f much, later criticism, particularly by Oberschall (1973), has not 
subsequently developed into a major strand o f social movement theorising. It is 
for this reason that this approach is not considered in any greater depth within 
this chapter.1
The ‘First Phase Theories’ in the European tradition are less clearly associated 
with particular theorists. Instead, European social movement theory has taken 
many forms, but can, nevertheless, be broadly termed a Social Democratic 
tradition and can be sub-divided into Weberian and Marxist approaches. These 
approaches will be briefly discussed before a consideration o f what is meant by 
this notion o f  the ‘1960’s watershed’ and its effects upon subsequent theorizing.
I w ill then move on to consider the ‘Second Phase Theories’. In the American 
tradition, post-1960’s theorizing has been dominated by the Resource 
Mobilization theories, and I include within this category the Political Process 
theories. Within this America tradition, the work o f Oberschall, Tilly and Tarrow 
is particularly central, so these theorists will be considered in some depth. In 
post-1960’s Europe a number o f  related approaches emerged based around 
notions o f  identity, defence o f the lifeworld, values and culture. I have rather 
loosely termed these approaches the ‘N ew ’ Social Movement theories. These
Chapter 5
1 For readers who may be interested to read further about this approach, please see: Parsons (1961, 1969); 
Smelser (1963); and Eyerman and Jameson (1991).
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theories are most clearly articulated in the work o f Touraine, Habermas and 
Melucci and their theories will be considered in turn within the chapter.
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Fig. 5a
Phase l  Theories
Collective Behaviour -  The American Tradition
Blumer -  symbolic interactionism
The Collective Behaviour explanation for social movements originates within the 
Chicago School and is probably best exemplified in the work of Herbert Blumer. 
Blumer was interested in the symbolic production and construction o f identity
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and saw social movements as being about producing new norms and solidarities. 
Social movements, according to his theory, are strongly linked with the value 
systems o f a society and are as such, an integral part o f  any ‘normal’ society. 
That is not to say that social movements are not about change, but that their role 
as catalysts for change is essential to the inherent transformational quality o f a 
‘normal’ society.
M ost theorists o f social movements would probably agree with Blumer ([1951] 
1995) that:
Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to 
establish a new order o f  life. They have their inception in a 
condition o f  unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand 
from dissatisfaction with the current form o f  life, and on the other 
hand from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system o f  living.
(p.60)
It is, however, the manner in which Blumer proceeded to theorize the ‘careers’ o f 
social movements and produce a typology o f different types o f movement, that 
signals his particular approach to this field. In many respects, what Blumer 
provides is a ‘joined up’ approach that seeks to explain both the ‘how’ and the 
‘why’ o f social movements.
Implicit in Blumer’s work is a focus upon the individual actor and issues o f  
identity. Blumer was clearly concerned with social movements as examples o f  
collectivities, the identity o f which are simultaneously structured by individual 
members, and yet also structure the lives and identities o f  those members. He 
identified three major types o f social movement, and these he termed the ‘general 
social movements', the ‘specific social movements' and the ‘expressive social 
movements'. To begin with the last, the distinguishing feature o f expressive 
movements is that they do not seek to achieve structural objectives. Expressive 
movements are not about social change. The tension and unrest out o f  which 
these movements emerge is not focused upon a particular objective, but rather 
takes the form o f some kind o f expressive behaviour. Nevertheless, these 
movements are not without effect, for some o f this expressive behaviour may
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have “profound effects on the personalities o f  individuals and on the character o f  
the social order” (Blumer, [1951] 1995:77)
Blumer identifies religious movements and ‘fashion’ as two examples o f  
expressive movements, with fashion probably being the most ‘expressive’ in 
nature and thus most clearly distinguished from a specific social movement. In 
particular, Blumer states that fashion differs from other movements in that it does 
not develop into a ‘society’. This is an important point because it establishes 
Blumer’s ([1951] 1995) over-arching view o f  general and specific social 
movements, that they are “societies in miniature” (p.76). Thus, fashion does not 
have a social organization, or develop a form o f  ‘we-consciousness’, instead it 
provides the means for expressing dispositions and tastes and in crystallizing 
these tastes, fashion constructs a common subjective life. This common 
subjective life is what Blumer describes as a ‘Zeitgeist’, and is a part o f  the 
development o f a new social order.
In contrast, according to Blumer, general and specific social movements are 
fundamentally about social change, although they differ in the extent to which 
they are organised about their goals. General social movements are constituted by 
gradual changes in the values that people possess. Blumer termed these changes 
‘cultural drifts’ and suggested that in particular, they took the form o f changes in 
the way that people conceptualise themselves. Where there has previously been 
acceptance o f the status quo and inertia, people begin to perceive infringements 
to their rights and privileges and they develop new opinions with regard to what 
they consider their entitlements to be. These new opinions are largely based upon 
individuals’ hopes and dreams and the development o f such ideas effects the way 
in which people look upon the reality o f their own lives. A s people come to form 
new conceptions o f themselves, so they increasingly find a disjuncture between 
how they see their ‘true selves’ and the actual positions in which they find 
themselves. For Blumer this change in sense o f ‘se lf explains how people come 
to experience dissatisfaction where before there was none.
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The chief characteristic o f general social movements, is therefore, vagueness, for 
“these new images o f  themselves, which people begin to develop in response to 
cultural drifts, are vague and indefinite; and correspondingly, the behaviour in 
response to such images is uncertain and without definite aim. ” (Blumer, [1951] 
1995: 61) A s a result, Blumer considers the efforts o f such movements to be 
‘groping’ and as moving only slowly towards their goals. Further, Blumer saw  
these social movements, o f which he identified the women’s movements as an 
example, as structurally unorganised with no clear leadership or membership. 
Instead, such movements consist o f  unconnected individuals engaging in the 
struggle in a wide variety o f loci.
According to Blumer, all social movements begin as general social movements, 
but whilst some remain uncoordinated, others develop into specific social 
movements. A  social movement can be considered a ‘specific social movement’ 
once it possesses a well-defined objective or goal, has organization and structure 
and has a recognised leadership and membership. Again, emphasising the 
importance o f  theorizing the individual when considering social movements, 
Blumer states that the membership o f specific social movements is characterised 
by the development o f what he terms ‘we-consciousness’, in which the individual 
senses that they are no longer struggling alone. This has clear implications for 
notions o f shared identity and solidarity.
Although stating that specific social movements are distinguished from general 
social movements by higher levels o f  coordination, Blumer sees a ‘career path’ or 
continuum along which these movements will pass over time, becoming 
increasingly organised and solidified over the lifetime o f  the movement. Several 
key processes are seen to occur during this development process and Blumer 
identifies the role o f  agitation, the development o f  esprit de corps, and the degree 
o f  morale within the movement.
The role o f agitation is most important during the early stages o f a specific social 
movement, although Blumer states that it may persist in a more minor form  
during later stages o f development. Agitation results in the awakening o f people
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and creation o f new impulses and ideas that make for restlessness and 
dissatisfaction. Agitation cannot work however, where there are insufficient pre­
existing grounds for disquiet. Agitation relies upon the pre-existence o f some sort 
o f injustice, discrimination or abuse, and seeks to encourage people to challenge 
the ‘taken-for-granted’. Alternatively, agitation works w ell where people are 
already discontented or restless but where they are either too timid or do not 
know what to do. Agitation gives people courage and the means to change things.
Esprit de corps, as defined by Blumer, is probably the most important aspect o f  
specific social movements since it determines who is an insider and who is an 
outsider. Further, according to Blumer, ‘in-group/out-group relations’ are never 
neutral, and it is an essential part o f  the development o f  the social movement that 
the outsiders are demonised as enemies. Esprit de corps is also developed through 
such things as informal fellowship in which individuals within the movements get 
to know one another and through common sympathy and a sense o f intimacy the 
individual gains a sense o f  status and social acceptance. This ‘fellowship’ is a 
particularly uniting factor since, according to Blumer, it is often the case that 
individuals who become members o f social movements have experienced prior 
loneliness and alienation. Involvement in ceremonial behaviour such as rallies, 
parades and demonstrations further enhance the individual’s sense o f  vast 
support, and parading in numbers gives the individual a sense that both they and 
their views are important.
Yet, Blumer claimed that a specific social movement cannot survive on esprit de 
corps alone. Morale is also central to the maintenance o f  solidarity, especially in 
the face o f adversity. To survive over time, the members o f specific social 
movements must be sure o f the rectitude o f their aims and that the achievement 
o f their goals would result in a near utopian state o f affairs. Further, members 
must have faith that the movement w ill eventually achieve its goals. This faith is 
essential if  momentum is to be maintained even through the hardest o f  struggles. 
This faith is shored up by the development o f  ‘sacred’ texts, by having leaders 
who are viewed as ‘saint-like’ and by developing myths surrounding such things 
as the inhumanity o f one’s opponents.
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Finally, ideology plays a part in maintaining morale, and is particularly important 
when a movement faces clear opposition from outsiders for it provides, amongst 
other things, a clear statement o f  the objectives o f the movement, a critique o f the 
status quo, against which the movement is struggling, and a body o f ‘defence 
doctrine’ that justifies the actions o f the movement. According the Blumer this 
ideology takes two forms, academic and populist. Populist ideology within a 
movement makes the more academic forms o f  the ideology more readily 
comprehensible. The relationship, therefore, within a movement between the 
academic and more general members o f  the movement is key to the success o f  a 
specific social movement:
To be effective (...) the ideology must carry respectability and 
prestige -  a character that is provided primarily by the 
intelligentsia o f  the movement. More important than this, however, 
is the need o f  the ideology to answer to the distress, wishes, and 
hopes o f the people. Unless it has this popular appeal, it will be o f 
no value to the movement. (Blumer, [1951] 1995:73)
This issue will be considered again in relation to the findings o f this research in 
chapters 6 and 7.
For Blumer ([1951] 1995), the manner in which all these aspects o f a specific 
social movement come together to gain supporters, keep hold o f  supporters and 
reach the objectives o f the movement, depends upon the particulars o f the 
situation and the nature o f  the movement: “For, tactics are always dependent on 
the nature o f  the situation in which the movement is operating and always with 
reference to the cultural background o f the movement.” (p.73)
The value o f Blumer’s theorizing, quite apart from the breadth o f explanation he 
provides, is, therefore, the way in which he outlines a new way o f  theorizing 
social movements as a form o f  collective behaviour. In emphasizing the potential 
for social creativity that can be found within such behaviour, Blumer provided 
one o f  the first ‘positive’ theories o f social movements. Blumer’s contribution is 
also vital in the respect that he highlights the context specific nature o f  social
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movements, an issue that is still key to social movement theorizing. Blumer’s 
theories in this field have therefore, clearly been highly influential, and came to 
dominate the study o f social movements until the late 1960’s.
Social Democratic Approaches -  The European Tradition
At the same time as the Collective Behaviour approach was being developed in 
the United States, in Europe, other approaches were emerging. O f key importance 
in explaining the differences between the European and American traditions is 
the fact that European societies have been more traditional and class based that 
the society o f the United States. In addition, according to Eyerman and Jamison 
(1991), the European, Social Democratic tradition was more philosophically 
informed than the Collective Behaviour approach, with the two major and 
competing theoretical interpretations arising from the work o f Weber and Marx.
For Marx, society was comprised from a “moving balance o f antithetical forces 
that generate social change by their tension and struggle.” (Coser, 1971: 43) 
Thus, social struggle was at the heart o f  social progress. The main actors in this 
social struggle, according to Marx, were the economic classes whose interests 
conflict. Thus, this ‘political’ conflict between the classes becomes more acute as 
more and more changes occur to their relative positions during the process o f  
economic development, and as increasing consciousness o f their interests 
emerges within each class (Tansey, 1995). Most importantly, according to Marx, 
the result o f these contradictions and tensions within capitalism, is the 
development o f a class-consciousness within the oppressed classes, that by 
banding together in collective action, will seek to over-throw the dominant class.
Much subsequent Marxist theorizing on social movements within this first phase, 
European tradition o f  theorizing has echoed Marx’s views on collective action 
and has tended to view  social movements with some anticipation. Such 
approaches have considered social movements to be signs o f a forthcoming 
collapse o f  the existing, capitalist order within society. For many Marxists, then, 
social movements possess the potential for social change, and the image o f the
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collective actor is that o f  the “self-activating class” rather than the faceless mass 
(Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 16). The theories within this branch o f Marxism 
have tended, therefore, to focus rather more upon what these movements 
represent, and what potential they may have for creating social change. It should 
be stated, however, that this somewhat ‘Leninist’ approach has not been the only 
line o f thought within this tradition. Some Marxist approaches have attempted to 
retain a critical distance from the Leninist model. Even so, they still tend to 
emphasise the importance o f politics and to reduce social movements to their 
political expression (M elucci, 1996). In short, all Marxist accounts have tended to 
be less concerned with why social movements emerge, or how they take shape.
In contrast to Marx’s hopeful and positive views on social movements, Weber 
viewed such things as crowds and mass movements with some concern, 
preferring to see them as necessary, but transitory factors in social 
transformation. Weber’s classification o f social stratification was rather more 
complex than that o f Marx and suggested a more pluralistic basis for social 
conflict (Coser, 1971). Weber rejected Marx’s vision o f a society polarized into 
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ and in so doing provided a more complex analysis 
o f power in society. Although Weber did agree with Marx that economic power 
is the predominant form o f power in many modem societies, he saw power 
existing on other bases. One example Weber provides is the power that exists 
within bureaucracies, but more crucially for theorizing on social movements, 
Weber also perceived power to be the chance o f  an individual, or a group o f  
individuals to achieve their goals through joint action, even against the opposition 
o f others.
This aspect o f Weber’s work on social movements is somewhat misleading 
however, for it suggests a more positive view  o f social movements than Weber 
perhaps intended. This point is addressed in the work o f  Michels (1959), Weber’s 
friend and confidant. Michels saw the life-cycle o f  social movements as a process 
in which charismatic leadership became routinized and there was the 
establishment o f bureaucratic institutions. This maturation o f  social movements 
in which previously dynamic social forces became routinized into stagnant, top-
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heavy institutions, was seen to be a necessary part o f  the life-cycle o f  social 
movements in modem society. This notion o f the institutionalisation o f mass 
movements became known as the ‘Weber-Michels model’ and has led to 
considerable debate. Indeed, Eyerman and Jamison (1991) claim that the 
Resource Mobilization approach to the study o f social movements emerged, at 
least in part, as an alternative to the ‘Weber-Michels model’.
These two major approaches, stemming as they do from the work o f Weber and 
Marx, appeared to be most strikingly opposed to each other during the early part 
o f the twentieth century, when the issues resulting from the emergence o f  
‘modernity’ were most acutely felt. During the past century however, social 
democracy, exemplified by the development o f  the welfare state, achieved a 
central role in society. Weberians and Marxists agreed that social movements 
appeared to have moved to the very core o f society. This notion o f  the 
institutionalisation o f ‘movement’ was to be greatly challenged during the 1960’s 
however, and the events o f this period instigated a radical re-think o f social 
movement theory.
1960’s ‘watershed*
On August 28, 1963, between 200,000 and 500,000 people marched on 
Washington D.C. in what has been dubbed the “March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom”. This protest culminated in the now famous “I have a dream” 
address by Martin Luther King Jr. (Giugni, 1999). This famous mass 
mobilization was one o f many during the period and these widespread protests 
raised some serious questions for theorists o f  social movements. Della Porta and 
Diani (1999) identify these major issues as being:
(...) questions o f  a practical nature, relating to the evaluation o f  
emerging forms o f social and political participation, and the 
response to them. (...) Furthermore, actors engaged in the new 
conflicts (youth, women, new professional groups and so on) could 
only partly be characterized in terms o f  principal political 
cleavages o f  the industrial societies. It was even less appropriate
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to view these actors in terms o f  class conflicts, which certainly 
constituted the principal component o f  these cleavages, (p.2)
Initially, theorists attempted to explain the 1960’s movements relying upon 
earlier approaches, such as the collective behaviour theories, or the social 
democratic ideas. The result o f  such theorizing was to continue to view social 
movements as being the products o f such things as ‘alienation’, the actions o f  
social deviants or misfits, ‘relative deprivation’, or status inconsistencies. In 
short, as Stryker et al (2000) have commented:
(...) social movements were viewed largely as the products o f  
unbridled affect, o f  non-rational and irrational wellsprings o f  
action. Social movements were taken to be anything but well- 
considered responses to legitimate concerns about real but 
oppositional interests, (p.2)
Since many social movement theorists were, and continue to be, active 
participants within social movements, it was not entirely surprising therefore, that 
there was considerable opposition to this view o f social movement activity as 
being ‘irrational’. Out o f this opposition to the existing theories emerged what I 
have termed the ‘Second Phase Theories’, namely, in the United States, the 
Resource Mobilization and the closely related Political Protest models, and in 
Europe the ‘N ew ’ Social Movement theories. A  consideration o f these ‘Second 
Phases Theories’ forms the next section o f this chapter.
Phase 2 Theories
Resource Mobilization and Political Process -  the changing face of the 
American tradition
Up until the 1970’s much social movement theorizing had drawn heavily upon 
Blumer’s work, but from the 1970’s onwards this social psychological approach 
to theorizing social movements was heavily criticised. A  major critique o f  the 
Collective Behaviour approach came via Resource Mobilization theory and the 
work o f the major proponent o f  this approach, OberschalL Equally important
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however, was the Political Process model o f  Tarrow and the critique o f the 
Collective Behaviour approach put forward by Tilly, whose theories appear to fall 
somewhere in between the Resource mobilization and the Political Process 
models.
In many respects, it is very difficult to define the distinguishing features o f  these 
two approaches, so akin are they to each other. Both theories see social 
movements as being about well-organised, purposeful, rational action. In so 
emphasising organizational and political factors, social psychological variables 
are de-emphasised within both models. In addition, according to both theories, it 
is unnecessary to focus the theoretical explanations o f social movements upon the 
structural tensions or conflicts that have prompted the protest. The focus o f  this 
social movement theorizing is, therefore, more upon the ‘how’ and ‘when’ o f  
social movements rather than the ‘why’.
Oberschall
Oberschall drew upon the concept o f  ‘resource management’ which had been 
introduced by Charles Tilly in his early work. Tilly (1978) had provided a new  
basis for the analysis o f mobilization, counter-mobilization, the struggle for 
power and the manner in which individual resources could be utilized for 
achieving collective group goals through the process o f conflict. Although Tilly, 
as will be discussed subsequently, went on to modify his own theories to the 
extent that they no longer belong entirely to the Resource Mobilization tradition, 
he did provide an important starting point for the development o f this approach 
by Oberschall.
For Oberschall (1973), social conflict arises out o f  the dynamic relationship 
between mobilization and social control.
Mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented 
group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit o f  group 
goals. Social control refers to the same processes, but from the
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point o f  view o f  the incumbents or the group that is being 
challenged, (p.28)
Further, social structures, according to Oberschall, can be analysed according to 
how resources are managed and allocated in the process o f  pursuing a group goal. 
For example, Oberschall cites the experiences o f the Black Power Movement and 
other such civil rights movements as examples o f the problem that negatively 
privileged groups face when trying to mobilize their meagre resources for the 
pursuit o f  their group goals. He then theorizes the extent to which external 
support can make up the resource deficits o f  such movements. Oberschall (1973) 
also provides a useful analysis o f  the Hungarian Revolution o f  1956, and in so 
doing demonstrates how a “shared culture, national sentiments, and historical 
tradition can be rapidly converted into a resource base for conflict, even in the 
face o f  an authoritarian regime. ” (p.29)
In other words, Oberschall provides us with a clearer understanding o f what kind 
o f things can be utilized as ‘resources’ by a movement. Finally, Oberschall states 
that participation, leadership and ideology within a movement can all be analysed 
according to cost-benefits and resource allocation. His approach does, therefore, 
tend to stress the instrumental bases for the various actions, interactions and 
relationships that occur within social movements. In this respect, and the manner 
in which Oberschall makes use o f  such notions as risk/reward ratios, the 
influence o f  economics upon his theorizing, is clear. Indeed, Oberschall himself 
states that injecting some economics into theorizing upon social movements was 
his intention.
Overall, however, the most important aspect o f Oberschall’s development o f  
Resource Mobilization theory is, as Melucci (1996) has commented, the idea that: 
“In order for a protest movement to form, common sentiments o f  oppression or 
an identification o f  a common enemy will not suffice; there must also be a 
minimal organizational base and leadership. ’’ (p.291) It is this notion o f the 
necessity o f  pre-existing networks o f social-ties that provides the starting point 
for the theorizing o f Tilly.
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Tilly
For Tilly (1993), social movements should not be theorized or spoken about as 
‘groups’ “thence assigning (them) a continuous life resembling the natural 
history o f  an organism.” (p.4) Social movements can be distinguished from 
organizations proper, belief-systems and even individuals by the manner in which 
they do not possess self-reproducing ‘natural histories’ according to which they 
form, flourish, undergo change and eventually disappear. Instead, Tilly (1993) 
proposes that social movements are best viewed as resembling:
(...) dragons living continuously somewhere in the social 
underground, but emerging recurrently from their labyrinths to 
stomp around roaring, (p.6)
In other words, social movements do not arise from the ether in some mysterious 
manner, instead they depend upon pre-existing groups and networks such as 
voluntary associations, fronts, federations and others. Echoing the Resource 
Mobilization model, Tilly sees these networks as resources that can be mobilized 
by key players in a movement. Although denying social movements a life cycle 
similar to that o f  an organism, Tilly (1993) does state that the actions o f these key 
players or ‘political entrepreneurs’ brings coherency to strategic interaction In 
particular, Tilly highlights the role o f ‘social movement specialists’ in co­
ordinating collective action, consistently publicizing the struggle engaged upon 
and influencing the routine behaviour o f supporters, rivals and those observing 
the movement.
Tilly, although echoing much o f  the Resource Mobilization model in the manner 
in which it rejects social psychological explanations for social movements, does 
take from the Collective Behaviour model o f  social movements, a belief in the 
context specific nature o f  such movements. Further, echoes o f the Collective 
Behaviour approach, in particular Blumer’s notion o f  esprit de corps and morale, 
can especially be seen in the work o f  Tilly (1993, 1999) when he identifies the 
manner in which solidarity is reinforced within movements by such things as 
slogans, banners and other “identifying devices” (Tilly, 1993: 12). It is at this
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point, however, that the two models begin to diverge, for Tilly considers such 
techniques to be ‘auxiliary activities’, being o f only secondary importance to his 
quite programmatic notion o f  mobilization. In addition, Tilly rejects two more 
elements o f the Collective Behaviour approach, namely the idea o f  ‘career paths’ 
or what he terms the ‘standard life histories’ o f  social movements and the related 
concept o f  a social movement as an organism that appears to be implied by this 
approach.
Essentially, Tilly takes a programmatic approach to theorizing social movements. 
This programmatic approach is best exemplified in his notion that social 
movements function according to the following multiple:
Numbers x  Commitment x  Unity x  Worthiness
(Tilly, 1999: 261)
For a social movement to succeed as a political force, it must be able to show  
evidence o f  each element. Providing that none o f  the four elements falls to zero, 
at which point the movement would lose its standing as a political force, a 
deficiency in one area can be compensated for in another. As an example o f this 
‘scorecard’ schema, Tilly cites terrorism and in particular ostentatious self- 
destruction as being a characteristic strategy o f  small sections o f  divided 
movements. In this example, the small section o f the movement would be 
demonstrating high levels o f  commitment and worthiness, and thus compensating 
for a deficiency in numbers.
Further, according to Tilly, additional coherency is given to a movement when it 
interacts with outsiders, particularly those in powerful positions. A  series o f  
strategic interactions w ill become viewed as a coherent social movement when 
those in power and other third parties, react to this series o f  struggles by treating 
them as “successive manifestations o f  the same phenomenon.” (Tilly, 1993: 6) 
The relationship between the powerful and social movements is a complex one 
however, for whilst it is often the case that the powerful are the objects o f  claims 
made by social movements - and possess therefore, an inherent desire to
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undermine social movements - they may also at times become activists, at least to 
a degree, if  it proves politically advantageous.
Thus, Tilly’s perspective on social movements provides the starting point for 
Tarrow, for Tilly (1993) concludes that social movements w ill vary according to 
four main factors: the nature o f the claims being made; the prevailing political 
opportunity structure; the shared understandings o f the participants; and the 
social structure from which members are drawn (p.19). It is Tilly’s second point 
regarding the effects that the nature o f the polity can have upon the development 
o f social movements that provided the basis for Tarrow’s theorizing.
Tarrow
In general, Tarrow’s aim was to understand which characteristics o f  the political 
system influence the growth o f less institutionalised political actors, in the course 
o f what he termed ‘protest cycles’ (Tarrow, 1989). Della Porta and Diani (1999) 
have commented that:
Chapter 5
The ‘political process’ approach succeeded in shifting attention 
towards interactions between new and traditional actors, and 
between less conventional forms o f  action and institutionalized 
systems o f interest representation. In this way, it is no longer 
possible to define movements in a prejudicial sense as phenomena 
which are, o f  necessity, marginal and anti-institutional, 
expressions o f  disfunctions o f  the system, (p.10)
Tarrow views social movements as part o f  the ‘normal’ functioning o f  the 
political system and yet stresses the context specific nature o f  social movements. 
In both these respects, Tarrow also echoes the ideas o f Blumer and the Collective 
Behaviour approach. For Tarrow, the most important context is the ‘political 
opportunity structure’ in which the movement exists.
The concept o f  the ‘political opportunity structure’ is central to Tarrow’s 
theorizing on social movements. His central argument is that individuals join 
social movements in response to political opportunities that have arisen and then
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through the process o f collective action, they go on to create further political 
opportunities. In conceiving o f social movements as being firmly linked with the 
polity in this way, Tarrow (1994) is arguing that as far as the outcomes o f the 
actions o f social movements are concerned, although movements nearly always 
conceive o f themselves as being external to the key institutions, nevertheless, 
collective action “inserts them into complex policy networks, and, thus, within the 
reach o f the state.” (p.25)
Tarrow’s second central concept is the notion o f ‘contention by convention’. 
According to Tarrow, the theory o f collective action had become somewhat 
preoccupied with the problem o f how individual actors become mobilized to 
achieve group goals. For Tarrow, this traditional focus is misplaced, for there is 
nothing particularly problematic about collective action per se. Instead, the 
problem needing analysis is the manner in which collective action is sustained:
Movements do have a collective action problem, but it is social: 
coordinating unorganized, autonomous and dispersed populations 
into common and sustained action. (Tarrow, 1994: 9)
Social movements partly solve this problem by responding to political 
opportunities using established forms o f collective action. In this respect, Tarrow 
(1994) draws upon the work o f Tilly:
Tilly observes that people cannot employ routines o f  collective 
action o f  which they are ignorant; each society has a stock o f  
familiar forms o f action that are known by both potential 
challengers and their opponents -  and which become habitual 
aspects o f  their interaction, (p.19)
According to Tarrow, however, although social movements do draw upon these 
established forms o f collective action, the question o f  how  this action is co­
ordinated and sustained remains. For Tarrow, mobilizing structures are necessary 
for activating and sustaining collective action. Existing institutions often 
represent these mobilizing structures. Tarrow cites the work o f Aldon Morris 
(1993), in which Morris demonstrated that the origins o f the Civil Rights
Movement in America were bound up with the role o f  the Black Churches.
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Tarrow also makes links with the work o f M elucci, who highlights the role o f  
movement networks in creating the collective identity o f movements in Italy. 
Tarrow’s work, therefore, represents an important link between the American and 
European traditions.
‘New’ Social Movements -  the changing face o f the European tradition
There are three major proponents o f the ‘New’ Social Movement theory, 
Touraine, Habermas, and Melucci. In many respects the theories o f  Touraine and 
Habermas are very similar, they remain, however, quite independently influential. 
Melucci’s work draws heavily upon the work o f both Touraine and Habermas, 
although he is more critical o f  Touraine. For the purpose o f  comparison, 
therefore, these theorists w ill be considered in the order, Touraine, Habermas, 
Melucci.
Touraine
For Touraine, social movements are the result o f  the general crisis o f  modernity. 
Two major problems face modernity, the first involves issues o f  social order and 
the second is concerned with issues o f  instrumental action. Touraine raises the 
question o f how social order is possible within societies that are entirely defined 
by their capacity to change. Capitalism, for example, is characterised by its 
capacity to destroy old forms o f  production in order to make way for newer 
forms. For Touraine, the result o f  this process is a society that is characterised by 
anomie, uprootedness and a tendency to subordinate all aspects o f  individual and 
collective life to economic interest. According to Touraine, anything that cannot 
be expressed in monetary terms is destroyed by this process o f  modernity.
Touraine also states that the so-called triumph o f instrumental action has failed to 
lead to a balance between individual interests. Touraine (1987a) states that “m a 
highly mobilized or modern society, power and domination are everywhere..." 
(p.208). Here the influences o f Foucault’s (1979) work on power are clear, for 
Touraine is clearly drawing upon Foucault’s notion o f the diffusion o f systems o f
Chapter 5
166
normalization and o f cultural and social control. Thus, modernity has been 
characterised by the subordination o f the individual to the impersonal laws o f  
rationality, which has in turn, increased the power o f the elites.
According to Touraine, this crisis o f modernity has inspired two particular types 
o f social movement. The first are the neo-communitarian movements, which seek 
to defend cultural identity. The second are the anti-modernist movements, which 
seek to resist mass production and to defend personal aesthetic or moral 
experience. The key point, however, according to Touraine, is that neither type o f  
movement calls for the triumph o f particularist over universalist values, or vice 
versa. Instead, the focus o f the ‘new’ social movements is on the production or 
defence o f the subject, be it the individual or collective:
We do not defend minorities’ rights because they fulfil a specific 
function or try to increase the level o f  social integration; we 
defend directly the right o f  a given group to assert its own identity, 
while fifty years ago we would have been more universalistic, 
more integrationist, fighting against obstacles to the assimilation 
o f  minorities (...) (Touraine, 1987a: 211)
Further, in his work entitled “An Introduction to the Study o f Social Movements” 
(1985), Touraine makes it clear that for him, social movements are only one form 
o f social conflict, but that they are defined precisely by their preoccupation with 
making claims for the recognition o f  the other as subject. In other words, for 
Touraine (1985), “the concept ‘social movements’ only refer(s) to conflicts 
around the social control o f  the main cultural patterns.” (p.760)
Having established what he regards these new forms o f conflict to be about, 
Touraine, goes on to develop a somewhat complex schema for both defining 
‘new’ social movements in a given situation, and to a certain extent, explaining 
how they function. For Touraine (1985), social movements are defined by the 
relationship between conflicting actors and the stakes o f their conflict. Thus the 
action o f social movements can be seen to involve three components: firstly, the 
identity o f the actor (/), secondly, the definition o f the opponent (o), and thirdly, 
the stakes or cultural totality which define the field o f  conflict (/) (Touraine,
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1985. Prioetto, 1995). A  social movement is thus defined as the relationship i-o-t 
and represents a quite complex vision o f social action since it depends upon 
sustaining relations o f creative tension between all o f the three fundamental 
components (Proietto, 1995).
All three o f these factors -  i-o-t - are bound together in the same social world and 
express the central conflict o f a particular type o f society. It is in this respect, that 
Touraine’s theorizing on social movements is most ambitious, for he places his 
theorizing on social conflict right at the heart o f  his general social theory. Using 
the concept o f historicity, which is defined as the interweaving o f  a system o f  
knowledge, a type o f  accumulation and a cultural model (Della Porta and Diani, 
1999), Touraine identifies four types o f  society: agrarian, mercantile, industrial 
and ‘programmed’. Touraine prefers the concept o f a ‘programmed’ society to 
the term ‘post-industrial society’, but in many respects, the two terms mean the 
same thing. For Touraine (1987b), a ‘programmed’ society is characterised by 
the “production o f  symbolic goods which model or transform our representation 
o f  human nature and the external world. ” (p.127) The basis for power in such a 
society therefore, becomes the control o f information and these cultural 
resources. Echoing Habermas’ notion o f  the colonisation o f the lifeworld and the 
system, Touraine is therefore arguing that:
Mobilizations by social movements address, therefore, the defence 
o f the autonomy o f  civil society from the attempts o f public and 
private technocratic groups to extend their control over ever- 
widening areas o f  social life. (Della Porta and Diani, 1999:46.)
Thus, Touraine’s theorizing has been concerned with social movements as both 
central to and the result of, transformations in modernity. His theories have been 
highly influential, but have not gone un-criticised. This is a point that w ill be 
considered later in this discussion.
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Habermas: social movements at the seam between the ‘lifeworld’ and the 
‘system ’
Definitions o f ‘new’ social movements see these movements acting within a 
broadly defined socio-cultural sphere (Pakulski, 1997). ‘N ew ’ social movements 
in comparison with older movements have been viewed as being concerned with 
redefining culture and lifestyle rather than structural reforms (Martell, 1994). In 
defining social movements thus, these theorists clearly echo the work o f  
Habermas (1981) when he says that:
( ...)  the new conflicts are not sparked by problems o f  distribution, 
but concern the grammar offorms o f life, (p.33)
For Habermas there is a paradox at the centre o f modernity and this paradox 
concerns the nature o f the relationship between what he terms the ‘lifeworld’ and 
the ‘system’. Habermas’ conclusion to “The Theory o f Communicative Action” 
(1987) is bleak, for he sees the ‘lifeworld’ as being threatened by the ‘system’. 
Habermas (1987) feared that reasoning that is only appropriate to the "formally 
organized domains o f  action” (p.403) would take over those functions o f  social 
life that should belong to communicative action. This is what Habermas meant by 
the ‘colonisation o f  the lifeworld’ and it is this understanding that made him 
question the notion that Modernity has made society more just.
This is not to say, however, that Habermas has entirely given up on the notion o f  
Modernity as a ‘good thing’. In fact, Habermas sees the role o f  the ‘new’ social 
movements as being an essential mechanism for preventing and working against 
the encroachment o f the ‘lifeworld’ by the ‘system’. Whilst the ‘colonization o f 
the lifeworld’ makes workers into consumers and citizens into clients, thereby 
minimising the opportunities for overcoming Modernity’s injustices, the ‘new’ 
social movements seek to break and restructure these redefinitions. (Habermas, 
1981. M cAfee, 2000.) Further, Habermas (1981) sees the ‘new’ social 
movements as being motivated by the unease members experience as a result o f  
the “culturally impoverished and unilaterally rationalized praxis o f  everyday
life” (p.36) Resistance, according to Habermas (1981), takes the form o f  placing
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a high value on the ‘particular’ and is intended to encourage the “revitalization o f  
buried possibilities for expression and communication.” (p.36)
Habermas (1981) is therefore, painting a picture o f the ‘new’ social movements 
as existing at the “seam between system and lifeworld’ (p.36) His call, is for 
nothing less than the re-kindling o f the promise o f democracy and in so doing 
ensuring that the ‘system’ be made less autonomous and more accountable to the 
‘lifeworld’. In this respect, Habermas’ work can be seen to provide an important 
precursor o f theories o f ‘engagement’, such as that proposed by Ellison (2000), 
which seek to forge a link between sociological understandings o f  social 
movements and sociological understandings o f  citizenship. According to Delanty 
(2000), it is precisely this view o f social movements, as existing within the 
‘meso-leveP o f  society, between the micro- and the macro- levels, that is key to 
understanding contemporary citizenship and democratic transformation. Roche
(1995) echoes this when he says that:
( .. .)  the new sociology o f  citizenship could be said to have much 
in common with the sociology o f  citizenship movements, (p.188)
Roche’s use o f the term ‘citizenship movements’ is interesting because it 
suggests that the essential characteristic o f contemporary social movements is 
that ‘citizenship’ is their project, it is what they are truly about. This link between 
citizenship and social movement theorising will be considered in more depth 
within chapter 7.
Clearly, therefore, Habermas has greatly influenced the development o f social 
movement theories. It must be noted however, that whereas many ‘new’ social 
movement theorists continue to draw heavily upon Habermas’ early work, in 
which the role o f such movements is seen as being to prevent the colonisation o f  
the lifeworld by the system, Habermas him self has moved on. In comparison to 
the ideas set out in his work “The Theory o f Communicative Action”, Habermas
(1996) has more recently viewed the role o f  social movements rather differently.
In this work he considers law to be central to radical politics and views social
movements as embracing the state domain to a degree, whilst maintaining a firm
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link to civil society. In other words, Habermas considers it possible for social 
movements to exist at both the macro- and the m eso- level. In some respects this 
is not too great a departure from his earlier theorizing, it merely demonstrates the 
difficulties associated with attempting to answer the questions o f ‘why’, ‘when’ 
and ‘how’ o f social movements.
Melucci
Melucci, whilst drawing considerably upon Touraine’s work, also provides a 
clearly articulated critique o f Touraine’s notion o f ‘conflict’ and ‘identity’. For 
Melucci (1996), Touraine, failed to adequately distance his theorizing from 
earlier definitions that portrayed social conflict in an overly deterministic manner. 
The problem for Melucci (1996) is how to “explain conflict in terms o f  social 
relations without turning it into a primal dimension.” (p.45) Melucci also 
criticises Touraine for failing to adequately deconstruct the notion o f identity. For 
Touraine, identity is taken as a given, whereas M elucci views identity rather 
differently. Melucci, although preferring the term ‘potential for individualization’ 
to ‘identity’, nevertheless views this as a process upon which action is entirely 
dependent. This critique o f  Touraine is central to the development o f  M elucci’s 
own theorizing in his field, for he begins by reconsidering the basis o f social 
conflict and then goes on to establish how collective action occurs.
Melucci (1985, 1989, 1994) begins his theorizing by drawing upon the work o f  
Habermas and the notion o f the colonisation o f  the lifeworld, claiming that the 
role o f  the ‘new’ social movements is to oppose the excessive intrusion o f  the 
state and the market into the realm o f the individual and to protect each 
individual’s identity from the manipulation and control o f the system (Della Porta 
and Diani, 1999). In other words, for M elucci, the ‘new’ social movements are 
about reacting against the colonisation o f  the lifeworld by the system. Indeed, 
Melucci (1989) has commented that: “among my criteria for defining a social 
movement is the extent to which its actions challenge or break the limits o f  a 
system o f  social r e la t io n s (p.38)
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For M elucci, the idea o f  the ‘colonisation o f the lifeworld’ is intrinsically linked 
to the notion o f ‘complex societies’. In this respect he echoes the work o f  
Foucault (1970, 1979, 1980a, 1980b) in the way that he perceives complex 
societies as being characterised by a homologation o f behaviour patterns, brought 
about by the manipulation o f  the information and cultural codes which form the 
basis o f  communication and consensus. For M elucci the present is characterised 
by society’s capacity for intervening in the production o f meaning. Areas that had 
previously escaped control and regulation are no longer free from interference by 
the system. Melucci (1989) suggests that these areas may include “self-definition, 
emotional relationships, sexuality and 'biological ’ needs” (p.45). At the same 
time, however, Melucci states that there is a parallel demand from the lifeworld 
for some control to be measured over the conditions o f personal existence.
In firmly linking notions o f the lifeworld and the system to theorizing on social 
movements, both Habermas and Melucci are placing considerations o f  social 
movements at the heart o f social theorizing, for their theories strike at the very 
centre o f  the agency/structure debate. In the work o f  M elucci, this is most clearly 
demonstrated by his theorizing on the notion o f ‘identity’. M elucci suggests that 
the concept o f ‘identity’ is increasingly redundant and that a consideration o f  the 
‘potential for individualization’ is o f greater value. He defines this ‘potential for 
individualization’ as involving on the one hand the possibilities for an individual 
to have control over the conditions o f  their action, and on the other hand the 
expropriation o f these “self-reflexive and self-productive resources by society 
itself.” (M elucci, 1989: 48) For M elucci, social movements are about challenging 
the powers that seek to control these social resources.
In seeking to redress this balance between the lifeworld and the system, agency 
and structure, social movements, Melucci (1985) claims, are striking at the very 
heart o f  society’s accepted ‘truths’:
( ...)  movements question society on something ‘else': who decides 
on codes, who establishes rules o f  normality, what is the space for  
difference, how can one be recognized not fo r  being included but 
for being accepted as different, not for increasing the amount o f  
exchanges but for affirming another kind o f  exchange? (p.810)
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What is sometimes less clear within M elucci’s work, however, is the extent to 
which he acknowledges that the redistribution o f  material resources may still be a 
central aim for many social movements. In a later work, Melucci (1989) does not 
appear to be completely rejecting the idea that social movements are still about 
addressing structural inequalities, but he makes it clear that he only sees this as 
one aspect o f  the aims o f  social movements, for they are about:
( ...)  more than the affirmation o f  new rights and the demand for  
equality. (...) also claims the importance o f difference, the need 
for alternative codes which demand recognition. (...) urge that 
everyone can be recognised as different, (p.56)
Having established what social movements are about, however, Melucci is more 
concerned with the ‘how’ o f  collective action. He claims that a form o f ‘political 
reductionism’ has characterised the views o f researchers in this field, he cites 
Tilly and Tarrow as examples. According to M elucci, both Tilly and Tarrow have 
engaged in quantitative studies o f social movements and in so doing, have 
considered collective events as discrete units o f  analysis. This research, according 
to Melucci, has produced some useful data concerning the product o f  diverse 
relationships and the goals o f  action. This, however, is a constructivist view o f  
social movements, focusing as it does upon the outcomes o f  collective action, 
rather than upon how that action is produced. For Melucci (1989), this emphasis 
upon the effects o f action can become unhelpful if  it ignores the “creation o f  
cultural models and symbolic challenges inherent in the 'new movements’.” 
(P-45)
In seeking to explain the ‘how’ o f collective action, Melucci considers social 
movements to be positioned outside the established boundaries o f  political 
systems, in what he terms ‘social spaces’ (1989, 1993, 1996). These social spaces 
exist as a result o f forms o f  behaviour that do not ‘fit in’ with the system, for 
example, conflict, deviance and ‘cultural experimentation’ (M elucci, 1989). 
According to Melucci (1993), on the one hand these social spaces prevent social 
movements from becoming institutionalised and on the other, they ensure that
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society is able to institutionally process the issues and conflicts arising from the 
goals and meanings o f the social action undertaken by social movements.
Although focusing upon the ‘how’ o f  social movements, nevertheless in viewing 
the area in which social movements operate as a new, and valuable “ 'sector ’ or 
‘subsystem ’ o f  the sociar, Melucci (1996: 3) stresses the important role o f social 
movements in preventing the system from closing in upon itself. In this way, 
Melucci (1985) is stressing the transformative nature o f ‘new’ social movements, 
for they force the ruling groups to innovate and to include in the decision-making 
process, groups which have previously been excluded. Melucci (1993) also 
makes a valuable link with notions o f  power, when he states that social 
movements: “expose the shadowy zones o f  invisible power and silence which a 
system and its dominant interests inevitably tend to c r e a t e (p.190) This is an 
idea that has been developed by Foweraker (1995) who also makes an important 
link to citizenship theorising in that he envisages social movement activity as 
being about citizenship, which in turn is about challenging these systems o f  
power in defence o f  group rights. The issue o f the connection between citizenship 
theorising and social movement theorising will be considered in more depth 
within chapter 7.
Conclusion -  the future for social movement theorizing?
From this discussion, it seems clear that whilst there are many differences 
between the various approaches, there are also continuities. Two major questions, 
however, remain and these, it seems to me, represent the fundamental issues yet 
to be resolved within social movement theorizing. Firstly, it would seem that it is 
now time to re-look at the social movements o f the 1960’s and ask again, what 
was so fundamentally different about these movements from those that came 
before? One o f  the most apparent ‘differences’ between many o f the social 
movements that existed pre-1960’s and those that came after the ‘1960’s 
watershed’ is the fact that from the 1960’s onwards social movement activity has 
been seen to be more ‘successful’. For example, early movements such as the 
Chartists and the Jarrow Hunger marches were largely unsuccessful. There is a
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sense, however, in which such movements as the Greenham Common protests 
and the Black Power movement, for example, have really ‘changed the world’. 
The important question, therefore, is whether social movements themselves have 
changed or whether the protest environment in which they take place has altered, 
thereby affecting the ability o f protest to bring about change?
From the literature it is clear that theories that emphasise the ‘newness’ o f  the 
‘new’ social movements rest upon notions o f  the crisis o f  modernity and the 
dawn o f post-modernity. These are contested concepts, however, and need to be 
used as the basis for theorizing only with extreme care. Without a doubt during 
the past forty years society has undergone radical transformation, but there 
appears to be little consensus surrounding the key aspects o f  this change. Whilst 
Melucci (1996) is clearly one o f the theorists responsible for introducing the 
concept o f the ‘new’ social movements into sociological debate, he is, however, 
concerned about the arid debate that he considers has ensued between supporters 
and critics o f ‘newness’. For this reason he is anxious that in debating the validity 
o f  the term ‘new’ social movement, theorists in this field do not lose track o f the 
fact that contemporary social movements are signalling that radical 
transformations are occurring to the reality in which we live. The first challenge 
then, for theorists in this field, is to rise above this sterile debate about ‘old’ and 
‘new’ social movements and to consider them afresh in the context in which they 
now exist.
One way forward may be to forge stronger links between citizenship and social 
movement theorising. It is the argument in this thesis that this may prove to be 
effective because understanding the way in which citizenship has changed over 
time is key to understanding the social and political environment in which social 
movements act. Understanding the nature o f  contested citizenship is also likely to  
be key to understanding social movements. For example, if, as writers such as 
Stevenson (1997a/b) suggest, ‘cultural citizenship’ is the basis o f  social 
movement activity, then the second phase European theories o f  social 
movements, with their focus upon such things as values, culture and identity, may 
well provide the key to understanding conflict today. Touraine (1985) is clear that
Chapter 5
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citizenship as ‘identity’ has become central to social movements but is equally 
certain that without the full recognition o f the other as subject, calls for the 
acceptance o f  difference, specificity and identity can lead to ghettoisation and 
intolerance. Further, he fears that whilst this now ‘anxious’ search for identity 
may result in new definitions o f  social ‘norms’, there is also a risk o f an 
individualism that excludes successful collective actioa
I f  however, there is evidence to suggest that more structural inequalities may 
also be a central part o f this process o f engagement, then it may be necessary to 
return to some o f the older explanations for social movements. The possibility 
that this may be the case raises a further challenge for any future theorizing on 
social movements, for if  we can no longer completely disregard the earlier, ‘First 
Phase Theories’ as explanations for why social movements exist and what they 
are about, perhaps we need not see these tw o phases o f  theorizing as 
incommensurable in other respects. Cohen (1985) offers a starting point for 
tackling this challenge when she writes that:
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O f course, one cannot evade the fact that the striking feature o f the 
contemporary (...) situation o f  movements is heterogeneity. The 
old patterns o f  collective action certainly continue to exist. In 
some movements, they may even be statistically preponderant. It 
would thus be futile to speak o f the new identity o f the movements. 
Since all movements are complex phenomena, however, 
heterogeneity itself cannot be the unique aspect o f  contemporary 
contestations. Instead, it is the thesis here that some identities, 
implying specific forms o f  organization and struggle within the 
contemporary movements, are new in the sense just indicated, and 
that there are good reasons to consider these to be o f major 
significance, (p.665)
She proposes a more critical consideration o f  the relationship between collective 
action and identity as the basis for future theorizing on social movements. Thus, 
in her model, social movements are viewed as having a fragile composition, often 
being fragmented and composed o f  individuals with diverse opinions and 
interests. This model may well provide a starting point when considering 
contemporary social movements, for it acknowledges diversity o f aim and action 
within one movement.
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The idea that social movements may possess diversity o f  aim and action 
according to the social and political environment in which they exist is an idea 
that forms the basis o f Ellison’s (2000) work on ‘defensive and pro-active 
engagement’. In many respects, his ideas echo Cohen’s but he has advanced 
further in theorising the link between these processes o f  engagement and 
citizenship theorising. His work is therefore, o f  central importance to the 
argument within this thesis and will be considered in more depth within chapter 
7.
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Findings1
The specific purpose o f the first section o f this chapter is to consider the key 
findings o f this research. To this end, the qualitative data2 presented has been 
grouped according to four main categories or themes. These themes are as 
follows:
❖  Structural Issues
❖  Disabling attitudes-enabling identities
❖  Disability Culture
❖  The Disability Movement
Structural Issues
In relation to this research, ‘structural issues’ are those that relate to the access to, 
and the nature and experience o f  certain key resources, such as education, 
employment and the built environment. In relation to this research, a distinction 
is drawn between these issues and more subjectively defined issues o f  public 
attitudes towards disabled people (in the form o f disablism) or the private 
identities o f individual disabled people, although the manner in which the two
1 Since respondents in this research are being kept anonymous, quotations in this chapter have been coded as 
‘members o f a particular group’. In excerpts in which more than one member is speaking the quotations have 
been coded according to the order in which the respondents speak -  i.e. member 1 for the first speaker and so 
on. There is no connection between the coding o f each excerpt, so the code ‘member 1 of DaCE’ for 
example may refer to more than one individual according to the particular excerpt. This is part o f a system of 
coding which aims to avoid accidentally identifying certain individuals. In the case o f the Deafmail 
respondents, the coding ‘respondents 1/2/3’ does refer to the same individuals throughout this section. This 
was considered to be justifiable since the membership o f Deafmail is extensive and the respondents replied 
privately to my questions, therefore making it unlikely that other users o f Deafmail will easily identify them. 
' Key to organisations as follows:
SUFA = Speaking Up For Action
SFPD = Sheffield Forum of People with Disabilities
Lancaster DISC — Lancaster Disablement Information and Support Centre
DaCE = Disability Association Carlisle and Eden
DASL = Disability Action South Lakeland
Arthritis Support =  Arthritis Care Support Group, Carlisle
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can inter-relate is important. The initial point to make here is that respondents 
clearly identified a number o f structural issues that were affecting their quality o f  
life and life chances. Further, in many cases when asked a variation upon the 
question: “What, if  any, barriers or problems are disabled people facing today?’, 
there was a marked tendency on the part o f respondents to identify structural 
issues only, or else before any other issues.
Respondents highlighted the key problems facing disabled people as being the 
perpetuation o f dependency and their exclusion from the ‘ideals o f citizenship’. 
They stressed the role o f the state and/or society in relation to this problem:
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Member of Lancaster DISC: '(...) I  think that there is a kind o f hypocrisy, 
tha t is, that the s ta te  is working towards making disabled people more 
dependent As the s ta te  cuts back on provision, disabled people can become 
more dependent on others -  which I  don't think is the way i t  should be 
because i t  really burdens others. We are getting back to 'cap in hand'."
Member of DACE-' I t's  also about the circumstances being created which 
allow you to be a good citizen.
Angharad- So you have to be enabled to be a good citizen in some way?
Member of DACE-' Participation is a big element o f  i t  - isn't it?  I f  you can't 
actually participate fully in society, how can you even be a good citizen  
really?_________________________________________________________
Respondents frequently highlighted issues relating to experiences o f schooling 
and in the workplace and o f the types o f barriers faced by disabled people in 
these two spheres. Respondents who chose to comment upon segregated special 
needs education were unequivocally critical o f this type o f education provision 
for disabled children. The following comments clearly echo the critique o f  
segregated education provided by many authors within Disability Studies and 
provide strong support for the view  that this type o f educational provision can 
greatly limit the educational achievement o f disabled children:
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Member of Lancaster DISC (re. special needs education): I  don’t  know 
whether they think that i t  is b e st to encourage you to aim low, so th a t you 
don't then g e t disappointed (...)
Member of DACE: Well, my firs t school was (...) a private school and I  
learnt more there up to the age o f  11. Then I  went to a special school and 
T d found that children there were ju s t being (...) they didn't know anything! 
They weren't being taught anything (...) the s ta f f  ju s t thought well, you 
know, they've g o t disabilities, they can't do this, they can't do that, we'll ju s t  
g e t them through a day - and that was it. I  ju s t hated it. I  know th a t there 
are s till places like that.___________________________________________
The logical assumption that might be drawn from these types o f comments might, 
therefore, be that disabled people favour inclusive, mainstream education. In this 
research, however, the issue o f  mainstream education was not discussed in 
sufficient depth to draw any clear conclusions. The following excerpt from one 
group interview nevertheless suggests that whilst in favour o f  mainstreaming, 
some disabled people are gravely concerned about the way in which lack o f 
sufficient resources may be disadvantaging disabled children in mainstream 
schooling:
Angharad: How would you s e t about building a more inclusive society? How 
does one do it?
Member of Lancaster DISC: I  think you s ta r t in school, in (...) all the 
schools -  inclusive education.
Angharad: Rather than segregated?
Member of Lancaster DISC: Yes.
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: Only i f  they give enough money. Without the 
money actually people suffer....
Member of Lancaster DISC: ^agrees with worker) in the lory run.___________
What can be concluded from the findings o f  this research is that disabled people 
clearly believe that major structural barriers still exist within the sphere o f  
education, even where advances such as ‘mainstreaming’ have been taking place. 
Some respondents also made important connections between what they
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considered to be these major barriers within education and subsequent barriers 
within the field o f employment.
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Member of DACE: (...) disabled people are s till not encouraged to apply for 
jo b s and to try  and move into employment. (...) I  mean, we have an education 
system  discouraging people in their future development._________________
What is clear from this last quotation is that the disabled people in this research 
supported the idea that the attitudes o f those involved in the education o f disabled 
people have tended to restrict the job prospects o f  young people. This is 
particular quotation goes one step further than this, however, for the respondent 
here is equally definite in their belief that the education system has been actively 
discouraging the future development o f disabled people.
Other important comments on the issue o f employment came from respondents 
who are members o f Speaking Up For Action (SUFA), a self-advocacy group for 
people with learning disabilities. In the first quotation one member expressed his 
feelings about his experience o f  trying to gain access to employment:
Member of SUFA: I t's  like when you go for jo b s isn't i t  (...)? You ju s t tell 
'em you've g o t summat wrong with you - then they don't want to know a t the 
end o f the day...they tre a t you tike scum in jobs._____________________
In the second quotation, another member o f SUFA who had gained employment 
within a sheltered workshop highlights the vulnerability o f  many disabled people 
once they are within the field o f employment:
Member of SUFA: I'm fed  up with i t  (sheltered workshop) (...) S ta ff  trea t 
people like kids. There are two s ta f f  always picking on me - "Comb you hair!". 
I t  happens a lo t (there). I  don't like i t  They're picking on me. (Distress)_______
What these two comments demonstrate is that according to the participants in this 
research major structural barriers still exist to the full employment o f disabled 
people and to their fair treatment by employers. That these problems persist 
despite changes to legislation to try to enforce equality o f  opportunity is
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something that frustrates many disabled people as is clear from the following 
quotation:
Member of DACE: (...) almost everything a t the moment I  would say had 
some so rt o f  barrier-creating e ffe c t (...) I  mean, why something for 
instance as (changes to) employment practices, why that hasn't had a 
significant e ffe c t in term s o f  increasing the employment o f  disabled people 
is quite hard to understand.________________________________________
In addition to issues relating to education and employment the respondents in this 
research also highlighted other areas where they perceived major structural 
barriers. Many respondents commented upon the need for improvements to 
services in order to maintain their own independence, members o f  SUFA stated 
that seeking to improve service provision was one o f the key (unctions o f their 
organisation:
Member of SUFA: I  think SUFA wants to make services b e tte r  for people 
with learning difficulties -  Social Services, Health Services, the Police 
Services, all o f  them need up-grading really.__________________________
Other members o f  SUFA expressed their desire to have more choices in relation 
services which impacted upon them and to be more involved in decision making 
about their own lives. Having a voice in consultation processes with service 
providers was an issue that other respondents raised throughout the research. 
Clearly there was a feeling that in the past too many decisions had been taken 
about the lives o f  disabled people with no reference to the views o f this ‘client’ 
group:
Angharad: What other factors or ways can improvement be made in the 
lives o f  disabled people?
Member of DACE: In the ways services are provided -  giving people 
grea ter opportunity (...) to ex ert their own independence, to have grea ter 
control over how services are provided, grea ter choice in the type o f  
services that are available to them...creating a situation where disabled 
people themselves are making decisions or influencing development, so that 
what is available relates a b it more clearly to their actuaLnot ju s t their
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needs, but their wants, their desires, their feeling about that. (...) I  suppose 
to a certain extent, there's a certain idealism in that, but it's something we 
should work towards (...)
Angharad: (...) What would you say were the barriers? (...)
Member of DACE: (...) Oh the obvious one is that disabled people aren't a 
priority in term s o f  (...) elements o f  consultation - being involved. I f  you 
don't have enough disabled people working for an organisation, and you're not 
consulting with disabled people, how can th a t organisation, therefore, be in 
touch with what disabled people feel or what they need?________________
That this lack o f consultation can be explained at least in part by the Medical 
Model o f  Disability and the traditional power o f professionals over the lives o f  
disabled people, was clearly identified by two respondents:
Member of Lancaster DISC: (...) professionals - there are a lot o f  people 
making a lo t o f  money out o f  knowing what's b e st for people like us. (...) I  
mean, i t  is you (to another group member) who is a stroke victim, and I  am a 
cerebral palsy sufferer. (...) They haven't g o t it.
Excerpt from a discussion a t SUFA - the questions a t this point of the 
discussion are being asked by SUFA's support worker:
Worker: Do you think that in (...) those organisations and groups that are 
for people with learning disabilities (...) people with learning disabilities don't 
g e t their say?
Member: Yes, Mencap does that.
Worker: They don't le t people have their say? Are there any other groups 
like that where people can't have their say?
Member: Yeah -  in Social Services you can't...
Worker: I'm thinking about something that you said earlier (name) about the 
Down's Syndrome Association?
Member: They were talking about people with Down'Syndrome...
Worker: Who should have been doing the talking?
Member: They don't know about i t  really.
Worker: Who should be doing the talking more?
Member: Us! Give us a chancel
What is clear from both o f these excerpts is that the power o f professionals over 
the lives o f disabled people persists both in the state and the voluntary sectors and 
regaining power over their lives is something that many o f  the respondents
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identified as being o f great importance to them. Further, some respondents also 
highlighted the problem o f tokenism within existing consultation processes:
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: They'd much rather you didn't actually say 
anything! They want you to be there, bu t not to be awkward!
Member of Lancaster DISC: I t's  a rubber-stamping thing isn't it?_______
In addition to these issues o f professional power and lack o f consultation, 
disabled people in this research also routinely highlighted the barriers that they 
faced in relation to transport and the built environment. What became clear from 
the discussions was that most respondents considered the inaccessible 
environment to be if  not the only barrier, certainly one o f the key barriers facing 
disabled people today. Indeed, when asked about key issues facing disabled 
people, the inaccessible environment was by far the most frequently mentioned 
problem. The following quotations demonstrate the views o f some respondents 
on this issue:
Member 1 SFPD: (...) independent living shows how the public environment 
could be made accessible, also mainstream services for disabled people such 
as supermarkets allowing their s ta f f  to assist disabled people with their 
shopping. I  believe this is what the disability movement is about, and I  do 
feel p a rt o f  that.
Member 2 SFPD: There is s till g rea t scope for improvements in the lives o f  
disabled people. Transport is one area where this is evident. The provision 
o f  community transport can enable a disabled person to travel a realistic 
number o f times a week a t an affordable price, but true equality, civil rights 
and the disability movement demands that disabled people should be able to 
catch a bus a t any time.
Member Lancaster DISC: Everyone thought i t  was awful that in South 
Africa when black people weren't allowed to use the buses for white people. 
But because someone cannot walk and cannot physically g e t on a bus, that's 
acceptable. I  don't look a t i t  in that way.
Member 1 DACE: But people cash in on disability as well -  (...) we went to 
Blackpool the other weekend and we found a hotel tha t has wheelchair
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access, but we paid double for i t  because i t  had a lif t and i t  had wheelchair 
access. Everywhere else we 'phoned' yes, they had steps, stairs, couldn’t  g e t  
up to the firs t floor and y e t this Hotel had everything and (...) because o f i t  
they know people would have to g o t there, so they pu t the price up.
Member 2 DACE: You fe lt tha t you were exploited?
Member 1 DACE: Yes. I  think people are exploited.
Member DACE: I t  isn’t  ju s t about the physical environment, i t ’s  about 
people getting around as well. How many buses in Cumbria are actually 
accessible for disabled people? I  think there’s  two in Carlisle, or something.
Another comment which was not made directly in relation to this topic o f  the 
inaccessible environment, but is nevertheless very revealing was made by a 
respondent in answer to the question: “What do you personally gain from being a 
part o f  this organisation?’. In this quotation, the respondent is highlighting the 
fact that her experience o f arthritis has made performing many tasks within the 
home difficult. For this respondent, one o f the key benefits o f the organisation o f  
which she is a member is the sharing o f  knowledge between members about how  
to overcome these problems:
Member of Arthritis Support: (...) i f  you can’t  do something in the house, 
people will tell you how they g o t round it._____________________________
Clearly this is an issue that relates to the inaccessible environment since many o f  
the difficulties mentioned in the wider discussion from which this comment was 
taken relate to the design o f homes, equipment, consumer good such as jars o f  
food and so on. Interestingly, this particular group took a somewhat less 
‘political’ stance towards the problem o f the inaccessible environment, seeing it 
as a problem to be faced and for which solutions must be found, rather than as 
something that they considered to be inherently unjust.
In addition to this interesting difference between groups, two other important
differences must also be highlighted within this section on structural barriers. The
first relates to key differences in experiences between physically disabled people
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and people with learning disabilities with regard to opportunities for independent 
living. For many disabled respondents with physical impairments, independent 
living was an ‘ideal’ which could be achieved given the appropriate support. The 
main issues, for these respondents was the funding shortfall in this area and the 
lack o f  availability o f carers, these two issues being closely linked as is shown in 
the following excerpt:
Member of DASL: Independent living is a lim ited thing too - they've 
changed the rules for that now.
Angharad: Really?
Member of DASL: Yes -  because they've actually run out o f  the funding 
available. (...) I t's  also very difficult to recruit carers because unemployment 
is  quite low and those are the so rts  o f  jo b s that people go into when 
unemployment is high because...
Angharad: I t's  not the b est paid job?
Member of DASL: No -  and i t ’s  not the n icest jo b  in the world either...and 
the employment services are forcing people to do the job, so they're doing it  
not because they want to but because they have to. (...) whereas, i f  you 
made i t  lucrative enough you'd be able to recruit your own personal assistant 
or carers for example. But the Independent Living, I  think i t  was the pre- 
1993 rules, i t  was almost, the ceiling was almost limitless, whereas now 
they've capped i t  to a certain amount each week._____________________
The view o f this respondent is quite clear - shortfalls in funding are the major 
barrier to independent living.
This was not the case for many o f the respondents who had learning disabilities.
The desire to ‘have my own flat’ was something that many o f the respondents at
SUFA mentioned as a ‘hope or dream’ but there was little sense that this goal was
achievable for most members o f  this group. Discussions at SUFA also
highlighted the fact that whilst attempts have been made to support ‘quasi’-
independent living for people with learning disabilities within small group
homes, these living arrangements fall short o f  the ‘ideal’ o f  independent living. In
the following excerpt from a discussion at SUFA one o f  the members o f  this
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group describes his experiences o f living in a group home and the stress that this 
way o f life causes him:
Excerpt from a discussion a t SUFA:
Member: I  like being trea ted  with respec t
Angharad: Are you not trea ted  with respect?
Member: Yeah - 1  do, bu t sometimes I'm always gettin g  blamed in th at 
house sometimes. (...) I  tr y  to keep out o f  trouble...
Worker: I  think that's something about living together -  with a  group o f  
people. Sometimes you're bound to  fa llou t (...)U
Member: She's (member o f shared household) always like that, she takes i t  out 
on o th er people as well (...)
Worker: Who so r ts  i t  out then when i t  happens?
Member: We have to so r t  i t  out. So I  say to h er -  now come on (name), you 
can stop  this you know.
Worker: And do you s o r t  i t  out in the end?
Member: Every time I  say  something she g e ts  a  face on. (...) And she storm s  
out o f  the kitchen, bangs on the door on the wall -  made a  righ t mark on i t  
and went upstairs.__________________________________________
The second issue relates to differences within groups between the views o f  
members with regard to the importance o f structural barriers in their lives. In the 
following excerpt from a discussion held at Lancaster DISC, what became clear 
is that there are some important differences o f opinion regarding what is the 
central function o f  the organisation. Whilst the excerpt may not be the most 
‘profound’, it is the only example o f a discussion between members o f  a focus 
group on the topic o f  ‘social exclusion’. One member o f  the group clearly states 
that the aim o f  the organisation should be to combat social exclusion and to help
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to build a more inclusive society. The responses o f the other members o f  the 
organisation to this comment are most interesting:
Chapter 6
Angharad: Okay -  so the central hopes and aim o f the organisation - what 
might they be would you say?
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: To help build a more inclusive society.
(...)
Angharad: Right...to build a more inclusive society you think that's a centra! 
part?
Member 2 Lancaster DISC: I'm not sure whether that is actually in the 
constitution. I  think maybe it's lurking somewhere in that scatterbrain o f  
yours (to member 1).
Angharad: Would you say that i t  should be in (the constitution)? (...)
Member 2 Lancaster DISC: Yes.
Member 3 Lancaster DISC: But that is the ultimate aim, but slightly 
smaller than that -  I  mean, our aim is  to  given disabled people as much 
information, confidence, advice to live as independently as they want to live.
The first comment by member 2 about the ‘scatterbrain’ o f  member 1 was clearly
this individual’s spontaneous reaction to the idea that the chief aim o f  the
organisation is to build a more inclusive society. It was apparent at this point in
the discussion that member 2 did not consider social inclusion to be a central aim
o f the organisation, although when asked whether it should be a part o f  the formal
constitution o f  the organisation, member 2 agreed that it should. To what extent
this second statement o f agreement reflected a genuine feeling is unclear, it is
possible that member 2 felt in some way obliged to agree given the current
‘political’ importance o f the term ‘social inclusion’. M ost revealing however, is
the comment made by member 3, which goes some way to explaining why it
might be that the organisation as a whole has not embraced the idea o f  ‘social
inclusion’. Member 3 clearly indicates that ‘social exclusion’ is a part o f  a much
bigger agenda, somehow ‘beyond’ the smaller, and more ‘everyday’ aims o f  the
organisatioa These everyday aims member 3 identifies as ‘information,
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confidence and advice’ about independent living. Combining this comment with 
knowledge about the functioning o f  this organisation it is clear that member 3 is 
talking about advice regarding how to overcome structural barriers such as 
income inequalities, housing difficulties, employment issues and access issues.
It seems to me that it can be logically inferred from this final comment, that for 
this member o f  the organisation, ‘social inclusion’ is about more than combating 
these types o f  structural barriers. Indeed, I would suggest that the use o f the term 
‘ultimate’ suggests that ‘social inclusion’ is viewed by this member at least as an 
almost utopian goal and one that does not reflect the everyday operations o f  the 
organisation. The main conclusion that may be drawn from this excerpt, seems to 
be that not all disabled people feel able to engage in the sort o f  truly 
emancipatory politics that is suggested by member l ’s comments about an 
‘inclusive society’. It would seem therefore, that whilst not denying that there are 
wider issues o f  participation, identity and acceptance, some disabled people are 
still choosing to focus their efforts upon helping disabled people to remove or 
bypass certain key structural barriers in society.
This final point is reinforced by the comments o f another respondent from a 
different group who admitted that fighting against the numerous structural 
barriers that remain, took up so much o f the organisation’s time, they were unable 
to engage in wider emancipatory action:
Chapter 6
Member DASL: (...) about being a b it more proactive and probably a b it 
more militant and probably raising awareness -  w ere so bogged down in 
doing what we're already doing that we find we haven't g o t time to do 
anything else.____________________________________________________
To conclude this section o f  structural issues, therefore, what the evidence from 
this research suggests is that for many disabled people these structural issues 
represent some o f the major, if  not the major disabling factors in society:
Member SFPD: The environment and services -  these are the two things 
that disable me most.
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Disabling attitudes -  Empowering Identities?
Whilst, as discussed previously, the majority o f respondents identified structural 
barriers as being at the heart o f their experience o f disability, discussions relating 
to disabling attitudes, language and identity also formed a major part o f  most 
discussions. Indeed, many respondents demonstrated that they had very strongly 
held views on these matters.
Several respondents described what they considered to be disabling attitudes and 
behaviours within society. The attitudes they described were those held by non­
disabled people and ranged from unconscious acts that disempower disabled 
people through their unintended consequences, through widely held but 
influential misconceptions about certain impairments, to openly prejudiced 
attitudes and actions. The following excerpts point to the key power imbalances 
that exist between all non-disabled and disabled people. What is clear from these 
quotations is that such power imbalances can occur even in seemingly caring or 
close relationships such as between friends, and persist in the field o f medicine 
where despite years o f  awareness raising, medical professionals continue to focus 
too heavily upon impairment and in so doing exacerbate the problem o f  
disability.
Member of Arthritis Care: Well, I  was out and I  was struggling, and I  
never told her, my b est friend a t work -  i t  was my own fault because I  
ordered pizza and I  couldn't cu t it! And she took my plate o f f  me -  and I  
was mortified! Really, really mortified! -  and I  was: "Oh please don't do this!" 
-  and she was doing i t  and I  was holding on to the plate. And she really 
thought she was being helpful.
Member Arthritis Care: (...) I  think i t  was about Septem ber that my 
daughter came and said mwe'Hgo to shop mobility in Carlisle!'' -  so I  tried  a 
chair and I  fe lt awful! I  really did! Because (...) people were talking to (name 
of husband) as i f  I  was invisible, and I  was someone, you know, who was ju s t 
there.
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Member Lancaster DISC: You g e t so th a t you can't talk as a friend to a 
doctor, they're ju s t in terested in you as a medical condition._____________
Respondents also highlighted the problem o f negative assumptions that many 
non-disabled people make about disabled people. At one end o f the scale 
respondents highlighted the very disempowering effects that such assumptions 
can have:
Member of Lancaster DISC: Even now i t  happens that people come in 
assume that because there's an able-bodied in the office and assume that 
they're in charge.
Member of SFPD: I  was sitting next to a women, she g o t on the bus a t the 
Sheaf Market and she said "Oh you're blind aren't you! My daughter's blind, 
and she's ju s t had a baby! Isn't i t  wonderful what they can do!"UI  was on a train once, going to Swansea from Paddington and there was an 
old lady, and do you know I  s till can't believe this story, but i t  happened - 
and I  knew she wanted to talk to me, and we'd gone through Reading and 
Bristol and we were nearly in Cardiff and then she said  - "Young man, would 
you like a chocolate biscuit?" So I  was doing my social b it and I  said "Oh 
Thank you!" and she placed this silver wrapped biscuit in my hand and there 
was silence whilst I  unwrapped i t  and ju s t as I  was about to ea t it, she said: 
"No, stop!" and I  said "Why, what's the matter?" and she said: "I didn't mean 
you to ea t the biscuit, I  ju s t wanted to know i f  you knew where your mouth 
was!". I  couldn't come back from that one, I  ju s t sa t there chewing the 
biscuit. (...) I  think she must have been in her eighties. I t  happens all the 
time and the reason for i t  is, we're basically excluded. I  mean, I  think she 
grew  up in a school for nice 'gals' somewhere and probably they had a few  
Black girls -  but only the very rich ones and I  think she'd never m et a 
disabled person and I  don't think she regarded me as being a human being, I  
think she regarded me as an organism that she could experiment with (...)
Whilst such assumptions o f  incompetence clearly need to be challenged very 
seriously, at the other end o f the scale respondents at SUFA highlighted the even 
more disturbing beliefs that some people hold about disabled people, in this case 
people with a learning disability, that they are dangerous and ‘deviant’:
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Member of SUFA: I'm not bad, but some people think I  am. I  don't think 
much o f  them!
Member of SUFA: (...) more able-bodied people are frightened o f  us.
Worker a t SUFA: (...) what other words have people used to describe 
people with learning disabilities?
Member 1 SUFA: ‘FunnyFarm'
Worker a t SUFA: Funny Farm?
Angharad: From the Funny Farm?
Member 1 SUFA: Yeah -  ’cos that's what they said about us a t College, ‘cos 
we used to work a t (name) farm - and they used to say *Oh, here they are 
from the Funny Farm. “
Member 2 SUFA: People call us mental as well.
Angharad: Mental?
Member 3 SUFA: Nutter!
According to another respondent, such attitudes are both demonstrated and 
perpetuated by the media. In this excerpt the respondent highlights the way in 
which disability is portrayed by the media in terms o f  crisis and incompetence:
Member of DACE: But it's the same with I  mean, there are other things 
like on TV. Disabled people only really appear on specific disability related  
programmes and that becomes a b it o f  an extrem e because they focus, I  
mean they do, they focus on the more extrem e issues rela ted  to disability. 
I t's  not like disabled people are present in all programmes. But I  suppose 
this is something Black people would have said a lo t more a few  years ago 
and things s ta rted  to change -  but they're s till saying i t  aren't they? And 
it's definitely not happening with disabled people! I  mean it's usually 'issue' 
things that come up -  i f  it's in the media it's like, you know...
(...) it'll be like, a women being pregnant and then she becomes blind a n d ’AhI 
How will she cope with that?" You know! And then i t  becomes a crisis and 
disability tends to be rela ted  to crises in the media and not about people 
like us ju s t living their lives really. _________
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The role o f the media and the importance o f preconceived ideas about the nature 
o f disability was also considered by several other respondents during discussions 
about the transition from a non-disabled to a disabled identity3. The following 
excerpts demonstrate the power o f disablist attitudes, and as will be discussed at 
greater length later, also show how understanding the extent to which most non­
disabled people hold these views can help explain subsequent differences 
between the attitudes o f those individuals with acquired as opposed to congenital 
impairments:
Member of SFPD: I  used to work as a physio, in a rheumatism clinic and I  
think that my patients found (...) because th eyd  been able-bodied and 
probably their Mum or their Granny or their bad had had arthritis before 
them, and when they were able-bodied they were really scornful (...) then 
when i t  goes around and comes to them, they've s till g o t those a ttitu des but 
now they're looking a t themselves like that.
Angharad: (...) is  i t  important to re-identify (...) disabled people (...) in a 
more positive light -  do you see that as something important?
DASL Member: Yes. You see prior to my accident, I  was as guilty as 
anybody o f  all the stereotypical images o f  what disabled people are. I t  
wasn't because I  really fe lt like that, i t  was because every time you see 
someone on the telly, in a wheelchair, they were always stupid or something 
like that -  you never saw them in a positive way.
(...)You know the Tom Cruise film - the Vietnam one, when he's in the 
wheelchair. Again it's always about him becoming disabled, but never actually 
integrating or being a part. And I  was as guilty as anybody else. (...) I  was 
ignorant, like the m ajority o f  people are, o f  the whole disability issue -  
totally ignorant o f what i t  meant, o f  who the people were. I t's  like I  said, I  
always thought that anybody in a wheelchair, they were brain-damaged or 
something like that (...) and that was the perception I  had a t the time. I t  
mis only when I  became disabled m yself that my whole attitu de changed.
( . . . )  _________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Respondents also talked extensively about what being disabled meant to them in 
terms o f their identities. On the whole, the majority o f respondents did not
3 Please see footnote 3, chapter 2 for definitions of the two terms ‘disabled identity’ and ‘disability identity’.
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perceive their disabled identity as something that was positive, or something that 
they felt proud about. Most o f the respondents felt that their disabled identity had 
been imposed upon them. O f those who did not seen their disabled identity as a 
negative thing, nevertheless, they did not see it as something positive, simply as a 
‘fact’ to be lived with. The following comments exemplify the large number o f  
comments made on this topic throughout the research:
Member of Arthritis Care: I  think other people have to pu t the label on 
you (disabled) - 1  don't think that I  could say m yself that I'm disabled. (...) I  
feet th a t it's not my decision.
Member of Arthritis Care: J  think you come to accept i t  because you have 
to use i t  when you are claiming for this, that and the other. You accept that 
you've g o t that label.
Member of SFPD: We are all individuals with our own identity who have in 
common that we are depersonalised by barriers including attitudes.
Member of SFPD: (...) having p a rt o f  your person not working is essentially 
negative. I t  is possible to be proud o f achievements as a disabled person. To 
be proud to be disabled was not a concept that found support here.
Angharad: I s  there such a thing as a 'disability identity' and i f  there is, 
what is the image that ex ists - what is  i t  like to experience it?  You said that 
Tm a disable person!“ with some... well, was i t  pride?...
Member of Lancaster DISC: I t  was ju s t a statem ent. But I  think that on a 
practical basis, I  might have needs -  because o f  my disability -  bu t th a t’s  a 
fact, not...it shouldn't be a problem. I f  I  go into a pub and a buy a lemonade, 
and I  want to s it  a t a table because I'm disabled, then I  need to g e t 
someone else to carry the lemonade -  it's a fa c t -  but i t  shouldn't be a 
problem.
Angharad: When you became disabled, did you feel tha t you had gained a 
new identity?
DASL Member: Definitely yes, without a doubt, yes.
Angharad: Was i t  a positive identity or...?
DASL Member: From a personal point o f  view - no, it's not. There are some 
positive things about i t  -  but from a personal view point I  would say probably
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less than 5% - I  can think o f  95% more reasons o f  not being disabled than 
being disabled. (...)_______________________________________________
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Curiously, in addition to these comments, which must bring into some doubt the 
idea o f a positive ‘disability identity’ and the notion o f ‘celebrating’ disability, 
some respondents expressed their reluctance to accept the ‘label’ o f  disability at 
all. Considering that each o f the respondents were key members o f  a disability 
organisation their position in relation to this issue o f identity is obviously 
complex:
Member of DASL: I  don't always see m yself as disabled (...) The only time I  
see m yself as disabled is when someone else is having to do things for me 
tha t I  can't do for m yself -  or I'm in bed and I  obviously can't g e t up. And I  
do feel vulnerable. And I  do -  I  am aware that I  become, more passive 
because you are so vulnerable.
Member 1 of Dace: I  g e t as much help as I  can but I  don't call th a t being 
disabled, sorry.
Member 2 DaCE: Well I'm ju s t thinking, I  feel p re tty  normal you see. (...) I  
don't think o f  m yself as disabled - 1  am, but I  don't think like that.
(...)
Member 1 DaCE: I  used to hate being called blind!
Angharad: Did you? What did you prefer?
Member 1 DaCE: I  don't know - I  probably didn't want to be called 
anything.
Angharad: Right -  which goes back to what you (to Member 2) were saying - 
(...) that you don't want to particularly be, or feel the need to be identified  
as a disabled person?
Member 2 DaCE: I  know other people think I  am, bu t I  personally ju s t  
think ju s t Tm  one o f  you". I  ju s t have a mobility problem (...) I'm me you 
see!
Member 3 DaCE: I t's  having a label isn't it?  People seem to think that we 
should be labelled.
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Member of SUFA: We ju s t don't want to be labelled tike jars!
The important point here is that in the case o f each o f  these respondents, the 
impairment that forms the ‘visible’ sign o f their disability was clear. It is often 
assumed that there is a greater tendency on the part o f individuals with so-called 
‘hidden’ disabilities to seek to avoid being labelled as disabled. The findings o f  
this research show that this is not the case and individuals with what might be 
considered by many non-disabled people to be ‘profound impairments’ also wish 
to avoid being termed ‘disabled’.
Another assumption that does not necessarily need to be completely rejected but 
which does need to be considered more carefully, is the idea that there are 
fundamental differences in terms o f  identity between people with congenital as 
opposed to acquired disabilities. Broadly speaking, the findings o f this research 
do support the idea that individuals with acquired disabilities have particularly 
negative views about their disabled identity and find the transition to such an 
identity very traumatic:
Member 1 of Arthritis Care: I  mean, the moment I  was diagnosed, I  burst 
into tears and said to the doctor, "Oh no! I'm going to have funny hands1" 
and I  mean I  was in agony! I  couldn't turn my w rists over I  was in such pain, 
bu t a!! I  could think about was th a t I  was going to  have these funny hands!
Member 2 Arthritis Care: I  thought the same about being in a wheelchair - 
I  though: mOh my god! I'm going to be in a wheelchair!"
These comments clearly demonstrate, as discussed earlier, the ways in which 
negative attitudes towards disability possessed prior to disablement, can greatly 
effect the experience o f  transition from a non-disabled to a disabled identity. 
Other respondents commented upon the long-term effects that this transition can 
have upon the extent to which an individual engages in the ‘politics o f disability’:
Member of DASL: Hmmmm...I think that the important thing as well is 
whether a person has become disabled as a result o f  an accident or whether 
they were born with a disability. I  imagine that you'd probably g e t
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completely difference answers from both. (...) So from a cultural point o f  
view, I  think you're going to have two cultures within one... where people are 
coming from...because they've not had life experience o f  not being 
disab!ed...whereas I  have.
Angharad: And you think that that has an e ffe c t on how you identify 
yourself now?
Member DASL: Yes, (...) I  think that's actually why I'm not so militant -  I'm 
not vocal, angry, b itter, bothered about terminology.
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: Well, I've said before that (other member of 
group) is on that side o f Disability where you have to change society, the 
re s t o f  us are -  we have to cope, we have to pu t up with things as they are 
and this is what we've g o t and we've g o t to do something with it.
(...)
Where (other member of group) would Say "This is not acceptable", I  would 
tend to say "Well, whether or not it's acceptable, this is the position and 
how do we g e t out o f  it?"__________________________
In the second o f  the two quotations above, the member o f  Lancaster DISC being 
discussed is an individual with congenital disabilities and the member voicing 
these opinions is an individual with an acquired disability.
There were occasions during this research, however, when individuals made 
comments, or debated with each other on this topic in such a way as to 
demonstrate that broad generalisations must be avoided and the complexity o f  
identity issues must always be acknowledged. One respondent with a congenital 
impairment stated that the difficult transition towards acceptance o f a disabled 
identity is something that he has also experienced:
Member of SFPD: I t  is not ju s t people who have acquired disabilities -  I'm 
s till going through it.________________________________________
Equally interesting was a discussion that took place in Lancaster DISC between 
tw o respondents, one with an acquired disability and one with a congenital 
disability. In the following excerpt from this discussion the tw o respondents 
consider the differences between their identities. What becomes clear is that
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member 1 feels that member 2 possesses a more positive identity as a disabled 
person and is better adjusted to life as a disabled person. Member l ’s comments 
reinforce the general findings o f this research in terms o f  indicating the uneasy 
transition from non-disabled to disabled identities. This discussion is even more 
revealing however, because the comments made by member 2 clearly bring into 
some doubt the idea that individuals with congenital impairments have more 
positive identities as disabled people. This is not to say, however, that member 2 
is indicating that he does not feel positive about his identity as a disabled person, 
for his argument is rather subtler than that. Member 2 suggests that the special 
needs education he had received attempted to impose upon him a certain kind o f  
identity that he considered to be essentially negative. His subsequent rejection o f  
this negative identity and development o f  a more positive ‘disability identity’ 
was, therefore, not something that developed naturally because o f the congenital 
nature o f his disability, but rather from his own determination and emancipatory 
thinking:
Chapter 6
Angharad: Would you say though that you had chosen your identities as 
'disabledpeople’-  or do you feel that you have been labelled by society?
Member 1: Oh its  been pu t on me entirely...yes...(...) T do wonder though, 
whether there is a difference between us -  you've (to respondent 2) been 
disabled all your life and me..1  wondered that?
Angharad: So how do you think - what is i t  like, i f  I  may ask you, to 
experience that change o f identity?
Member 1: Well, this is it...you see, I  think that I  do rather think that i t  
was imposed on me...whereas, you (to respondent 2)...it seem s to me - have had 
an identity o f  your own all your life.
Member 2'. N o - not really, because..! think that a t my former college, a lo t 
o f  the pupils were more ready to accept what society had marked down for 
them...they were more likely to accept the expectations.
Angharad: What were the expectations would you say?
Member 2: Basically, to  go to special school and to go to local day centre 
and to live in some so rt o f  local sheltered  housing. That is what is available...
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Member 1: You know...I'm shocked, in big levels about you (to respondent 2) 
saying about disablism and about this iden tity thing...because you've 
developed your own.... whereas I  had one forced on me!
Member 2: Well, I  didn't choose mine!
Member 1: Yes you did!!
Angharad: Okay, okay! How about me suggesting that what you are saying is 
that for you (to respondent 1) your identity pre-ex isted  your 
disability... whereas for you (to respondent 2) your disability is very much a part 
o f  your sense o f identity?
Members 1 and 2: Yes!
(...)
Member 1: (...) this is one o f the problems you ju s t have to g e t used to...you 
see, when you become disabled, i t  ju s t happens like th a t (with a click of a 
finger) and i t  took me a year to g e t used to it. And I  think th a t in that year I  
had to develop my own identity...which came with my own reasons for wanting 
to be alive.. J t  is a terribly confusing time.
Angharad: Yes... this is  what I've heard in other groups too -  tha t to go from 
a non-disabled identity to a disabled identity, is very difficult.
Member 1: Yes, and i t  is  what a lo t o f  people ju s t can't deal with...you know 
the people who have strokes who are 70 or 80, and are so used to living an 
active Hfe...they ju s t can't adapt...whereas I  had to adapt.
Angharad: Yes, you were young...
Member 1: I  was 34....I had to adapt, or go under...and take on a new 
identity.
Excerpt from discussion a t Lancaster DISC.____________________
What the previous excerpt, in connection with the whole o f this section o f  the 
chapter shows, is that very few  respondents considered their disabled identity to 
be something entirely positive and several o f  the respondents clearly felt that 
their identity as disabled people was a negative factor in their lives, or something
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that they wished to reject, challenge or avoid. It is important at this juncture, 
however, to stress that whilst the findings o f  this research do bring into some 
question the idea o f a positive ‘disability identity’ and the notion that disabled 
people are ‘celebrating the disability identity’, this is not to say that respondents 
entirely rejected the idea o f striving for a more positive representation o f  
disability in society.
Chapter 6
Two respondents described how they used humour as a way o f disrupting 
people’s negative attitudes towards them:
Member of SUF/t: Yeah - someone says: ' There then you nutter!" I  sa id  to  
them: 'I f  Tm a nutter, they would be salted  nuts/* AnH th at way I  g o t them 
back! I f  I  fight back they don't like it.
Member of DISC: (...) the fir s t time I  went into the Biker's Pub in 
Lancaster, I  said 'Hi! I'm Wobbly (name)/* and a fte r  that, you know, that 
ended any kind o f taking the piss! That meant that they had no chance to 
say 'Bugger Off!", you know..._______________
Whether in defining themselves in these humorous ways these individuals are 
truly finding a positive ‘disability identity’ is unclear. There are echoes o f  the 
idea o f  ‘defensive identities’ here. Nevertheless, the actions o f these individuals 
do represent a definite rejection o f the negative attitudes in society.
In another discussion, respondents at Lancaster DISC, felt that one o f  the key 
functions o f the organisation was to promote a positive image o f disabled people:
Member 1 Lancaster Disc: (...) I  think i t  also shows th a t disabled people 
can actually do i t  and we can be seen in a quite a positive role within the 
local community.
Member 2 U ncaster DISC: I  actually think that is very important...too 
often disabled people are seen as incapable. There are not many positive 
roles out there.
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They were also keen to reject the use o f certain terms such as ‘invalid’ to describe 
disabled people because o f its connotation o f not being 'valid*. Members o f other 
organisations involved in this research put forward similar arguments against the 
use o f  derogatory language:
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Member of DACE** A lo t o f  language had a derogatory connotation didn't it?  
And I  presume i f  you are trying to change things in society then I  suppose a 
very obvious change is language, because it's something th a t we use and is 
around us all the time. I f  you are trying to educate, i f  you are trying to 
change, language is perhaps the most obvious way.
O f particular note was the issue o f  the use o f  the term ‘sufferer’ when describing 
individuals with certain impairments. Some o f the respondents at SFPD explained 
why they disliked the term:
Member 1: I  don't like to be described as an M S su fferer’. (...) 'a person 
with MS'.
Angharad: What is essentially wrong with this term? (...)
Member 2: I  have a g rea t problem with the way th a t society sees disabled 
people -  they also actually assume that because we've g o t some so r t o f  
disability tha t we are all suffering, you know. (...) But i t ’s  like everything, 
when someone g e t’s  depressed because o f  their disability then they'll see  
themselves as suffering then. But in general I  would say it's how general 
society sees the disabled person, rather than how the disabled person sees  
themselves.
Clearly for these respondents, the use o f  the term ‘sufferer’ was derogatory and 
negative. It should be noted at this point, however, that as with most issues 
considered during this research, not all respondents agreed with the views o f  the 
members o f  SFPD and there was diversity o f  opinion even within organisations:
Member 1 Arthritis Care: I  don't think there's anything wrong with /'/(term arthritis sufferers) v
Member 2: Because we do su ffer don't we?
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Member 3 : 1  mean, I  would say "I su ffer from..." not '‘I've got..."
Member 4 : 1  think that i f  people say we're sufferers, i t  makes us sound like 
victims.
Member 5: Half o f i t  is tha t we do want to feel in charge -  i t  has to be our 
decision. I  mean, now and again it's nice to  have a  b it o f  sympathy, or 
empathy.________________________
This diversity o f opinion occurred on a number o f other occasions during the 
research in relation to the importance o f language as a way o f positively ‘re- 
identifying’ disabled people. For example, at Lancaster DISC, comments by 
respondents demonstrated that although they did not deny the importance o f  
using respectful terms when talking about disabled people, they nevertheless felt 
that there was a limit to the importance o f language when seeking to improve the 
overall lives o f disabled people:
Angharad: Okay - well the next issue is about how you p refer to identify 
yourselves (...) I'm thinking (...) about which expression is more acceptable: 
‘disabledpeople', ‘people with disabilities'and so on...?
Member 1: Oh, I  think you are moving onto ‘political correctness'now!
Angharad: Well, do you have any feelings about i t  yourself?
Member 2: I  ju s t find i t  quite ironic that there is so much discussion that 
is a waste o f  tim eJ t has been 'academicised'. Unless the position o f  
disabled people in society changes, saying which word is m ost appropriate is 
ju s t tokenism.
(...)
(...) i f  you look a t words like 'spastic" or "Mongol", you know -  then they are 
medical in origin. And so until we move away from seeing people in th a t way, 
and instead see people in a more positive light -  then any name will become 
an abusive word. I  mean I  can imagine i t  in the playground now, instead o f  
saying that someone is “spastic", they're saying do you have a disability?"!
Worker a t Lancaster DISC referring to a statement made by another 
member of the group (member confirmed this statement): That's the 
centra!problem (...) isn't it?  - 1  don't care what you call me -  as you said to
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someone when they asked you about the language o f  disability - you can call 
me a cabbage i f  you like, ju s t give me the money, basically._______________
On the other hand, at DaCE, another respondent thought that campaigns relating 
to the use o f language were a vital part o f  the struggle to improve the lives o f  
disabled people:
Member of DaCE: I t's  preferable that people either worry about i t  or think 
about i t  (language; than...even i f  they don't always g e t i t  right...than i f  they 
don't think about i t  or think it's not important.
UBut that's why, in a sense, the language becomes a kind of, not a flag-ship, 
but it's almost like something that stands out I f  you can't change that, i f  
you can't s ta r t to change attitudes, how do you g e t the support to change 
the other things that you need to change?
Angharach So you think you need to change a ttitu des first?
Member of DaCE: I t  works both ways, sometimes other things ge t, are pu t 
in place that s ta r t to change attitudes. Like a lo t o f people's language in 
terms o f  'race'wouldn't have changed unless there was a lo t o f  publicity or a 
lo t more awareness o f  equal opportunities and using term s that are non- 
discriminatory developed (then) in term s o f  'race'._______
On one level these differences are quite profound, in that for Lancaster DISC 
achieving improvements in relation to the language o f  disability runs the risk o f  
being a mere sop in relation to the major structural barriers still facing disabled 
people. The respondent at DaCE, however, sees structural and attitudinal barriers 
as closely interlinked, and that, therefore, disability campaigns need to have a 
dual focus. The differences between the respondents here should not be over­
emphasised however, because the comments from both groups essentially convey 
the same message: that the key struggle facing disabled people is still to demolish 
structural barriers. Their views differ surrounding the notion o f the extent to 
which changing the language o f disability can help in this struggle.
This is a critical finding for this research because it highlights again, that even 
when the disabled respondents in this research talk about the need for changes in
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attitudes and language, they are not aiming to achieve cultural or identity based 
rights but rather, necessary structural changes to their lives. These findings must 
bring into some doubt the idea that a unified and positive ‘disability identity’ is at 
the heart o f  all disability campaigning. These findings also have clear 
implications for the notion o f a disability culture. This issue will be briefly 
considered in the following section.
Disability Culture
During this research, very little evidence emerged to support the idea that a 
celebration o f a separate ‘culture o f disability’ is occurring widely amongst 
disabled people, with the possible exception o f  the limited number o f  people 
involved with Disability Arts. Most respondents showed some degree o f  
uncertainty surrounding the idea o f a disability culture. The only cultural 
difference that was clearly identified by a number o f  the respondents in this 
research was the issue o f the acceptable use o f non-politically-correct language 
amongst disabled people in humorous contexts. Whilst several o f  the respondents 
suggested that this probably represented the disability culture, I think that it is 
questionable to what extent this use o f  humour amounts to an entirely separate 
‘culture’. The following excerpts typify the comments made on this issue:
Chapter 6
Member DaCE: I t's  hard to see that (disability culture) existing in very 
broad terms, in term s o f  disability as a whole.
Angharad: I s  there such a thing as a !culture o f  disabled people? Do 
you find this a realistic concept?
Member SFPD: Yes, but i t  is not well developed. (...) N ot many cultural 
icons. We have our heroes and villains and jokes - some o f the elements 
o f  culture, but we are fundamentally differen t to other cultures in that 
you can be proud to be a woman, proud to be black, proud to be gay - but 
having a pa rt o f your person not working is essentially negative.
Member DASU (...) I  think th a t there is a culture o f  disability. 
Angharad: Right - so how would you describe th a t then?
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Member DASL: (...) for example, we tend to talk in a d ifferen t language 
with each other than we would do with someone who is not 
disab!ed...because there is affin ity (...) we can use the term s that are 
not PC and g e t away with it. (...) we can crack Christopher Reeve jokes 
and that...
The real difficulty, perhaps, when considering cultural aims as the basis o f  
the disability movement appears to be the assumption that there is some 
‘essential’ cultural difference between disabled people and non-disabled 
people, and that disabled people are culturally united. Whilst the members o f  
Lancaster DISC largely echoed the quotations above, again identifying 
humour as an example o f disability culture, one respondent at this 
organisation made the following comment:
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: I t's  funny...non-disab!ed peop!e...if for 
exampleJn town, in a meeting area, i f  you are in a wheelchair, people 
expect you to have much more affin ity to someone else in a 
whee!chair...andyou might do...
Angharad: But no more than anyone does to anyone else?
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: Quite.
Evidently then, this respondent is not entirely convinced by the idea o f a 
homogenous disability culture that unites all disabled individuals.
During the research, some respondents also openly voiced concerns about the 
activities o f  those engaged in Disability Arts, who they feel are ‘ghettoising’ 
disabled people by celebrating cultural ‘difference’ in a manner that is 
exclusionary:
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: I t's  a  b it like when we went to  th is A rt's 
meeting, you know, what I  call the Disability A rts  Mafia - DAM! -  sorry! 
- (...) they are getting too separatist (...)
Member 2: Which I  hope doesn't happen because I  think i t  will sp lit the 
movement ______
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Such fears are clearly related to wider issues o f  separatism within the disability 
movement that will be considered in the next section o f this chapter. Before 
moving onto consider the disability movement, however, it is also important to 
note one further point about the issue o f the disability culture. In the research 
questions sent in advance o f each group discussion, there was a question about 
disability culture, yet, despite having raised this issue with each group no 
respondent chose to focus upon or talk at length about the question. Whilst this 
issue o f a disability culture clearly requires a fuller investigation than was 
possible within this research, what I suggest can be concluded is that, at present, 
the number one focus o f  many disability organisation is the dismantling o f  
structural barriers; identity issues are an important but somewhat confused 
secondary issue; whilst cultural issues have yet to reach the main agenda in many 
organisations and may never reach this position.
The disability movement
In their 1999 book “Exploring Disability. A Sociological Introduction” Barnes et 
al state the following:
It is a sign o f the maturity and confidence o f the disabled people’s 
movement that disabled people are able to celebrate difference, 
and work together to create and discuss images o f their own 
choosing, (p.207)
The purpose o f this section is to consider the extent to which the evidence from 
this research supports this statement. The first thing that can be said with some 
certainty is that as shown in the previous discussion, there was a large degree o f  
opposition to the idea o f ‘celebrating difference’ amongst the respondents in this 
research. Equally, the respondents in this research expressed views in complete 
contrast to this quote from Barnes et al in two other respects:
The first problem arises in relation to the idea o f the disability movement being 
characterised by disabled people ‘working together’. Several respondents
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highlighted the major divisions that exist between disabled people, as 
demonstrated in the following quotations:
Chapter 6
Member of DaCE: The other thing which is quite important, which we've 
been doing recently is  trying to pull disability organisations through-out 
Cumbria together as a group, as a network, but that's very difficult. They're 
all really suspicious o f each other and won’t  work together.U(...) one o f the things we feel a t the moment is tha t we don't have 
particularly strong links with the Deaf community for instance. And I  don't 
think that's necessarily ju s t to do with us -  it's tha t the D eaf community is 
quite self-contained as well (...).
(...)(...) it's very fragmented the whole thing, that's why this idea o f  a movement 
is very difficult to come to term s with sometimes.
Member of SFPD: Now when we s e t up the forum we lost all the able- 
bodied representatives o f  charities like The Spastics Society - as they were 
then - (...) the Multiple Sclerosis Society, the Polio Federation and all those, 
but we also lost a to t o f  disabled people from those organisations who didn't 
want to join the 1common pool o f  disability' they wanted to ju s t stick  with 
their impairments. Now, we said, tha t basically the barriers we're fighting 
apply to everybody - to some in one area more than others...regard!ess o f  
their impairments, but maybe - 1  fee l sure that this is an inadequacy in the 
social model, because i t  doesn't place sufficient, i t  doesn't pay sufficient 
attention to the specific consequences o f  specific disabilities and i t  thinks 
that everything can be massed together. So in a way they were right and we 
were wrong and in another way, we were right and they were wrong! And we 
actually had huge animosity from other disability groups, because when 
disabled people become empowered what we do is to attack each other firs t 
-  I  think because we see each other as weak and disempowered like 
ourselves and so really fairly easy targets -  but useless target! We should 
be taking our fight outside to the people who actually erec t the barriers.
During the course o f the research other aspects o f  discussion also highlighted the 
fragmented nature o f  the disability movement. Divisions on the grounds o f  
impairment became apparent, the major issue being the reluctance on the part o f  
those with physical impairments to associate themselves with people with a 
learning disability or a mental health problem, although this is usually explained 
with regard to the limits o f the professional knowledge o f the organisation:
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Member of Lancaster DISC: Because none o f us have a learning disability 
i t  would be very unfair o f  us to try  to advise someone with a learning 
disability, depending on the inquiry. There are also quite a few  organisations 
who deal with people with mental health problems and people with learning 
disabilities, so i t  is quite often b e tte r  to signpost (...) or getting in touch 
with the particular organisers because they've g o t the expertise on whether 
i t  be mental health or learning difficulties which we do not possess._______
There were some comments made, however, which show how pervasive certain 
images o f people with a learning disability or a mental health problem can be, 
even amongst disabled people. In the following quotes, one respondent 
demonstrates the fear she has in relation to people with a mental health problem; 
the other respondent in talking about people with a learning disability suggests 
that forbearance is necessary when including such individuals:
Member of DaCE: I f  you don't know them (persons with a mental health 
problem) you don't quite know what they're going to do (...)
Member of Arthritis Care: And we're all very tolerant aren't we? (of persons 
with learning disabilities)________________________________________________
Whilst in many respects neither o f these comments were extremely disablist in 
tone, nevertheless it may be that such views represent a major barrier to the 
development o f  an inclusive and cohesive disability movement.
Divisions on the basis o f illness/disability were also apparent during the research. 
Some o f  the members o f the Arthritis Care Support Group, Carlisle felt that 
understanding their experiences o f pain was important because it helped to 
explain their apparent lack o f politicisation:
(Issue being discussed -  the group's lock of connection with the 
disability movement.)
Member 1 Arthritis Care: I  think we're all quite laid back aren't we?
Member 2 Arthritis Care: But surely it's the pace o f  life we have to lead 
that makes us like that?
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Member 3 Arthritis Care: My achievement is getting through the day!
Another respondent from SFPD, although more personally politicised also 
highlighted this issue o f illness and disability:
Member 1 SFPD: I  actuallypersonally, have - and s till do to a certain 
ex ten t -  question whether I'm really p a rt o f  i t  (the disability movement) 
actually, because o f  my impairment -  because my impairment involves being 
ill.
Member 2 SFPD: You're not a 'fitparaplegic?!
Member 1 SFPD: Exactly! Because I  think the disability movement when i t  
s ta rted  out wanted to distance itse lf from people who are ill -  so I  
sometimes feel that, okay. I'm pa rt o f  i t  when I  fee l reasonably well -  but 
when I  don't fee l well I  don't fee l pa rt o f  i t
UI  agree quite Strongly with what GLAD (Greater London Association of Disabled 
People) have said  -  they talk about the need to bring impairment into 
disability (...)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
What is important at this point is the manner in which this respondent identifies 
the underlying issue here, the inclusion o f the experience o f  ‘impairment’ into 
definitions and understandings o f disability. This respondent went on to discuss 
at some length her own uncertainties with regard to her position as a disabled 
person. She explained how, because it is unclear whether a person who is long­
term ‘ill’, such as herselfj can be a part o f  the disability community, she had 
found it difficult to confidently identify herself as a disabled person. Friends and 
colleagues had rejected the idea that she was disabled, and when the point came 
when she herself felt that she could accept and embrace the ‘disability identity’, 
she then felt rejected by some elements o f the disability movement. She stated 
how she felt that the work o f Jane Campbell exemplifies the attitudes within the 
movement which have made her feel excluded:
209
Chapter 6
Member SFPD: She said, i f  somebody is ill then they deserve sympathy but 
that's differen t from disability. And I  think the BCODP embodies some o f  
th a t kind o f  attitude.
This issue is important to this research because it demonstrates that even when an 
individual may be keen to embrace the ‘disability identity’ and to be included in 
the disability movement, dominant figures and dominant ideologies within the 
movement may actually exclude that individual.
The other important division that emerged during this research was the difference 
between the level o f  ‘politicisation’ o f disabled people who live in the larger 
cities and traditionally more industrial areas, and disabled individuals living in 
more rural or isolated areas. In terms o f the groups involved in this research the 
following organisations were city based: SFPD; SUFA; and Lancaster DISC. The 
following organisations were based in more isolated rural areas, and this includes 
Carlisle which, although having official ‘city’ status is an essentially rural centre 
and groups based there draw their members from the surrounding rural areas: 
Arthritis Care Support Group, Carlisle; DaCE; and DASL.
Whilst respondents particularly in SFPD and Lancaster DISC spoke in some 
depth about their feelings about being a part o f  the disability movement, 
respondents in the more rural based organisations considered themselves to be 
somewhat removed from the movement:
Member of DaCE: We kind o f  live outside that world for the moment (...) in 
term s o f  voluntary sector organisations I  would say Cumbria is s till behind, 
lags behind especially (...) the urban areas. But is tha t about pace o f  
development? I t  would be quite surprising to see a rural area moving well in 
advance o f  an urban area because o f  the way they can organise -  they've go t 
a smaller area, they can pull people together far more easily.
Angharad: Do you fee l a p a rt o f  the disability movement?
Member of DASL: I  don't, no.
(...) _______________________________________________________________________
210
Chapter 6
Angharad: What is the major reason why there isn't a disability movement 
then do you think?
Member of DASL: I  think it's difficult to mobilize people, and motivate 
because you spend so !ong...one thing that seem s to go hand in hand with 
disability -  and I'm not talking for everyone - is an element o f  depression, 
you know, feeling flat... "I can't do anything as a single voice" you know -  
there's not enough o f  us in the local area - whereas i f  you are in Bradford, 
or somewhere with a high concentration o f  a particular ethnic group who can 
go along an lobby their MP - well, I  always struggle to g e t 2 0  people to help...
Angharad: So it's isolation?
Member of DASL: To come out and shout...yes, the feeling o f  iso/ation.Jt 
might not be particularly isolated...
Angharad: But you feel that you are?
Member of DASL: Yes, but you feel a lone voice a lo t o f the time...and then 
you become accepting o f  things that you should never really accept._______
These discussions would suggest that there is a rural/urban divide between 
disabled people in terms o f the activities o f their organisations.
The final, and perhaps most important issue that divides disabled people, and 
which was greatly evident in this research, is the extent to which individuals 
envisage a separatist movement. A s has already been discussed within the 
methodology, all o f  the groups participating in this research were run by and for 
disabled people, and all place limits upon the involvement o f non-disabled 
people. None o f  the groups, however, excluded non-disabled people entirely. In 
most o f  the groups there were non-disabled workers, and some groups chose to 
include a non-disabled worker in their group discussion. At DASL and Lancaster 
DISC, helping the carers o f disabled people is included in the work o f the 
organisation:
Member of DASL: Well, because carers have needs as well.
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Several respondents also expressed their concerns surrounding moves being made 
by one o f the most important disability organisations, the BCODP towards a 
‘100% disabled’ rule, whereby all member groups should be run entirely by 
disabled people, with no non-disabled people on their management committees:
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Member of Lancaster DISC: I  think they (BCODP) may be going too far 
for OISCs liking.
(...)I've already said my biggest concern about the ’100%' issue is that RADAR* 
will look like a more reasonable option!
Angharad: (...) I  don't know i f  you are aware that there are moves within 
some organisations to become, totally, 100% controlled by disabled people. 
I s  that a positive step, is i t  something you could see...
Member of DASL: I t's  a negative step! I  don't think.Jt's segregation again 
isn't it?
In a related comment, a respondent at DaCE expressed concerns over the extent 
to which separatism in general, both in terms o f the ‘disability identity’ and 
within the disability movement, is a positive step: 4
Member of DaCE: But there are situations where, for whatever reason, 
whether it's social, political or both, people do need to identify together and 
form some so rt o f grouping. And i t  may be more appropriate in certain  
circumstances or localities than i t  is  in others. (...) In a political sense that 
is -  there may be grea ter strength, well, some people may feel there's 
grea ter strength in grouping with a dear identity to put forward (...) ideas
(...)
Angharad: So you can see times when people would need, or want to identify 
themselves, firmly, as 'disabled'?
(...)
4 RADAR stands for the Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation. RADAR’s constitution 
currently states that there must be sufficient disabled members o f the association for them to have a 
controlling vote. RADAR does not, however, exclude non-disabled people from becoming members. 
Implied in the comment of this respondent, however, is a criticism of RADAR that goes beyond the issue o f 
membership of the organisation. Unfortunately, this respondent did not enlarge upon this comment and so 
the exact details o f the wider criticism o f RADAR implied by this comment, is unknown.
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Member: There may be. How far they could do that successfully and in 
term s o f  separating themselves o ff  completely -  creating a totally separate 
identity is very difficult because as I  said earlier, we live in a mixed society. 
(...) So there is a danger in grouping (...) tha t also allows the wider, non­
disabled society the opportunity (...) to say, well, "There they are, th a t 
group -  le t them g e t on with it1”__________________________________
To return to the original quotation from Barnes et al (1999) the evidence o f all o f  
these different divisions between disabled people and between different disability 
organisations must bring into some question the idea o f a unified disability 
movement in which disabled individuals are ‘working together’. Equally, as the 
previous discussion demonstrates, the implications o f  these important divisions 
between disabled people must surely mean that the idea o f  a ‘mature disability 
movement’ must also be questioned. Several respondents commented on the fact 
that they considered the disability movement to be in its fairly ‘early stages’:
Member of SFPD: My feeling is that i t  is realistic to talk about a disability 
movement but i t  is s till very young and i t  is  not coherent and i t  is in danger 
o f  falling apart.
Member of Lancaster DISC: (...) i f  you look a t when the su ffragettes 
started , they were ju s t a handful o f  \extreme' women. (...) They did  not 
represent, you would not have said that they were a 'Woman's Movement.'
(...)
Angharad: Would you say i t  was as embryonic as that? - that the Disability 
Movement is in a very embryonic stage in that case then?
Member of Lancaster DISC: Yes, I  mean, maybe not a t the very beginning.
Angharad: No.
Member of Lancaster DISC: But a long way o f f  any kind o f  movement.
In the light o f such fragmentation and the agreed lack o f  maturity o f the disability 
movement the question o f what kind o f movement and what it means to be a part 
o f the existing movement was an issue much discussed between respondents. In 
terms o f  locating the movement, discussions at SFPD and Lancaster DISC
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revealed that although respondents were unquestionably o f  the belief that the 
BCODP was a major part o f the disability movement, that it could not be said to 
be the disability movement:
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Member 2 of Lancaster DISC: (...) I  think th e c lo sest we've g o t to a 
movement is  th e BCODP. (...) But it's  a long way o f f  being a movement, sim ply 
because the numbers don't add  up.
Member of Lancaster DISC: Well, we are quite willing to leave i t  (BCODP) 
i f  necessary.
Angharad: Yes? So you don't think...we can't equate th e D isability Movement 
with th e BCODP?
Member of Lancaster DISC: No.
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: I  should think th a t nine-hundred and ninety- 
nine percen t o f  disabled people have never h eard o f  th e BCODP.
Member 1 of SFPD: I'm against being hide-bound b y  one organisation. The 
BCODP is  n ot the movement.
(...)
Member 2 of SFPD: There are some remarkable individuals within th e  
British Council and I  wouldn't deny th at, bu t I  think th is organisation's had  
th e b e lie f th a t the British Council is  the B-end and that's it.
In saying such things, these respondents were aware that they were going against 
some o f  the orthodoxies o f Disability Studies that place considerable emphasis on 
the BCODP as the site o f the movement. This is a key point because quite a part 
from the issue o f  which organisation is the most important within the disability 
movement it also raises the issue o f  what does it mean to be a part o f  the 
movement? Is it necessary to be affiliated to any organisation to be a part o f  the 
disability movement? Here again, there were interesting differences o f opinion 
between disabled people as demonstrated by this excerpt from a discussion at 
Lancaster DISC where the issue o f what constitutes involvement in the 
movement was debated:
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Member 1 Lancaster DISC: But i f  you g e t  from  the house to  th e  pub and 
people se e  you, you are im m ediately representing disabled people.
Member 2 Lancaster DISC: I  hope not!
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: Oh I  hope you are -  well, I  hope people will 
stan d  in th e s tr e e t and go 'Oh look! There's (Name) on h is bike, going to  th e  
pub like a normal human being!"
( J
Member 2 Lancaster DISC: (...) b u t i f  th e  BCOOP hadn't s e t  up, change 
wouldn't even have begun y e t.
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: Um...you think change wouldn't have begun i f  
th e BCOOP hadn't s e t  up? You see, I  don't think they're as im portant as th a t 
- 1  think th ey’re  im portant amongst disabled people like you, bu t a s 90% o f  
disabled people will never have heard o f  them and 90% o f  th e public -  more 
than 90% o f  th e public -  won't ever o f  hear o f  them...
Angharad: No?
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: They are so  sm all a s to  be  non-existent. But 
what does make a  d ifferen ce is  people everyday going ou t -  like...
Member 1 Lancaster DISC: Yes!
Worker a t Lancaster DISC: Like you going to th e pub, like you doing what 
you do, like people going to meetings. Those are th e people who make the  
difference, n o t th e BCOOP shouting.__________________________
The idea that a broader definition o f what constitutes involvement in the 
disability movement is needed, was echoed by another respondent from DaCE:
Member of DacE: (...) So, i t  is  strange isn't i t  -  with saying we don't think 
there's a g rea t, necessarily a movement, and i t  is  giving th e impression th a t 
we're n o t particularly politica l in a sense -  especially w ith a big 'P"! Y et a t  
the same time, w e’ve g o t involved in a d isability organisation -  why aren't we 
involved in a  chi/dminding organisation! You know w hat I  mean?
215
To conclude this section o f analysis, therefore, it is plain that there are problems 
with the views o f certain leading academics and activists in this field on the 
coherence, location and functioning o f the disability movement. Whilst the 
evidence from this research does not, overall, bring into doubt the existence o f  
the disability movement, it does suggest that the definition o f  the disability 
movement provided by mainstream Disability Studies may not be entirely 
accurate. Before embarking, within the following chapter, upon a more 
theoretical consideration o f  these findings, there is, however, one final section to 
this chapter:
Deafness and disability
As previously explained within the methodological chapter, during the process o f  
the research an issue arose surrounding the absence from any o f  the participating 
organisations, o f Deafrdeaf people, or people with mental health problems. This 
absence led to inevitable questioning o f whether this was a chance occurrence, or 
whether these groups were, for some reason, not a part o f  the disability 
community. Since the most striking theme arising from the first round o f  group 
discussions surrounded the issue o f identity, it was thought to be important to 
establish whether the absence o f such individuals was because they did not feel 
themselves to be welcomed within the disability movement, or because they did 
not regard themselves to be disabled people. Since research time was limited, it 
was decided that further investigation would be made into the apparent absence 
o f  Deafrdeaf people from such disability organisations. To achieve this, a letter 
and series o f questions was posted onto the web-based mail group: ‘D eafinaif. In 
this section, the findings o f this part o f  the research will be considered.
Before considering the comments o f  the three Deafinail respondents it is 
important to note one key fact about each o f  these individuals: that each 
identified themselves as ‘d eaf or ‘deafened’ and made it clear that they were not 
a part o f the ‘D eaf community.5 Despite the fact that ‘DeafmaiP is a mailbase
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5 Throughout this research, the word ‘dear is used to refer to those people who experience the physical 
impairment o f deaftess, but who do not regard themselves as being a part of the culture o f Deaf people. The
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group used by both deaf and D eaf people, no D eaf individuals chose to respond 
to the research questions posted on this website. Therefore, whilst it is not 
possible to gage the views o f the D eaf community on these matters, it may be 
possible to surmise from this absence o f  response that the D eaf community either 
did not wish to address the issue o f their association with the disability 
movement, or simply did not find the question o f ‘disability’ relevant to their 
experiences. Either way, what can be concluded is that there is some uncertainty 
about whether D eaf people are, or wish to be, a part o f  the disability 
community/movement.
That these key divisions between deafrdeafened and D eaf communities exist, is 
something that all o f  the respondents identified, but was most clearly explained 
by respondents 1 and 2.
Deafmail respondent 1 \ I d o  not feel p a rt o f  the OeafBSL community. I've  
my deaf friends from boarding school (name of school) but do not identify 
with Deaf culture or fee l I  am p a rt o f  a linguistic minority. This is despite 
having spent several years in the London Deaf scene and having Deaf 
boyfriends.
Angharad: I s  there a Deaf identity and/or a Deaf culture that is differen t 
from those o f  hearing people?
Deafmail respondent 1: Yes, but I  don't identify with it. I t  is about as 
accessible to me as a culture like Australian aborigines or African Bushmen.
UI  wish the Deaf world would stop bickering and in-figh ting. Deaf BSL users 
look down on SSE deaf people and the deafened. I t ' s  ju s t stupid. We all 
need to accept that everyone is different. (...)
I  do feel excluded from the Deaf Community. And yes I  did expect to 
become pa rt o f  it. When I  le f t school\ I  s ta rted  going down the deaf dub 
and learnt to sign - but never fe lt accepted. In London I  was very involved 
in the Deaf world for about 4 -5  years but gradually grew  to fee l that my 
face didn 't f i t  and that the way I  saw life was different. So I  ju s t s ta rted  
fading out o f  the picture. Incidentally two school friends, who are both 
fluent in BSL and who have been very involved in the Deaf community, both 
say they don't fee! they are 'real' Deaf people._________________________
word ‘D eaf, therefore, refers to those individuals who aspire to British Sign Language usage and its related 
cultural heritage.
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D eaf mail respondent 2: The D eaf have th eir own id en tity  and culture based  
on th eir use o f  B5L The deafened do n o t have a separate id en tity  or 
culture. (...)
A s things are a t presen t, I  have absolutely no wish to  be  p a r t o f  th e ‘D ' 
community. I t  is  a very b itch y and back-stabbing group. People within i t  
seem  to  take offence very quickly because th ey are unaware o f  th e nuances 
th a t one can place on one's voice to  crea te  irony o r something else. (...)
I  would very much tike to  see  th e d iffe ren t section s o f  th e d e a f (i. e. *ALL * 
section s o f  th e d e a f community) to  fin d common ground. That is  achievable 
as we do co-operate within th e Telecommunications Action Group (TAG). But 
I  very much doubt w hether we 7/ se e  agreem ent on a ll issues th a t will allow 
us to be p resen ted  as a homogeneous group o f  people.______________________
Clearly these divisions run deep and are the basis o f some conflict between 
groups o f  deafD eaf people.
In relation, however, to the question o f whether deaf people are ‘disabled’ and 
whether they consider themselves to be a part o f the disability movement, there 
was less agreement between the respondents. All respondents said that they did 
identify themselves as disabled people. The interesting point about their 
comments, however, is that they define their disability only in terms o f  
impairment. This suggests that these respondents may not be as aware o f  the 
social model o f disability as some o f the members o f the disability organisations 
that took part in this research.
Angharad: A re d e a f people disabled?  (Respondents all replying to same question.)
D eaf mail Respondent 1: Yes, from m y poin t o f  view. M y ears don 't work. 
O utside th e d e a f world, only family and 2 -3  d o se  frien ds can understand  
w hat I  am saying. O f course I'm  disabled. But i t  is  a sensory handicap 
ra th er than a physical m obility issue.
D eaf mail Respondent 2: D eafened people like m yself are prepared  to  
a ccep t we are disabled since we don 't have fu ll access to  communication via 
our auditory senses.
218
Chapter 6
Deaf mail Respondent 3: In my view absolutely yes but some would not see  
i t  that way. Indeed i t  took me many years before I  would recognise the 
position. I t  is because the deafness is hidden unlike a physical disability.
The tone o f these comments clearly suggests that for these respondents the 
disabled identity is something that is essentially negative since it is associated 
with loss, in this case o f hearing. The comments also suggest that these 
respondents have not embraced their identities as disabled people, but rather, it is 
something that they have come to ‘accept/recognise’. That they would prefer not 
to be deaf and cannot therefore, be seen to be ‘celebrating’ their deafness is 
shown by following comments:
beaf mail Respondent 1: Being deaf is ju s t something th a t I  am. I  g e t on 
with life and try  to live the life I  want to have. I d  ju s t prefer not to be 
deaf.
Deaf mail Respondent 2: I  am aware that b e a f people (i.e. the born deaf) 
have some concerns that medical progress eg. cochlear implants may 
eventually lead to the reduction in size o f  the b ea f Community particularly 
i f  Genetic Engineering identified the faulty gene that causes loss o f  hearing 
in inherited deafness. Some o f the more extrem e b ea f campaigners see  
medical advances as a means o f  committing genocide on the b e a f Community. 
I  hasten to add that is NOT my view nor the view o f  the m ajority o f deaf 
people but some people genuinely do hold that belief.
(...)I  would personally welcome advances in genetics that led to deafness being 
eradicated. No one who has not been deaf themselves will be aware o f  how 
isolating the problem can be._______________________________________
Clearly these types o f  view  echo the rejection o f  the idea o f  a positive ‘disability 
identity’ expressed by some members o f the disability organisations that 
participated in this research. Interestingly, the final comment from respondent 2 
above about genetics, stands in stark contrast to the concerns o f  some leading 
disability activists and academics in relation to this matter. Whilst it must be 
stated that the attitudes o f  these individuals towards such issues as advancements 
in genetics may not represent the views o f all deaf people, and certainly cannot be 
said to represent the views o f  the D eaf community, such opinions must not be
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ignored by mainstream Disability Studies. That such ‘diverse’ opinions have been 
largely ignored with Disability and D eaf Studies is something that respondent 1 
clearly identified:
Deaf mail Respondent 1: Nearly all social science work is around Deaf 
language and culture, you don't often g e t anything analysing the world o f  
those who have hearing loss and the divisions between the deaf.__________
Further, respondent 2 expressed how powerless he felt in relation to his view s on 
genetic engineering when faced with the powerful opposition to these new 
technologies being voiced by key activists and academics in the field:
Deaf mail Respondent 2: I  think i t  will be difficult to pu t forward reasoned 
debate to those who are opposed to genetic engineering. I  think we have to 
reluctantly accept their viewpoint.__________________________________
This comment highlights some important disparities o f power between leading 
figures in the field and ‘ordinary’ deaf individuals. This comment also clearly 
resonates with the views o f many o f the disabled respondents in the research in 
relation to the power o f  dominant voices within a community. Respondent 1 also 
highlights the tendency on the part o f  some key figures in the field to hold a ‘your 
either with us or against us’ attitude when facing differences o f opinion within 
the deaf community. She talks about the ‘exclusive’ nature o f  the D eaf identity 
and how  some deaf people feel that they are not ‘real’ D eaf people and that they 
have not been ‘accepted’ by the D eaf community. She also stresses her own 
concerns about the way in which some deaf voices have been silenced in favour 
o f  the voices o f  the dominant few and o f the negative implications o f this:
Deafmail Respondent 1: One o f  the reasons I'm not terribly keen on this 
Deaf Community approach is that it's so limiting. The world is full o f  hearing 
people.
(...)The Deaf BSL user community is  a tiny minority; they ju s t happen to be 
extrem ely vocal.
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This quotation clearly echoes the views o f  several o f  the disabled respondents in 
this research in relation to fears they had about separatism in the movement and 
the potential for ‘ghettoisation’.
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Moving to the issue o f the disability movement, having stated that they each felt 
themselves to be disabled people, these respondents did, however, have mixed 
feeling about whether they were a part o f  the disability movement. *1
Deafmail Respondent 1: D eaf people are cut o f f  from the disability 
movement because o f  the communication barrier. I  do, however, identify 
with the disability movement because the idea is to remove barriers\ 
whether physical or not.U
I f  you pu t me in a room full o f people with physical disabilities, I  s till can't 
talk to them without communication support. For me, they are hearing 
people. To them, I  am able bodied.
Deafmail Respondent 2: Some Deaf people are a p a rt o f  a campaign to 
obtain recognition o f  British Sign Language in its  own right but would 
probably not see th a t as p a rt o f  a disability movement. O ther deafened 
people are campaigning for equal access to things and do recognise that 
their campaigns are p a rt o f the wider disability movement. I'm not actively 
campaigning though.
Angharad; Do you personally feel a p a rt o f  a disability movement?
Deafmail Respondent 3: I  am not as I  prefer to work positively in the 
hearing world (...) I  am basically a p a rt o f  the hearing world,_____
Thus, for these respondents the disability movement is not something that they 
feel strongly connected with. This is interesting considering that during the email 
correspondence with these individuals, they each mentioned that they were facing 
the same sort o f  structural and social barriers identified by many o f  the members 
o f the disability organisations involved in this research. In the case o f respondent
1, the similarities in barriers faced between deaf and disabled people is something 
that she herself acknowledges:
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Deafmail Respondent 1 : Do you know about deaf education? The Oralism 
versus Total Communication debate?
Angharad: Yes (...) - what are your views on this issue?
Deafmail Respondent 1 : I  could go on for hours on this one! To pu t i t  very 
baldly, oralism works fine for kids with enough hearing to support their 
lipreading and speech. Lipreading is 90% guesswork on its  own. But oralism 
has been implemented as a blanket m ethod o f  educating ALL deaf children 
to be as normal as possible. Unfortunately the end result o f  oralism applied 
to very very deaf children is nearly always illiteracy (reading age o f  7  a t  
m ost)plus speech no one can understand. There's a parallel here with other 
disabled children being educated to ’pass'and i t  not working a t all well. Total 
communication a t least means deaf children leave school with language and 
skills.
Other respondents commented about public attitudes towards deaf people and 
experiences in the workplace, and whilst not making the direct comparison with 
the experiences o f other disabled people, such comparisons are nevertheless 
obvious:
Respondent 2: There does need to be some education on the p a rt o f  
hearing people to understand how isolating the invisible handicap o f  being 
deaf can be. How that can be addressed I  am not sure. I  know there are 
several Deaf Awareness Courses but I'm not sure whether hearing people 
would welcome them i f  there was some compulsion to a tten d them. (...) 
People are much more helpful now but I  do find that people s till have doubts 
tha t deaf people can be intelligent and reliable workers.
Respondent 3: (...) there is s till much that could be improved in deaf 
awareness. (...) The willingness to provide support under the DDA also needs 
to be pressed. Many public services do not provide or understand the need 
to provide support. Ju st imagine being on a railway station when things are 
going wrong and the screens are not up to date with information. Or on a 
train and i t  is getting nowhere, or a flight which is also wandering around 
the skies because i t  cannot land ( I  have had all these). Because I  am strong 
I  do not hesitate to ask (but only when really necessarily) but others do not 
have that strength.
To conclude this section, it emerged from this part o f  the research that there is 
some uncertainty about the position o f  deafrDeaf people in relation to the
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‘disability identity’ and the disability movement. This picture is made 
considerably more complex by the internal divisions between deafTDeaf people.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the fact that for many disabled people, breaking 
down structural barriers remains o f central importance. Respondents in this 
research identified a range o f problems feeing disabled people in the public 
sphere, for example in relation to the institutions o f government and education 
and in the labour market. They routinely stressed the role o f  the state and/or 
society in relation to their disempowerment. In this respect, the views o f  
respondents in this research clearly supported the idea o f  the ‘disabling society’.
In other central respects, however, respondents’ comments veiy often stand in 
opposition to those key activists and academics who argue for the exclusion o f  
impairment from the social model o f  disability and who also espouse the idea o f a 
politics o f disability based upon a celebration o f the disabled identity. Whilst the 
findings o f this research do not bring into serious question the existence o f  a 
disability movement per se, they do highlight the fractured nature o f  this 
collective. Differences between groups o f disabled people in terms o f impairment 
have been shown to be key to understanding the somewhat disunited nature o f the 
disability movement. The views o f the respondents in this research also bring into 
doubt the idea that a unified and positive ‘disability identity’ lies behind all 
disability campaigning or that the idea o f  a celebration o f a separate ‘culture o f  
disability’ is part o f the main agenda for many organisations.
As will be discussed in the following chapter, it is the argument in this thesis that 
these findings have clear implications for contemporary theorising on citizenship, 
social movements and for the approach taken by mainstream Disability Studies to 
disability politics.
Chapter 6
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Reconsidering Theorising on Citizenship and Social 
Movements in the light o f Disability
Introduction
As previously discussed within chapter 3, despite centuries o f theorizing, 
citizenship remains a contested concept. Whilst a widely agreed definition about 
what exactly ‘citizenship’ entails remains largely elusive, certain themes reoccur 
frequently within contemporary theorising. As shown in the discussion in chapter 
3, issues o f ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ are now at the heart o f most contemporary 
citizenship theorising. That these two issues have become o f  major importance 
must largely be the result o f successful campaigning by a variety o f pressure 
groups. Consequently such things as class, ethnicity, employment status and 
sexuality are now routinely considered by citizenship theorists and have greatly 
affected thinking in this field. Disability, however, has been largely ignored and 
yet the findings o f this research suggest that this omission may be unwise, for 
what a consideration o f disability tells us does not always sit comfortably with 
recent citizenship theorizing. Indeed, I would suggest that a consideration o f  
disability related issues is invaluable for it provides useful insights into the 
shortcomings o f many key theories o f  citizenship and demonstrates the need for 
on-going theorizing in this field.
The very ancient origins o f  the citizenship debates have already been discussed at 
some length in chapter 3. The first thing, therefore, that must be stated is that in 
this chapter I have chosen to focus on the more modem/contemporary 
approaches. By this I mean a variety o f  theories that have been developed post- 
World War 2 and which move from the frequently criticised, but nevertheless
influential Social-Liberal perspectives exemplified in the work o f  Rawls,
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Marshall and Berlin, through the pluralist accounts o f writers such as Kymlicka 
and Young, to the reflexive account o f Habermas and finally to the post­
structuralist critiques provided by authors such as Mouffe.
The second point that should be noted is that it is not my intention within this 
chapter to revisit the critiques o f  the various citizenship theories as considered in 
chapter 3. For this reason, the reader is asked to consider the arguments that have 
been made there alongside the discussion within this chapter. The aim o f  this 
chapter is to relate the necessarily particular findings o f this research to key 
aspects o f existing theories o f citizenship. These aspects are, therefore, 
‘selective’.
Social-Liberalist accounts
A s previously stated, the Social-Liberal view o f  citizenship is probably best 
exemplified in the work o f Rawls, Marshall and Berlin. Whilst some might 
question Marshall’s position as a Social-Liberal since he is often considered to be 
more o f  a social-democrat, nevertheless, his credentials as a modem proponent o f 
the older liberal tradition have been discussed at some length in chapter 3. It is on 
the basis o f the argument made there, that he is considered within this section.
For Rawls, citizenship is best viewed as a system o f co-operation. This system he 
describes as: rational individuals co-operating on the basis o f mutual respect for 
one another. The first thing to note here, therefore, is that the attitudes o f non­
disabled people towards disabled people are clearly not always rational. Several 
quotations from respondents demonstrate the ignorance of, or fear felt by non­
disabled people about disabled individuals. Equally, however, divisions between 
disabled people, for example, between individuals with physical impairments and 
those with mental health problems, may also be due to fairly irrational beliefs 
held by some physically disabled people about the ‘risks’ involved with working 
with such individuals. In the light o f  this, and the other divisions that have been 
demonstrated both within the disability community and in relation to the position
Chapter 7
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o f disabled people in wider society, the idea that a system o f co-operation exists 
is clearly problematic.
O f course, it could be argued that Rawls’ system o f co-operation is still a useful 
ideal and one that although not currently in place, is nevertheless something that 
we should be striving to achieve. It could equally be argued, however, that 
Rawls’ theory is essentially utopian in that it largely ignores the seemingly 
‘natural’ tendency on the part o f  human beings to categorise, stigmatise and 
disadvantage certain groups. Theorists in the area o f  ‘race’ and ethnicity, from as 
seemingly ‘diverse’ standpoints as the functionalist (Patterson 1963), Marxist 
(Cox 1970, Miles 1982, 1993) and Weberian (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979) 
perspectives have all highlighted the feet that conflict is at the heart o f  society. 
Further, arguably, when considering the position o f  disabled people in society, 
the functionalist views on ‘scapegoating’, the Marxist theories o f  exploitation and 
the divisive impact o f ‘scapegoating’ on the working class, and the Weberian 
approach to prejudice as a form o f  ideology which is used to disadvantage a 
supposedly ‘inferior’ group, can all be used to question the feasibility o f  Rawls’ 
notion o f co-operation.
In relation to the findings o f this research, it must also be stated that there is a 
problem with Rawls’ (1998) account o f  citizenship in that it rests upon the idea o f  
‘competency’:
(...) persons as citizens have all the capacities that enable them to 
be normal andfully co-operating members o f  society, (p.60)
There is a great deal here that needs ‘unpacking’, for the construction o f society 
being put forward here by Rawls is clearly a normative one. It is the argument 
here that this is also a view o f society shared by Marshall in his famous work: 
Citizenship and Social Class. Although the extent to which Marshall was 
proposing a normative or an empirical outline o f citizenship is much debated, it is 
the argument within this thesis that it was clearly both. In this respect the 
argument here owes much to Delanty’s (2000) analysis, for he states that
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although Marshall’s work “was primarily a description o f  the development o f  
citizenship in England’ it was “one that had a strong normative edge to it. ” 
(p.17) This ‘normative edge’ is demonstrated in Marshall’s ([1963] 1998) 
definition o f citizenship as a ‘status’, for he writes that:
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal 
principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but 
societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an 
image o f  an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be 
measured and towards which aspiration can be directed, (p.102 
my emphasis)
The theories o f both Rawls and Marshall therefore clearly rest upon an image o f  
an ‘ideal/good citizen’ against which the achievements o f  individuals can be 
measured. This has implications for all groups whose beliefs or actions do not 
conform to the dominant group’s notions o f  ‘normality’ or ‘civilisation’. 
Alternatively, such normative views also have implications for individuals or 
groups who may be unable to ‘live up to ’ this image o f  ‘ideal citizenship’, for 
they are judged to be failing in what clearly amounts to an important aspect o f  
‘personhood’.
Explanations for the concept o f ‘personhood’ and who is termed a ‘proper 
person’ and who is not, appear therefore, to underlie both Rawls’ and Marshall’s 
approaches to citizenship. There is a tendency in such Social-Liberalist accounts, 
therefore, to view citizenship as a ‘status’ in which respect is given to those who 
take up the role and perform it competently. In relation to the position o f disabled 
people in society, as Marks (2001) states, the manner in which society constitutes 
disabled people as ‘racialised others’ positions them outside the category o f 
‘personhood’ and this impacts upon their perceived competency with regard to 
citizenship. As has already been discussed in chapter 4 , (incom petence must, 
therefore, be seen as a social construction (Jenkins, 1998). As Goodey (1995) has 
commented, by defining who is f it  to exercise the responsibilities o f  citizenship, 
citizenship as a concept has traditionally been about exclusion. In other words, a 
viscous circle emerges in that where there is stigma, there is also an assumption
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o f ‘incompetence’ with regard to citizenship. The implications o f this assumption 
o f incompetence then prevent those experiencing this stigmatised identity from 
achieving those goals associated with being a ‘good citizen’, thus perpetuating 
their image as ‘failures’ within society.
A s a society w e appear to regard such things as living an independent life, 
achieving paid employment and ‘responsible’ parenting as being central to the 
image o f the ‘good citizen’. It has been well documented however, by research in 
the field o f  disability and within the findings o f this research, that many disabled 
people continue to face major structural barriers when it comes to gaining proper 
employment, living their lives independently, and having relationships and family 
lives. Further, in relation to what Marshall clearly believed to be the ‘backbone’ 
o f  citizenship, education, the comments o f  respondents in this research clearly 
demonstrate that there have in the past been and are still, serious failings in terms 
o f the life opportunities provided by special needs education. A lso, as discussed 
in chapter 4, despite some key attempts to improve the educational opportunities 
and attainment o f disabled children and young people, important questions 
remain surrounding the success o f more recent moves towards ‘mainstreaming’.
According to the Social M odel o f  Disability, the reasons why the provision o f a 
range o f services for disabled people fail to enable disabled people to ‘live up’ to 
this image o f  a ‘good citizen’, rest upon the views held by non-disabled people 
about disabled people. The vicious circle previously described thus emerges in 
the lives o f disabled people, for the ‘stigma’ attached to the identity o f a disabled 
person can be seen to be both the result of, and the reason for, their continuing 
position in society. The ‘stigma’ attached to the identities o f disabled people with 
different impairments does differ, and it may be easier to fight against the stigma 
associated with certain impairment than others, but nevertheless, the assumption 
o f  incompetence with regard to citizenship applies to the majority o f  disabled 
people, to a certain extent.
Ironically, o f course, one o f Marshall’s other interests, apart from theorizing 
British citizenship, was the historical and global comparison o f different types o f
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citizenship and social structure. When considering the effects o f  social status 
upon citizenship he considered the caste system o f India and the manner in which 
it is underpinned by notions o f purity and impurity. It is clear that Marshall did 
not consider the British system o f social structure and citizenship as having any 
similarities to this caste system and yet, it can be argued, perhaps somewhat 
controversially, that this connection does exist. Shakespeare (1994) draws upon 
Douglas’ (1966) notion o f purity and impurity when he comments that: “When 
boundaries are breached, and identities seem threatened, behaviour is devoted to 
re-establishing the fixates, reinforcing categories and power relations. " (p.294) 
It can therefore be argued, that the maimer in which the identities o f  disabled 
people have been stigmatised and the fact that their overall position in society is 
not entirely based upon personal wealth but upon some other more psycho-social 
reasons, means that the position o f disabled people in Britain today bears more 
relation to the caste system than to the class based analyses that are more usually 
employed when considering the UK.
In short, what Marshall, like Rawls, did not adequately resolve within his early 
work, was the problem o f persistent and unjust social inequality. If citizenship is 
to be about justice, then unequal status must be fairly  apportioned according to 
unequal abilities. In reality, power differentials within society ensure that certain 
groups remain disadvantaged. Images o f the ‘ideal citizen’ may be socially and 
culturally determined. In a society in which power inequalities exist, it is likely 
that the dominant group will determine the image o f the ‘ideal citizen’ but in the 
same way that host societies tend to deny their own ethnic identities, the powerful 
group are also likely to think that their image o f the ‘ideal citizen’ is non-group- 
specific. In this way, it can be argued that if  the dominant group are non-disabled, 
middle-class, white men, then the image o f an ‘ideal citizen’ is likely to reflect 
the characteristics o f this, distinct group. The effect o f  this is to legitimise rather 
than reduce social inequality as more and more people are seen to ‘fail’ to live up 
to the image o f the ‘ideal citizen’ and the ‘official’ status o f  equal citizenship 
then becomes meaningless as it fails to compensate for that social inequality.
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This critique o f  the early work o f Marshall, along with the work o f the earlier 
liberals, was advanced convincingly by feminist writers during the 1980’s (see 
Pateman, 1988). It does not tend to be widely acknowledged however, that at 
about the same time, Marshall re-visited his earlier theorising. In his 1981 work 
entitled: “Reflections on Power”, Marshall discussed the civil rights movement in 
America and argued that what was being claimed by this movement was not 
‘power over’ or ‘redistribution’, but rather, an effective share in the total power 
o f society. In other words as Isin and W ood (1999) have stated, Marshall 
perceived such movements as being about the “power to escape anomie, 
disrespect and alienation to achieve legitimate goals by the use o f legitimate 
means.” (p.31) The goal, Marshall believed, was a new kind o f multicultural 
society, or if  that should prove impossible, then a society composed o f  
independent and equal ethnic communities. In this way, Marshall quite clearly 
anticipated the pluralist accounts o f  citizenship.
Having stated the above, however, it is the argument here that Marshall’s 
dominant contribution to the citizenship debates, no matter how unfair this may 
be to his wider thinking, is still that o f his earlier theorising. Further more, whilst 
his later work is interesting in the way in which it can be seen as an important 
precursor o f the pluralist accounts, the work o f Marshall’s contemporary, Isaiah 
Berlin has clearer pluralist credentials.
Before moving on to consider the work o f Berlin and the pluralist thinkers, it 
must be stated, however, that there are a number o f arguments in favour o f the 
idea that there is nothing inherently wrong with this Social-Liberalist definition 
o f citizenship, particularly as it appears in the work o f Marshall, and that perhaps 
what is needed is to ensure that all groups, including disabled people experience 
full rights in every spheres. For example, in relation to the lives o f  disabled 
people, some improvements that could be made to the social sphere have already 
been mentioned in terms o f welfare service provision and education. In addition, 
as has been well documented elsewhere, improvements within the civil sphere 
could be made to the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) with its numerous 
‘let-out clauses’. Although improvements to the DDA have been made under the
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current Labour government it will be some time before the legal changes that can 
be enforced have positive effects in reducing the numerous disabling barriers and 
discrimination experienced by disabled people.
As was discussed in chapter 6, the importance o f enabling disabled people to 
‘participate’ in decision making was identified by respondents in this research. 
Within the political sphere, access to decision-making processes could be further 
improved at the most basic level by ensuring that all disabled people can exercise 
their right to vote. In reality there are several obstacles, in addition to issues o f  
access, that prevent disabled people from participating. Barnes et al (1999) list 
some o f  these barriers as: traditional assumptions about disabled people’s 
inability to make independent decisions; legalised barriers such as the 
Representation o f the People Act 1983 that codifies an assumption o f  
incompetence on the part o f people with learning disabilities resident in 
institutions, and only permits such individuals to vote once they have proved 
themselves capable to do so; finally, the right to be entered onto the electoral 
register is often determined by the awareness and integrity o f those who are ‘in 
charge’ o f the lives o f  the disabled person, be that within the family, or in an 
institution. In addition to voting, more genuine consultation with disabled people 
on a range o f policy issues, in particular issues relating to welfare provision is 
also needed in combination with an assurance that this consultation advances 
beyond what respondents in this research described as mere ‘rubber-stamping’.
It can be argued, however that the most fundamental flaw in Marshall’s definition 
o f civil, political and social rights is that they assume the possession o f certain 
freedoms and powers on the part o f each individual ‘citizen’. For example, what 
is liberty without choice? As is documented in this research, it is often the case 
that basic choices about their everyday lives are denied to disabled people 
because they rely upon local authority provision; or they experience, as many 
disabled people do, a life in poverty; or they have not got the confidence to speak 
out about their preferences. The growing number o f self-advocacy and 
empowerment based groups o f disabled people, akin to those that participated in
231
this research, is a reaction to this historical reluctance by disabled people to speak 
out about the issues in their lives.
Ultimately, however, despite the appeal o f  some aspects o f  Marshall’s work, the 
normative, monistic nature o f his famous early work, and that o f other Social- 
Liberal thinking remains a major stumbling block when advancing this concept o f  
citizenship as a way o f  tackling the inequalities faced by many disadvantaged 
groups including disabled people. As has already been discussed at some length 
in chapter 3, this theoretical weakness was clearly identified by Isaiah Berlin 
(1958), who, although undoubtedly a contemporary o f Marshall and a liberal 
thinker himself, was considerably ahead o f Marshall in terms o f his theoretical 
understanding o f the need to broadly reject the idea o f a universalist definition o f  
‘ideal citizenship’ . The great value o f  his work on value-pluralism is, I believe, 
largely overlooked by sociologists and this is unfortunate, for it can be argued 
that Berlin’s work avoids many o f the pitfalls o f other Social-Liberals. It is also 
proposed here that whilst Berlin’s work can be seen as an important pre-cursor o f  
the pluralist accounts o f  citizenship, his ideas may in fact be more usefiil than 
some subsequent theorising. For this reason, a discussion on the value o f  Berlin’s 
theorising will appear at the end o f the following section which considers the 
pluralist accounts o f  citizenship.
Pluralist Accounts
Pluralist accounts o f citizenship suggest that any contemporary definition o f  
citizenship must include the realm o f ‘culture’ in addition to the civil, political 
and social. For Stevenson (1997a):
( ...)  cultural citizenship can be said to have been fulfilled to the 
extent to which society makes commonly available the semiotic 
and material cultures necessary in order to make social life 
meaningful, critique practices o f  domination, and allow for the 
recognition o f difference under conditions o f tolerance and mutual 
respect, (p. 42)
Chapter 7
232
In other words, the recognition o f difference is only one part o f  cultural 
citizenship. It is also important to guarantee democratic institutions and to 
provide protection from the excesses o f the free market. Nevertheless, the 
pluralist accounts do appear to place a large emphasis on the politics o f  
difference. This would seem to be essential to the development o f  the concept o f  
cultural citizenship.
Both Kymlicka and Young take as the basis o f  their theorising a critical stance 
towards the universalist, normative notion o f citizenship. Both theorists perceive 
that in pluralist societies it is essential to consider group rights within the 
citizenship framework. The first problem that arises here in relation to the 
findings o f this research however, is the assumption that all disadvantaged groups 
possess distinct cultural identities. The views o f  the respondents in this research 
demonstrate that individuals often have very complicated feelings about their 
own identities and that not everyone agrees about the existence o f cultural 
differences between supposedly distinct groups. Whilst Young does tackle some 
o f these issues, as will be discussed later, Kymlicka’s ideas are somewhat more 
problematic.
Drawing upon Rawls’ (1971, 1996) ‘social bases o f self-respect’ Kymlicka 
(1991) treats cultural membership as being a precondition for the appreciation o f  
other goods, not as a means o f achieving those goods:
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But cultural membership is not a  means used in the pursuit o f  
one’s ends. It is rather the context within which we choose our 
ends, and come to see their value, and this is a precondition o f  
self-respect, o f  the sense that one’s ends are worth pursuing. And 
it affects our very sense o f  personal identity and capacity. When 
we take cultural identity seriously, we ’ll understand that asking 
someone to trade off her cultural identity for some amount o f  
money is like expecting someone to trade o ff her self-respect for  
some amount o f  money. Having money fo r  the pursuit o f  one's 
ends is o f little help if  the price involves giving up the context 
within which such ends are worth pursuing, (p. 192-193)
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In other words, in relation to disability, if  disability culture is being used to 
achieve ends not as a context within which to choose ends then, according to 
Kymlicka’s argument, the idea o f a distinct cultural context o f disability must be 
questioned. The evidence from this research suggests that this achievement- 
orientation is precisely what characterises the activities o f  the disability 
community. Indeed, there is very little evidence from this research to support the 
idea that a celebration o f  a separate ‘disability identity* or ‘culture o f  disability’ is 
occurring widely within the disability movement with the exception o f the limited 
number o f people involved with Disability Arts1. By the end o f the research I had 
found no evidence for a ‘culture o f disability’ that differs from more 
‘mainstream’ culture and instead encountered concerns on the part o f some 
disabled people about those engaged in Disability Arts, who they feel are 
‘ghettoising’ disabled people by celebrating cultural ‘difference’ in a manner that 
is exclusionaiy. As previously discussed in chapter 6, the only cultural difference 
identified by respondents in this research was the issue o f the acceptable use o f  
non-politically-correct language amongst disabled people in humorous contexts. 
This does not appear to amount to an entirely separate ‘culture’.
Further, as the views o f several respondents demonstrated, many disabled 
individuals choose assimilation into the ‘normal’ world, over the cultural context 
o f  disability. In the light o f Kymlicka’s theorising, the only logical conclusion 
that can be drawn from the existence o f such individuals is that they do not 
consider their self-respect to be connected with a strong ‘cultural identity’ as a 
disabled person. Hence for these individuals, achieving the resources necessary to 
become assimilated into the ‘normal’ world, does not mean a loss o f  ‘true’ 
identity. That many disabled people do not feel that the issue o f ‘trading off* 
cultural identities in order to achieve resources applies to them is exemplified in 
the comment made by one respondent: “you can call me a cabbage if  you like, 
just give me the money, basically.” (Member o f Lancaster DISC, please see ch.6
p.200)
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1 As has been discussed in chapter 6, it is important to acknowledge that this is not the case for all members 
of the Deaf community, many o f whom consider themselves to be members o f a linguistic and cultural 
minority.
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In this way, Kymlicka’s analysis does, to a certain extent, assist in the 
understanding o f  the position and views o f many disabled people, but a problem 
then arises, for if  by his very construction, disabled people cannot be considered 
to be engaged in the struggle for cultural citizenship, then what alternative theory 
should be employed to explain the aims o f the disability movement? Kymlicka’s 
theorising is clearly o f  value when considering the citizenship aims o f groups that 
are unambiguously defined by cultural context but further theorising is needed to 
explain the aims o f groups who have no clear cultural context. The need to 
advance theory in this area is all the more urgent not just in the light o f disability, 
but also because o f the increasing importance o f the post-modern approaches to 
‘ethnicity’. Such approaches propose a more fluid understanding o f cultural 
contexts in which certain identities may be ‘created’ rather than originating in 
historical cultural contexts. Where the idea o f a political ‘disability identity’ and 
disability culture were discussed by respondents, there was a clear sense that this 
represented a form o f  ‘defensive engagement’ akin, if  not as w ell developed, to 
the defensive identities that have emerged amongst some ethnic minority groups 
in the face o f racism (see the post-modernist account o f M odood, 1997). The real 
difficulty, therefore, when considering cultural aims as the basis o f  the disability 
movement appears to be the assumption that there is some ‘essential’ cultural 
difference between disabled people and non-disabled people. Further, whilst there 
are undoubtedly, differences between all people, the manner in which the concept 
o f  ‘difference’ can be manipulated in an essentialist manner in order to categorise 
some groups as ‘other’, needs to be problematised.
Bourdieu’s work on the nature o f groups and categories is very useful here 
because it represents an attempt to bridge what many have considered to be a 
major fault line within social theory: “between an approach which prioritises 
people’s own understandings o f their social relationships, and another which 
looks fo r  and classifies behavioural patterns from a perspective which is outside 
the context in question" (Jenkins, 1996: 81). In short, according to Bourdieu, 
between subjectivism and objectivism. According to Bourdieu, the subjectivist 
approach makes the mistake o f assuming that individuals can or do classify 
themselves according to their awareness and understanding o f the social world.
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The objectivist stance, on the other hand, makes the mistake o f  assuming that the 
classification o f individuals according to certain criteria, for example, 
employment, age, gender and so on, will provide an adequate description o f  
groups as they exist in reality. Indeed, Bourdieu goes further in his criticism o f  
objectivity, for not only, he argues, does this approach run the risk o f making 
inaccurate assumptions about the nature o f  groups, it has also led to the 
assumption by some scholars that the groups they describe actually exist.
This difficulty with objectivism has allowed some theorists to argue that there are 
no real social differences between individuals. For Bourdieu this assertion is also 
wrong, however, for whilst it is not an easy task to classify discretely the great 
variety o f individuals that make up the real world, differences do nevertheless 
exist. He argues that: “// is possible to deny the existence o f classes as 
homogenous sets o f  economically and socially differentiated individuals 
objectively constituted into groups, and to assert at the same time the existence o f  
a space o f differences based on a principle o f  economic and social 
differentiation'’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 3). Bourdieu also proposes that it might be 
possible to do this by making a distinction between two types o f collectivity, the 
probable group and the practical group.
In defining these two types o f group, Bourdieu is clearly drawing heavily upon 
Marx’s notion o f Klasse an sich (class in itself) and Klasse fuer sich (class for 
itself), in which potentiality is turned into actuality, a class in itself, into a class 
for itself, only when individuals occupying similar positions become involved in 
“common struggles, a network o f communication develops, and they thereby 
become conscious o f their common fate." (Coser, 1971: 49) Marx, however, 
somewhat assumed the practical existence o f theoretical classes. Bourdieu (1987) 
questions this assumption and claims that it is only ever possible at the outset, to 
talk with confidence about the existence o f probable groups, whose constituent 
individuals are likely to form networks and mobilize on the basis o f  their similar 
dispositions, but may not in fact do so. This is an appealing framework from 
which to consider the disability movement since its lack o f cohesion and 
‘embryonic’ status was w ell documented by respondents.
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Indeed, Bourdieu also provides a useful definition o f  a practical group against 
which to compare probable groups. For Bourdieu (1987), a practical group exists 
when:
( ...)  there are agents capable o f  imposing themselves, as 
authorized to speak and to act officially in its place and in its 
name (...) (p.15)
A paradox then arises, for whilst an individual who so identifies themselves with 
a group may become empowered and gain recognition, at the same time they are 
relegating their individual powers to those who claim to speak on behalf o f  the 
group. There are two clear risks associated with this: the first, is that when groups 
“begin to represent themselves as real as opposed to constructed via social 
struggles, they tend to essentialize properties o f  individuals that make up such 
groups by appealing to nature, God or science.” (Isin and W ood, 1999: 38) 
Bourdieu, therefore, clearly shares with Mouffe, as will be considered later, a fear 
that such essentialism ignores the multiple subject positions that characterise each 
individual. Again, in relation to the findings o f  this research, Bourdieu’s 
theorising clearly resonates with the concern respondents expressed about the 
risks associated with embracing a political ‘disability identity’. Respondents were 
clearly worried that such actions might lead to the essentialising o f  the ‘disability 
identity’ as ‘other’. They also expressed fears about relegating their individual 
powers to the more vocal members o f the disability movement who claim to 
speak on behalf o f disabled people. In this way, the findings o f this research 
largely support Bourdieu’s warning that instead o f voicing the legitimate 
thoughts o f their members, group advocates may become an oppressive power 
within the collective. I f Bourdieu’s warnings are correct, then this must be a 
grave concern for citizenship theorists, for they must not rely solely upon the 
views o f  group advocates if  they wish to understand the nature o f  citizenship 
being claimed by a group, but must also consider the views o f  the group’s 
constituent members.
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To relate this discussion to his notion o f habitus, what Bourdieu is therefore 
arguing is that whilst the formation o f a group does involve the conditioning o f  
members into particular ways o f being in, and understanding, the world, more so 
in feet than members would perhaps be aware, or wish, it is not true that all 
individuals displaying the same habitus are identical. For Bourdieu, the 
relationship between the habitus o f  the individual and the habitus o f  the group 
will always be homologous, but not identical. For this reason, the purpose o f  
sociology is not to consider either the individual, or collectivities as seen as 
concrete groups o f individuals, but rather to consider the “mutual conditioning 
between group and individual habitus." (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 126- 
127)
In the light o f Bourdieu’s theorising, therefore, the fact that it is difficult to apply 
Kymlicka’s notion o f  ‘differentiated citizenship’ to disabled people does not 
mean that the position o f disabled people represents the ‘exception to the rule’, 
but rather, that it is important to question the idea o f  ‘differentiated citizenship’ 
when applied to any apparently distinct group.
To a degree, Young also assumes greater homogeneity within groups than may in 
fact exist. She does, however, acknowledge the need for a more contextualised 
understanding o f  difference. As has already been discussed at some length in 
chapter 3, what sets Young apart from Kymlicka is her theorising on the need for 
a more fluid and contextualised understanding o f  difference which rejects the 
tendency on the part o f the dominant group to essentialise differences whilst 
denying their own specificity. Further, Young (1990) points to what she terms the 
‘dilemma o f difference’. She defines this as a dilemma facing some socially 
excluded groups as they find that they have to deny that they are different from 
others since citizenship rights are so often based upon the equal moral worth o f  
each individual, and yet simultaneously have to affirm their difference from other 
groups since formal, equal treatment, has placed them in a position o f  
disadvantage. Young’s theorising here, on the construction o f difference is useful 
when considering the position o f disabled people: a group, which she herself, in a 
somewhat rare move by a citizenship theorist, actually considers. Her argument,
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that depending upon the groups being compared and the context, differences may 
become more or less salient, echoes clearly with the findings o f this research. Her 
use o f the following example also relates to these findings:
(...) in the context o f  athletics, health care, social service support, 
and so on, wheelchair-bound people are different from others, but 
they are not different in many other respects. Traditional 
treatment o f  the disabled entailed exclusion and segregation 
because the differences between the disabled and the able-bodied 
were conceptualised as extending to all or most capacities.
(Young, 1990: 171)
Young considers that traditional politics has excluded or devalued people by 
suggesting that there are such things as essential differences. ‘Difference’ is 
therefore, best viewed as the result o f social processes, as a social construction. 
According to Davis (1999) it is precisely this notion o f essential difference that 
has been perpetuated by the highly criticised Medical Model o f  Disability. For 
those who are involved in the construction o f welfare policy there has been a 
convenient tradition o f assuming that disabled people are ‘different’. This has had 
two results: firstly, the development o f a number o f  often disempowering 
apparatuses o f  welfare for disabled people, based upon assumptions about their 
‘special needs’ and their dependency. Secondly, it further supports the notion o f  
‘bodily perfection’, in which disabled people are viewed as the imperfect ‘other’ 
and the non-disabled community refuse to accept their own, perhaps less visible, 
bodily imperfections or vulnerabilities.
A s Davis (1999) has commented, this attachment to the Medical M odel and 
associated notions o f  ab/normality has been heavily criticised by the disability 
movement. Further, campaigns by organisations o f disabled people based upon 
the notion that all people are vulnerable and interdependent to some extent during 
their lifetimes, strike at the very heart o f  widely held beliefs about ‘difference’. 
According to Delanty (2000) this new emphasis upon personhood “whereby the 
self is contextualised, contingent and decentrecT (p.69) is the result o f  human 
rights discourses impacting upon notions o f citizenship. There is then, a risk o f  
lapsing into a ‘false consciousness’ when considering identity and culture
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amongst disabled people. Everyone has an identity, and everyone has the right to 
have that identity respected by others. Further, it would be inaccurate to state that 
the imagery o f ‘identity’, ‘difference’ and what Fraser (1995b) terms 
‘recognition’, do not play a part in the disability movement’s campaigns. There 
may be, however, misconceptions about the true nature o f disability identity 
politics. The findings o f  this research suggest that whilst disabled people are keen 
to achieve recognition and respect, they are not seeking to be recognised as 
having essentially different identities from those o f  non-disabled people, or as 
being a part o f a different culture, but rather, as equal persons.
Indeed, the evidence from this research suggests that most disabled people see 
themselves as having been ‘labelled’ as disabled, and that, therefore, their 
identity has been forced upon them. The disabled identity can thus be a negative 
social construct at times, and one that disempowers those who are forced to 
accept this label. The extent to which this ‘label’ has negative implications was 
clearly demonstrated by respondents who referred to the difficult transition and 
subsequent identity crisis that had occurred when they became disabled, or to 
their observations o f this experience on the part o f others.
It would seem clear that two key emotions are felt during this transition from a 
non-disabled identity to a disabled identity: firstly, a deep depression about the 
change in body capabilities further exacerbated by preconceived ideas, 
constructed whilst non-disabled, about the negative identity o f  disabled people. 
Secondly, anger is felt at the injustices experienced by disabled people and the 
subsequent development o f a ‘political identity’ as a disabled person that may 
bear no relation to the person’s sense o f genuine personal identity.
Revaluing disabled people as possessing non-stigmatised identities has, therefore, 
been key to the limited number o f identity-based campaigns by the disability 
movement. Evidence from this research suggests, however, that disabled people 
perceive there to be risks associated with such campaigns, for at times the 
political identity o f disabled people that is key to a cohesive vision o f the 
disability movement appears to be purposefully maintained in order to disguise
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the genuine lack o f unity within the movement. Maintaining a unified political 
identity in this way then becomes too reductive o f  the complexities o f  social 
identities (Fawcett, 2000). Feminist approaches to disability have highlighted the 
fact that whilst power does appear to exist throughout the network o f  social 
relations, it does not circulate equally:
( ...)  challenges can be seen to be emerging in relation to the 
‘universalism’ o f  disabled people’s movements, based on the 
social model o f  disability, by calls for the inclusion o f issues 
related to gender, 'race ’, impairment, ethnicity and age. (Fawcett,
2000: 4)
Thus, disability is best viewed as a contested concept and issues o f unity 
surrounding the homogeneity o f the disability movement need to be considered 
carefiilly.
The great strength in Young’s work, therefore, is in the way that she 
acknowledges that differences can sometimes be essentialised. At the same time, 
however, the manner in which she then goes on to utilise her understanding o f  
difference to develop a model o f democracy and citizenship is somewhat more 
problematic. Indeed, at times, it is hard to see how her own thoughts on 
difference connect with her theorising on democracy. This issue has already been 
discussed at some length in chapter 3, but whilst it is not the intention here to 
repeat the critique o f Young’s theorising that appears there, it is important to 
consider how the evidence from this research relates uneasily to some important 
aspects o f her work.
The first way in which the evidence from this research does not appear to 
correspond with Young’s analysis, is in relation to the idea that the self­
organisation o f group members in order that they achieve collective 
empowerment is both possible and desirable. As has previously been discussed in 
this chapter, both the views o f  the respondents and the arguments put forward by 
Bourdieu question Young’s views in this regard. The findings o f this research 
suggest that disabled people are far from being a practical group and many
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disabled individuals have profound concerns over the effects that a the transition 
towards such a group may have in relation to the abdicating o f individual powers. 
This is a particularly thorny issue for disabled people in the light o f the obvious 
divisions between disabled people and the lack o f a unifying ‘disability identity’.
The second way in which evidence from this research challenges Young’s work 
is in relation to her reliance upon the idea that the only collectivities that should 
be given specific representation are what she defines as ‘social groups’ which are 
culturally determined. Whilst she acknowledges the existence o f collectivities 
that are based on other factors such as interest groups, she nevertheless prioritises 
cultural issues over any other. As has already been discussed in relation to 
Kymlicka’s work on cultural citizenship, the evidence from this research suggests 
that there are potential problems with Young’s approach at this point. Firstly, 
disabled people along with many other disadvantaged groups within society still 
face major structural inequalities and for disabled people at least, these issues 
form the major focus o f their campaigns. Further, as the previous discussion here 
and in chapter 6 has indicated, the ‘culture o f disability’ is not a uniting factor 
amongst disabled people. According to Young’s theory therefore, disabled people 
as a collective would not be considered to be a ‘social group’ and would not be 
allowed specific representation. It is hard to see, therefore, how Young’s notion 
o f democracy is likely to improve the position o f groups who are concerned more 
with redistribution than recognition.
Further, as the previous discussion demonstrates, the issue o f how to define a 
culture remains, and it is unclear, for example, whether Young would give 
representation rights to ‘defensive cultures’ which do not exist historically but 
have developed in the face o f prejudice. Would Young give disabled people 
specific representation rights according to a ‘culture o f disability’ that is based 
not upon an essential cultural difference between disabled and non-disabled 
people, but upon a process o f defensive engagement in an unjust society? Since 
only limited numbers o f  disabled people regard themselves as being a part o f a 
‘culture o f disability’, and many disabled people reject the idea or are ambivalent 
about it, giving such culturally based representational rights would have
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implications for any individuals who may appear to be members o f that collective 
but who do not share the cultural identity. For any groups, such as disabled 
people, where their identities are clearly embodied, giving such a group 
representational rights on the basis o f a purportedly shared culture runs the risk o f 
locking all members o f the group into an alleged shared identity which bears no 
relation to their own true sense o f identity. That is to say, if  you are obviously a 
disabled person, then clearly you must also be a part o f that ‘other’ culture. The 
risks associated with such separatism were considered by several respondents in 
this research to be matters o f grave concern.
Given this apparent disjuncture between some important aspects o f  both Young 
and Kymlicka’s theories and the findings o f this research, it must be concluded 
that in relation to disability at least, the pluralist accounts o f  citizenship do not 
appear to be entirely satisfactory. O f course, it must be stated that some o f  these 
problems have been acknowledged within even more recent pluralist accounts by 
authors such as Stevenson (1997a/b). Stevenson, for example writes about the 
need for a multi-layered notion o f citizenship in which ‘cultural citizenship’ is 
viewed as a model in which a diversity o f rights, both structural and ‘identity’ 
based can be guaranteed. Whilst this may at first seems a more convincing 
approach, the intractable problem o f the continuing focus upon ‘culture’ and the 
idea that social groups can be defined by their need for cultural recognition 
remains in relation to disability.
It is at this point that I think it is interesting to return to the work o f Berlin, and to 
propose that whilst undeniably a liberal, elements o f  his thinking may form the 
basis o f a more convincing pluralist approach. Where Berlin differs from pluralist 
thinkers such as Kymlicka and Young is in the way that his particular brand o f  
pluralism is not about seeking recognition for disadvantaged groups on the basis 
o f respect for different cultures per se, although he would consider this to be 
entirely necessary under certain circumstances and for particular groups, but 
rather is about ensuring that all individuals are regarded as ‘fully human’. In this 
respect, Berlin’s work is clearly an important part o f  the human rights debate. 
Whilst some critics have pointed out that Berlin’s adherence to the principle o f  a
243
‘minimal moral horizon’ common to all human societies and cultures, is an 
essentially universalistic concept, and therefore somewhat stands in tension to his 
anti-monistic theorising, I think that this aspect o f  his work is o f  considerable 
importance and merits re-consideration. In particular, the importance o f Berlin’s 
thinking is clear when it is compared with the writings o f both Habermas and 
MoufiFe, both o f whom have provided some important alternatives to both the 
liberal and pluralist accounts o f citizenship.
Beyond the pluralist account
Both the reflexive and post-structuralist accounts o f citizenship may w ell provide 
some way out o f this apparent disjuncture between pluralist accounts o f  
citizenship and the true nature o f  the ‘struggle’ engaged upon by the disability 
movement. Shafir (1998) highlights the way in which the journey from modernity 
to late/post-modemity has resulted in an increasingly complex set o f  frameworks 
within which the individual constructs their citizenship identity. Further, it is easy 
to see how global citizenship and the notion o f  human rights can coexist uneasily 
and sometimes in out-and-out conflict with national or more community based 
notions o f citizenship. It is in the light o f these changes that Habermas developed 
his reflexive account o f citizenship, and Mouffe her more post-structuralist 
account. Whilst both authors are firmly opposed to the liberal approach to 
citizenship, nevertheless, some interesting links can be seen between their work 
and that o f Berlin.
Berlin’s (1958) notion o f  a ‘minimal moral horizon’ is clearly echoed by 
Habermas when he proposes a form o f  citizenship as a ‘minimal shared identity’ 
in which consensus is reached between members o f  society by striving for a 
‘reflexive position’. Such a ‘reflexive position’ Habermas describes as being the 
critical appropriation o f competing positions. Whilst essentially ‘macro’ in 
approach, the strength o f Habermas’ thinking in this regard is in his lack o f  focus 
upon the politics o f difference as the ‘end goal’ o f  citizenship and instead upon 
processes o f  reflexive engagement which involve individuals and groups from a 
variety o f  different positions striving for shared interests. There are two problems
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with this approach however: the first relates to the fact that Habermas appears to 
have over-looked the importance o f  power when considering the ability o f  
individuals to reflexively engage. Differentials o f  power, often flowing from 
differential control o f resources o f one type or another, still affect the degree o f  
autonomy individuals have as actors. As the findings o f  this research show, 
disabled people still experience profound problems in what Habermas would 
term the ‘pre-discursive’ space in terms o f lack o f resources within or access to, 
the public sphere. These problems have clear implications in terms o f limiting the 
ability o f disabled people to actively participate in this process o f  reflexive 
engagement.
The second problem is clearly articulated by Mouffe (1992, 1993) in her 
consideration o f  the fragmentary effects o f  multiple identities upon the public 
sphere. Whilst Berlin’s notion o f a ‘minimal shared horizon’ is also clearly 
echoed in terms o f the end goal o f  M ouffe’s ‘radical democracy’, the strength o f  
M ouffe’s thinking is in her understanding o f the polity as a ‘societas’ o f  
individuals with shared interests, but with very different ideas about the meanings 
and definitions o f these shared interests. M ouffe’s ideas about the ‘multiple se lf  
is also key here for she also proposes that the multiple subject positions 
individuals inhabit will further complicate the processes within a radical societas 
as members o f particular groups are likely to have very different ideas about the 
meanings and definitions o f their shared interests. In the light o f this complexity, 
achieving a ‘minimal shared horizon’ is likely to be increasingly difficult but all 
the more necessary if  society is not to become dangerously fragmented. The 
considerable worth o f M ouffe’s thinking on this point is clear when compared to 
the findings o f this research, for the fragmented nature o f the disability movement 
is something that was clearly articulated by several respondents.
Divisions between disabled people on the grounds o f  impairment became 
apparent during the research, the major issue being the reluctance on the part o f  
some people with physical impairments to associate themselves with people with 
a learning disability or a mental health problem. Although this is usually 
explained with regard to limits to the professional knowledge o f the organisation
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I suggest that in fact this division highlights two important points. Firstly, it 
suggests that if  we consider ‘disability’ from within a framework o f  
‘stigmatisation’, then if  people with a learning disability or a mental health 
problem are more cruelly or differently stigmatised by society than people who 
have a physical impairment, then it is understandable that physically disabled 
people who already feel their own identities to be stigmatised, would not wish to 
take on the stigma o f others, through association. Secondly, it demonstrates how  
pervasive certain images o f people with a learning disability or a mental health 
problem can be, if  even amongst disabled people there is a degree o f  prejudice. 
Subsuming this diversity under one heading ‘the ‘disability identity”  and using 
this as something to rally around is, therefore, unlikely to be successful within the 
disability movement.
Clearly then, the pluralist notion o f citizenship is brought into further question 
since, in the light o f  such complexity, identity politics and the ‘politics o f  
difference’ are unlikely to achieve consensus. In the light o f  this, the idea that all 
individuals should be striving for a ‘minimal shared horizon’ becomes even more 
appealing, if  even more difficult to achieve. That the nature o f citizenship is 
changing in the light o f this progressive fragmentation o f  the public sphere is 
something that Ellison (1997, 2000) has clearly identified and his theorising, it 
seems to me, represents a very interesting new development in this field. 
Ellison’s approach seeks to combine a more convincing reflexive/post-structural 
account o f contemporary citizenship with an understanding o f current forms o f  
protest and social movements. In doing this, he proposes that citizenship is now  
best understood as a process o f defensive and/or proactive engagement in the 
context o f  a society characterised by increasingly complex social and political 
identities:
The argument here is that rapid change transforms the nature o f  
citizen participation and ‘encourages’ engagement; willing or not, 
in the pursuit, or defence, or particular interests and/or social 
rights. In short, both the capacity to engage, and the differential 
nature o f  engagement itself, are rapidly becoming the most 
significant features o f  a citizenship conceived as a series o f  
fractured ‘contiguous belongings’ (...) (Ellison, 2000: para. 1.1)
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Ellison’s (2000) definition o f  defensive engagement is particularly useful when 
considering the position o f  disabled people because he defines it as being the 
activity o f ‘‘'those lacking access to relevant power networks who find themselves 
engaged in efforts -  perhaps to maintain a status quo, or to develop new 
arrangements -  simply to preserve existing interests and entitlements.” (para. 1.4) 
In other words, if  the context in which a group engages is one in which power is 
concentrated in the hand o f the ‘opponent’, then the group may only be able to 
engage defensively. In terms o f understanding citizenship this is a useful model 
because it explains why some disempowered groups such as disabled people may 
appear to be more concerned with protecting and enhancing existing rights than 
with claiming ‘new’ rights. Thus, ‘defensive engagement’ is a useful way o f  
explaining the findings o f  this research which suggest that many disabled people 
are more concerned about achieving real equal treatment in spheres where they 
are already ‘officially’ equal (for example in relation to equal opportunities 
legislation in employment), than they are about claiming ‘new’ rights on the basis 
o f ‘identity politics’.
Whilst providing a useful way o f understanding the functioning o f movements 
such as the disability movement, the really interesting aspect o f  Ellison’s (2000) 
approach, however, is that he questions the extent to which, ultimately, * defensive 
forms o f engagement ’ which are ‘likely to be organised around social divisions 
already shaped by existing discourses' enable true agency (para. 7.3). In 
defending particular sets o f interests, he argues, a group may utilise identities 
such as the ‘disability identity’ as a way o f  appealing to a supposedly pre-existing 
sense o f solidarity. Quite apart from the problems associated with whether or not 
such identities are true representations o f solidarities, Ellison states that this 
approach does not give the same scope for agency that more pro-active 
engagement might provide. A more genuinely pro-active approach could move 
beyond existing discourses such as disabled/non-disabled and allow instead for 
the challenging o f ‘established assumptions about social divisions’ (Ellison, 
2000: para. 7.3). N ew  and differently conceived solidarities might then emerge 
which by the very nature o f their formation w ill be inherently unstable.
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Having stated that Ellison considers proactive engagement to enable agency more 
than defensive engagement that is not to say that he is overtly proposing that 
proactive engagement is the preferable form o f engagement. Indeed, he states 
clearly that it is the hallmark o f contemporary citizenship that individuals are able 
to engage defensively and/or proactively and the two forms o f engagement are 
not mutually exclusive:
(...) individual citizens can simultaneously inhabit class, gender 
and/or ethnic solidarities for defensive purposes in particular 
areas o f the public sphere, while rejecting the logic o f  these 
belongings when engaging proactively elsewhere. (Ellison, 2000: 
para. 7.3)
I think that it might, in fact, be necessary to go one step further than Ellison and 
suggest that proactive engagement is likely to bring about the best long term 
results for disadvantaged groups since it is about transforming rather than 
working within existing social relations and in so doing is more likely to be able 
to tackle the assumptions that may be underpinning social exclusion. Further, my 
argument here is that the very act o f  defensive engagement only becomes 
necessary in the absence o f previously successful proactive engagement. In other 
words, defensive engagement becomes necessary when disadvantaged groups 
have been excluded from decision-making processes and have thus been unable 
to influence the development o f structures or policies that impact upon them. The 
hallmark o f contemporary citizenship then becomes the ability to engage 
proactively and without the need to engage defensively. Whilst this idea may be 
slightly at odds with Ellison’s theorising, nevertheless it remains true to his 
understanding o f  citizenship as a process. This aspect o f his work is, I suggest, 
the most important.
Whilst the types o f issues that may form the bases o f  this proactive engagement 
will be considered in the final section o f this chapter, it is important to note that 
although Ellison’s approach clearly represents an important new development in 
terms o f our understanding o f citizenship, by defining citizenship as a process o f
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engagement, it is also a vital new development in terms o f  social movement 
theorising. As has already been discussed at some length in chapter 4 , some 
important issues remain as yet unresolved within the social movement theorising.
Implications fo r social movement theorising
A s has been discussed in chapter 5, the current debates in the field o f social 
movement theorising focus upon the key differences that exist between what I 
have termed the First and Second Phase theorising and between the American 
and European traditions. Amongst British theorists in this area there has been a 
tendency to favour the Second Phase European approaches o f authors such as 
Touraine, Habermas and Melucci and to embrace their ideas about ‘new’ social 
movements. Indeed, so popular has this approach been, that it has been used 
enthusiastically by some key figures within Disability Studies who claim that the 
disability movement is a ‘new’ social movement (see Oliver, 1997).
The findings o f this research however, do not support the idea that the disability 
movement is a ‘new’ social movement. Whilst it is not my intention here to 
revisit my discussion o f the second phase European theories at this point, it is 
important to highlight the fact that according to this tradition, ‘new’ social 
movements can be defined as acting within a broadly defined socio-cultural 
sphere and as having largely moved beyond a focus upon structural issues. For 
the disability movement to be a  ‘new’ social movement, therefore, then the type 
o f citizenship underlying the disability movement would clearly reflect the 
pluralist account o f citizenship. As the previous discussion has demonstrated, it is 
not easy to locate the type o f citizenship underlying disability campaigns in any 
one o f  the modem/contemporary models o f  citizenship, but it is especially 
difficult to analyse the goals o f the movement in terms o f the ‘politics o f  
difference’ o f the pluralist account.
By way o f  demonstrating this point, whilst in no way completely disregarding all 
o f Touraine’s contributions to social movement theorising, his focus upon
identity and culture as the basis o f  social movement activity is brought into
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question by the findings o f  this research. As the previous discussion has shown, 
the disability movement is not, on the whole, concerned with defending the 
cultural parts o f private life as are, he suggests, other contemporary social 
movements. Further, the disability movement does not appear to be about 
redefining culture and lifestyle, the “grammar o f  forms o f life” as Habermas 
(1981: 33) suggests, or about seeking a “space fo r  difference” as Melucci (1985: 
810) believes. In the light o f  the problems associated with the essentialising o f  
difference and the rejection by many disabled people o f the idea o f  a positive 
‘disability identity’, such theories must be questioned.
Further, Melucci argues that contemporary social movements are positioned 
outside the established boundaries o f  political systems and are characterised by 
‘alternative’ behaviour such as deviance and ‘cultural experimentation’. Again, 
very little evidence emerged during this research to support the idea that there is a 
‘culture o f disability’ being widely celebrated by disabled people or that disabled 
people wish to be seen as ‘deviant’ from the ‘norm’. Indeed, quite on the 
contrary, most respondents in this research questioned the notion that disabled 
people are ‘different’ from non-disabled people in any essential way. Further, 
several respondents, as discussed in chapter 6, highlighted what they considered 
to be the importance o f  establishing a firm place for disabled people in the 
established boundaries o f political systems and o f ensuring that the views o f such 
individuals are taken seriously.
In the light o f the findings o f this research therefore, and according to current 
social movement theorising, the disability movement’s status as a ‘new’ social 
movement must be placed in some doubt. Indeed when writers such as Oliver 
(1997) state enthusiastically that the disability movement is a ‘new’ social 
movement there is a sense in which he is attempting to theoretically hammer the 
‘square peg’ that is the disability movement into the ‘round hole’ o f  existing 
theorising. I propose that the findings o f this research indicate that the disability 
movement is unlikely to ever correspond to the existing theories o f  ‘new’ social 
movements and that a more productive approach may be to start by considering
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how an understanding o f the disability movement might lead to the development 
o f a more convincing theory o f contemporary social movements.
Whilst it is not possible within the confines o f  this thesis to develop such an 
alternative approach, it is nevertheless interesting to consider where the point o f  
departure might be for this new theorising. One question raised by the findings o f  
this research is the extent to which it is either necessary or desirable to 
completely reject the first-phase theories o f  social movements. Blumer’s ([1951] 
1995) understandings o f social movements, for example, seem very useful in the 
light o f  the disability movement. The movement would appear to reflect 
Blumer’s definition o f  a ‘general social movement’ to the extent that the 
disability movement does appear to be moving in a groping fashion only slowly 
towards its goals, and to be structurally disorganised with no clear leadership or 
locational focus for its struggle. It is also interesting to note that Blumer’s 
definition o f a ‘specific social movement’ is also o f  use when analysing the 
disability movement, for it is the obvious lack o f  a ‘we-consciousness’ or shared 
identity amongst disabled people that marks out the movement as not being a 
‘specific movement’.
Further, according to Blumer, during the transition from general to specific social 
movement, ideology plays an important role for it must carry respectability and 
prestige and answer the genuine wishes and hopes o f  the members o f  the 
movement. That such a widely agreed upon ‘populist’ ideology is absent within 
the disability movement is evident from disagreements over issues such as the 
extent to which non-disabled people should be excluded from participating in the 
disability movement or disability research, or the nature o f the relationship 
between illness and disability. It must be concluded from this that the disability 
movement is a long way from becoming a specific social movement. To define 
the disability movement in this way as a ‘general social movement’ in its early 
stages o f  development clearly corresponds with the comments made by 
respondents about the ‘embryonic’ nature o f  the movement.
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The problem with Blumer’s approach, however, as has been discussed in chapter 
4, is that he somewhat assumed the natural ‘career path’ o f  social movements 
from general to specific. Whilst at times Tilly’s approach to social movement 
theorising may be too programmatic, nevertheless, his critique o f  this aspect o f  
the collective behaviour model o f  authors such as Blumer is instructive. Tilly’s 
(1993) much more fluid definition o f  social movement activity sees them as: 
“dragons living continuously somewhere in the social underground, but emerging 
recurrently from their labyrinths to stomp around roaring.” (p.6). In this way he 
does not give social movements the progressive life histories implied by the 
collective behaviour approach. Instead, he proposes that social movements are 
best understood as varying in nature according to the effects o f four main factors: 
the nature o f  the claims being made by the movement; the prevailing political 
opportunity structure; the shared understandings o f the participants, and the social 
structure from which members are drawn (1993: 19). This is an appealing 
approach because in terms o f this research it explains how factors such as the 
continuing focus o f many disabled people upon structural issues and the lack o f a 
shared identity amongst disabled people, shape the nature o f  the disability 
movement. This approach also avoids the old/new distinction that may not, as has 
already been discussed, be entirely justified or productive.
Tilly’s approach therefore avoids the underlying implication within Blumer’s 
work: that the ultimate goal o f  a social movement should be to become 
homogenous. According to Tilly’s schema it would therefore, be entirely possible 
for a movement to be comprised o f both separatist and non-separatist factions, 
factions based upon differing ideological beliefs and factions based upon the 
addition o f further factors o f  inequality. Such divisions, according to Tilly’s 
schema, do not necessarily bring into doubt the existence o f  a movement, but do 
alter it’s structure. Thus, to understand the disability movement in the light o f  
Tilly’s theorising, it is vital to acknowledge divisions within the movement, for 
example between the separatist and non-separatist factions, for such divisions 
will affect the nature o f the movement.
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Tarrow furthers Tilly’s theorising by adding into the equation the idea that social 
movements must also be understood according to the level at which they are able 
to sustain collective action. Tarrow appears to share Tilly’s definition o f  social 
movements as ‘dragons’ which emerge only sporadically to struggle against 
particular foes and particular threats. He adds to Tilly’s definition, however, the 
idea that movements have inherent problems in relation to “co-ordinating 
unorganised, autonomous and dispersed populations into common and sustained 
action. ” (Tarrow, 1994: 9) As the evidence from this research demonstrates the 
disability movement does indeed experience these collective action problems. 
Tarrow’s analysis is therefore o f  considerable use in this regard. His work on 
‘mobilizing structures’ can also be profitably employed when considering 
movements such as the disability movement. Although many key activists and 
writers in this field see organisations such as the British Council o f  Disabled 
People (BCODP) as a ‘mobilizing structure’, the evidence from this research 
demonstrates that not all disabled people agree on the importance o f  the BCODP 
to their lives or to the disability movement as a whole. It can be argued, therefore, 
that the very absence o f such ‘mobilizing structures’ within the ‘embryonic 
disability movement’ accounts for the latter’s problems in relation to activating 
and sustaining collective action.
A  problem does arise in relation to both o f these approaches however, for if a 
social movement is significantly divided in terms o f  its constituent groups, and 
has mobilizing difficulties, then how is it possible to state categorically that it is a 
social movement as opposed to a political coalition or a loosely structured protest 
event? It is the argument here that Della Porta and Diani (1999) provide the most 
convincing answer to this question:
The aspect which enables us to discriminate is the present o f  a 
vision o f  the world and a collective identity which permit 
participants in various protest events to place their action in a 
wider perspective. In order to be able to speak o f social 
movements it is necessary that single episodes are perceived as 
components o f  a longer-lasting action, rather than discrete events; 
and that those who are engaged feel linked by ties o f  solidarity
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and o f ideal communion with protagonists o f  other analogous 
mobilizations. ” (p.19)
This is a useful quote because it explains how  despite the apparently 
heterogenous nature o f the disability movement, it can still be categorised as a 
social movement: Firstly, whilst the evidence from this research suggests that it is 
important to treat with caution the idea that a collective identity based upon a 
positive 'disability identity' exists within the disability movement, this is not 
necessarily the type o f collective identity implied by Della Porta and Diani. It is 
the argument here that according to this approach the existence o f  such a 
collective identity may amount simply to the acknowledgement by constituent 
members that they have been labelled as being the same, in some way. In the case 
o f this research the collective identity is therefore, the experience o f the label o f  
‘disability’. More importantly, despite the heterogeneity within the disability 
movement it is still possible to see that constituent members share an overall 
vision o f  the world as ‘disabling’. This may be one o f  the only views behind 
which all respondents in this research would unite, but it is o f  fundamental 
importance to the disability movement. Finally, the evidence from this research 
also suggests that whilst total agreement does not exist amongst the various 
factions o f  the movement, an overall solidarity does exist. This solidarity was 
demonstrated by the reluctant way in which certain respondents criticised leading 
organisations, such as the BCODP. Such respondents clearly felt sufficient 
affinity with, and perhaps even ‘loyalty’ to, this organisation to be reluctant to 
criticise the organisation to any great extent.
However, despite the appeal o f  these aspects o f  previous models o f  social 
movements, in particular o f  their explanations for both ‘how’ and ‘when’ social 
movements can be seen to exist and mobilize, these theories do not provide 
adequate explanation for ‘why’ social movements come into being in the first 
place. In the fight o f  this weakness in the older approaches, I propose that any 
new theory o f  social movements, whilst building upon some aspects o f  older 
traditions, would need to focus upon this ‘why’ aspect o f  movements. A s has 
already been discussed, in the light o f this research, the second phase European
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theorists’ focus upon culture and identity as the being at the heart o f  the 
campaigns o f  ‘new’ social movements does not explain the activities and aims o f  
all contemporary social movements and so this aspect o f the approach is unlikely 
to provide the best starting point for this new theorising.
That having been stated, there are some strands o f  thinking within the second 
phase European approach that may prove to be more fruitful. When both 
Habermas (1981) and Melucci (1993) write that the important role o f  social 
movements is to prevent the system from closing in upon itself and in Melucci’s 
(1993) view to expose the “shadowy zones o f  invisible power” (p.190), it is 
possible to see how these ideas link with the theory o f engagement proposed by 
Ellison (2000) for they are both calling for a more radical sense o f democracy.
Although Melucci is probably the chief proponent o f  this approach to social 
movement theorizing, what is often termed the Reactive/Defensive M odel can 
also be seen in the work o f  Foweraker (1995). Foweraker (1995) echoes much o f  
the work o f Melucci when he states that ‘new’ social movements are the result o f  
major changes in society, changes in particular to the boundary conditions o f  the 
social system. Reflecting Melucci’s (1993) theorizing on the “shadowy zones o f  
invisible power’’ (p.190), Foweraker draws upon the work o f  Foucault (1979) 
when he comments that ‘new’ social movements challenge the ‘microphysics o f 
power’. Thus, the role o f  these movements becomes one o f  reaction to negative 
aspects o f  these changes in the social system and to the ‘microphysics o f power’, 
in defence o f the position o f  the group. A s the previous discussion and 
Bourdieu’s work has demonstrated, care must be taken when using the term 
‘group’, nevertheless, Foweraker’s overall conclusion, that ‘old’ or ‘new’, in the 
end, the central focus o f all social movements is citizenship, is an important 
contribution to this debate.
Here again, the link between Foweraker’s work and Ellison’s notion o f  
‘engagement’ is also clear for they both consider understanding ‘citizenship’ to 
be at the heart o f understanding contemporary social movements. Ellison’s work 
is o f  central importance because it highlights the need for greater understanding
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o f not only the process o f engagement, but also the kind o f rights that are in need 
o f defence or are being proactively sought. In other words, what Ellison proposes 
is that understanding the true nature o f the contested citizenship is key to 
understanding social movement themselves.
The future for citizenship theorising?
As has already been considered earlier in this chapter, one o f the departure points 
for understanding the true nature o f contested citizenship may be Ellison’s 
understanding o f the difference between the goals o f  those engaging defensively 
or proactively. As has also been discussed, the work o f Berlin on the ‘minimal 
moral horizon’ and Habermas on the ‘minimal shared identity’ combined with 
M ouffe’s understandings o f  ‘radical democracy’ and the nature o f the ‘societas’ 
are also theoretically important. There may be other areas o f theorising that need 
to be considered along side o f these however, and it is the argument here that 
such areas include: human rights discourses; theories o f  personhood; and 
theories o f  embodiment.
In chapter five, new trends in Medical Sociology were discussed which stress the 
need for a more embodied understanding o f  disability (Bendelow and Williams, 
1995, Hughes and Paterson, 1997). Thus there are calls for a more highly 
developed theory o f  impairment and for Disability Studies to actively engage 
with the sociology o f the body. Such research has been concerned with the ways 
in which both lay and professional attitudes towards disabled people can radically 
constrain the competence o f  disabled individuals. Whilst these new ideas are 
being increasingly embraced by Medical Sociology, Disability Studies appears to 
have been reluctant to consider such issues. This reluctance on the part o f  
Disability Studies may be due to concerns about the possible weakening o f  the 
Social M odel o f  Disability that might result from proper engagement with issues 
o f embodiment. It is the argument here, however, that the costs in terms o f  
questioning the Social Model o f  Disability may be outweighed by the benefits 
that can be gained by placing disability firmly at the centre o f  contemporary 
theorising on the embodied self.
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As has already been discussed in chapter 3, Turner has developed a sociology o f  
the body which places theorising about the embodied nature o f  human life at the 
heart o f  many o f the central sociological debates. Whilst it is not possible within 
the limits o f this thesis to consider in any great depth the implications o f all o f  
Turner’s theorising here, it is important to note how his concerns with the ethical 
implications o f medical interventions into people’s lives is o f  considerable value 
to debates surrounding the eradication o f congenital disabilities via genetic 
screening and other new techniques. His ideas about the cultural formation o f the 
body also have implications for understanding the effects o f  powerful images 
such as the ‘body-beautiful’ on both the lives o f disabled people and perceptions 
o f disability amongst non-disabled people. At this point in Turner’s theorising, 
the links between his ideas and those o f Goffman (1968) on stigmatised bodies 
and Foucault (1979) on ‘abnormal’ bodies and stigma is clear. As has already 
been discussed, Goffman’s work, in particular, remains central to understanding 
both the attitudes o f  non-disabled people towards disabled people and the 
divisions that exist between disabled people and which account, at least in part, 
for the fragmented nature o f  the disability movement. Further, the work o f  
Foucault (1979) on the manner in which the body has become increasingly 
governed by the state and is firmly connected to systems o f  domination and 
oppression has clearly influenced Turner. Understanding the ways in which the 
body is both governed and oppressed is o f  great value when considering the lives 
o f disabled people. Where Turner departs from both Goffman and Foucault, 
however, is in his rejection o f the earlier theorists’ views o f the body as being 
almost entirely socially constructed.
According to Turner, the central problem with the view o f the body as entirely 
socially constructed is that it ignores the materiality o f embodiment. In this 
respect there are clear links between Turner’s theorising on the body and Jenkins’ 
(1998) notion o f the ‘materiality o f identity’. Thus, for Turner ([1996] 2000):
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There is a phenomenology o f the life-world as a lived experience, 
about which cultural relativism and structuralism have no interest 
or purchase, (p.492)
Again, the links between Turner’s work and current moves within Medical 
Sociology in terms o f developing a more embodied notion o f disability are clear 
and the frequent use o f  his work within current Medical Sociology reflects this. 
The strong point o f his approach is that it appears to provide a way o f closing the 
divide between impairment and disability. This is important because despite 
arguments by authors such as Oliver (1997) in favour o f the development o f  a 
separate model o f  impairment that together with the social model o f  disability 
may produce a social theory o f  disability, it is the argument here that closing, not 
redefining this divide is essential. It is no longer possible to ignore or bracket o ff 
into a separate ‘category’ the experiences o f such things as pain and the effects 
that such sensual experiences have upon the ‘se lf and identity. For Turner, there 
should be equal focus upon this ‘materiality o f  embodiment’ as upon the 
historical controls that have been placed, for example, upon disabled bodies by 
non-disabled medical professionals. It is understandable given the level o f  
importance Turner gives to the materiality o f embodiment that some proponents 
o f the Social Model find this approach threatening. Turner’s views should not be 
seen in this way, however, for his ideas do not threaten the central tenet o f  the 
Social Model, that society ‘disables’ individuals with impairments. Rather, his 
ideas are o f  considerable importance in dealing with the real threat to the Social 
Model, which is that many disabled people who are not ‘able-disabled’ or who 
experience illness or pain, have felt that their experiences fall ‘outside’ the Social 
Model. If the Social M odel o f Disability is to be truly inclusive o f the experiences 
o f all disabled people then it must engage with issues o f  embodiment or it will 
risk losing veracity.
Having established his Sociology o f the Body, Turner then turns his attention to 
the implications o f this embodied understanding o f personhood to discourses o f  
citizenship and human rights. He proposes that: “given frailty and 
precariousness, human beings need a universalistic legal framework in which to 
seek protection.” (Turner, [1996] 2000: 496). In other words, Turner is proposing
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a theory o f personhood as inherently fragile and a corresponding theory o f human 
rights that rests upon the awareness o f every individual o f  their own vulnerability. 
Thus:
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Human beings will want their rights to be recognised because they 
see in the plight o f  others their own (possible) misery. (Turner,
1993b: 506)
Clearly there is some way to go before the majority o f  people become so 
‘enlightened’, but it is an appealing ideal.
There is, as yet, however, an unresolved problem in Turner’s work and this is 
whether or not such a notion o f  human rights removes the need for citizenship 
rights? Turner (1993b) suggests that human rights debates are beginning to 
replace citizenship debates and that achieving proper human rights for all would 
mark the end o f  the need for citizenship. I am uneasy about his thinking in this 
regard, however, for he appears to be avoiding the problem o f governance. Even 
if  a universally agreed set o f non-culturally specific human rights could be drawn 
up, and this is itself likely to be a utopian aim, individuals would still remain the 
‘citizens’ o f  a given state. The apparatuses o f  that state would remain central to 
the lives o f  individuals and be the main context within which individuals seek 
support against risk. Under such circumstances the idea o f human rights as 
existing beyond the boundaries o f the state is problematic.
By way o f tackling this problem, this thesis argues for a new understanding o f  
citizenship as a process o f proactive engagement, in a radical democracy, for the 
achievement o f human rights for all citizens on the basis o f a universal 
acceptance o f vulnerability. Rather than rejecting Turner’s theory o f  human 
rights, therefore, I suggest that the way to overcome this problem o f governance 
is to position human rights at the heart o f  citizenship, with citizenship acting as 
an ‘umbrella’ for Human Rights rather than the other way around. In this way, 
human rights can be viewed as representing what Berlin termed the ‘minimal 
shared horizon’ and citizenship becomes a process akin to M ouffe’s notion o f
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radical democracy or Ellison’s proactive engagement in which the goal is to 
guarantee that this ‘shared horizon’ is experienced by all.
Such a notion o f  citizenship as a process also avoids overly emphasising rights as 
opposed to responsibilities, for if the nature o f the ‘minimal shared horizon’ is an 
understanding o f personhood as vulnerable and contingent, then each individual 
in claiming their right to be protected from the effects o f  potential vulnerabilities 
is also defending the rights o f others to receive support in the light o f their actual 
vulnerability. Such a notion o f citizenship is one that avoids marking out certain 
groups as ‘other’ and in so doing makes it clear that we are all vulnerable in 
terms o f disability, poverty or other forms o f social exclusion. Such a concept o f  
citizenship also removes the need to make a distinction between structural and 
identity based rights, for since cultural identity may be an important part o f  an 
individual’s sense o f  personhood, then they must also be protected from forces 
which might attack this aspect o f  their person. Dominant groups must 
acknowledge their own cultural specificity and that their own cultural identities 
are potentially precarious and need to be defended, in so doing, as argued above, 
they guarantee that those whose cultures may actually be vulnerable, receive 
protection in this regard.
Conclusion
This research has demonstrated that by placing disability at the heart o f  
citizenship debates, valuable insights can be made into both the strengths and the 
weaknesses o f  a number o f modem/contemporary theories o f  citizenship. The 
argument in this chapter and throughout the thesis has also been that analyses o f  
contemporary social movements such as the disability movement must go hand in 
hand with the development o f new theories o f  citizenship, for it is clear that if  
citizenship is to be seen as a process o f  engagement, then social movement 
activity is likely to be a major part o f  that engagement. Finally, it has also been 
the contention in this research that whilst competency, personhood, embodiment 
and human rights are becoming important areas o f debate within Medical 
Sociology, Disability Studies must not avoid such issues for it seems likely that
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they will be key to the citizenship debates o f the future. As has been 
demonstrated in this chapter and throughout the thesis, it is vital that disability be 
placed at the heart o f these debates.
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Conclusion
Theoretical Issues
The aim o f this research has been to reconsider the appropriateness o f existing 
theories o f citizenship and social movements in the light o f  the structure and aims 
o f  the disability movement. It has been contended within this thesis that a 
consideration o f the true nature o f the ‘struggle’ faced by disabled people serves 
to illuminate useful links between citizenship theorizing and current approaches 
to social movements and in so doing provides the basis for the development o f a 
new model o f  citizenship. Central to the argument put forward in the preceding 
chapters have been the important links between the work o f Berlin, Habermas, 
and Moufife; to the value o f Ellison’s ideas about ‘proactive and defensive 
engagement’; and to Turner’s ‘sociology o f the body’.
The conclusion to this research, however, whilst having clear theoretical 
antecedents, nevertheless remains original in that it proposes a new understanding 
o f  citizenship as a process o f  proactive engagement, in a radical democracy, for 
the achievement o f human rights for all citizens on the basis o f a universal 
acceptance o f  vulnerability. In proposing that an understanding o f personhood as 
fragile and contingent should be the basis o f  human rights, which in turn should 
be located within the umbrella o f citizenship and form the basis o f  the ‘minimal 
shared horizon’, the argument put forward in this thesis thus stands in some 
contrast to existing theories.
In proposing a new model o f  citizenship, however, whilst making some 
suggestions at a fairly abstract level, this thesis does not profess to have provided 
an account o f  how such a model could be ‘operationalised’. In leaving the 
theorising at this abstract level, therefore, there is always the risk that the model
can be criticised on the basis that it is as utopian as previous models. In the 
confines o f this thesis, however, it has not been possible to extend the theorising 
beyond the abstract. Clearly, however, it is important for the validity o f  the 
argument put forward here, that the model be 'operationalised'. Future research is 
needed, therefore, to support the theorising in this thesis and there are a number 
o f likely avenues that such research might take. The importance o f  education and 
political institutions in fostering this model o f  citizenship as something that is 
empowering for every individual, is something that particularly interests this 
author. The scope o f this model in terms o f challenging a range o f powerful 
discourses based around ‘the body’ also means that it could be usefully taken up 
by those involved in emancipatory politics, for example, by activists and 
academics in the field o f  ‘race’ and gender. Future research in these areas might 
consider how the idea o f universal vulnerability can be used to challenge, and 
move beyond, discourses surrounding black/white and male/female.
It is crucial, however, that any future research which uses this model, as w ell as 
harnessing its potential for challenging existing power imbalances, also 
acknowledges that such imbalances o f power are likely to have an adverse effect 
on the ability o f disempowered groups to do precisely this, to oppose powerful 
discourses. Whilst theorising thus may seem like a contradiction in terms, 
nevertheless, failing to acknowledge that the development o f  any new model o f  
citizenship must take place within existing frameworks o f  power/powerlessness 
would bring into considerable doubt any proposed methods for making the model 
work in the real world. In the future, therefore, as w ell as research into the 
‘operationalising’ o f the model, more abstract theorising will also need to 
continue in order to understand the effects that power imbalances may have upon 
the development o f  this idea o f citizenship.
Methodological Issues
As has been discussed in chapter 2, it has also been a central concern o f  this 
research to inject the voices o f disabled people into the citizenship/social 
movement debates and to provide a platform for their opinions. For this reason a
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qualitative research paradigm was employed that sought to maximise the 
inclusion o f the voices o f the respondents in the text, whilst minimising the over 
interpretation o f their views by the author. At a meta-theoretical level, it has been 
contended in this thesis that the abductive approach to research is the best way o f  
ensuring that theories generated during the research are both clearly linked to the 
data and accessible to the social actors in question.
An effort to remain reflexive in relation to my position as a non-disabled 
researcher has also been key to the methodology o f this research. Whilst it has 
been contended in this thesis that non-disabled people can do research in the field 
o f  disability providing that they remain reflexive in this way, nevertheless, some 
issues remain surrounding the relationship o f  researcher/respondents during 
research carried out as part o f a PhD. During this research, in the light o f  the fact 
that the sole responsibility for the collection o f  the data and the authorship o f  the 
thesis lies with the PhD student, the problem o f how to make the research 
methodology more collaborative, proved to be intractable. As discussed in 
chapter 2, ‘the equality proviso’ as defined by Humphrey (2000), did not function 
to any great extent within this research and this author must remain uneasy 
surrounding this issue. As proposed in chapter 2, it is hoped that some flexibility 
will be allowed into the PhD process o f  the future, to allow for such uneasy 
asymmetries in power to be minimised.
As things stand, however, subject to the additional funding that would have been 
required, it might have been better to have carried out this research 
collaboratively with research respondents and to have produced jointly authored 
material from the findings. The author may then have been able to negotiate the 
use o f these findings as the basis for an individual PhD. Such funding was not 
readily available, however, and so a fairly pragmatic decision was made that the 
need for the research to be carried out outweighed concerns surrounding some 
imperfections o f methodology. This author hopes that readers will accept the 
basis for this decision.
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Appendix
Angharad E. Beckett, University o f Sheffield,
Tel:
Email:
Dear All at
I am writing to you to ask for your help. My name is Angharad Beckett and I am 
a researcher at the Department o f Sociological Studies, University o f  Sheffield. 
At the moment I am doing some research into the role o f  the Disability 
Movement and issues o f  citizenship and social exclusion. As part o f  this research 
I am hoping to meet a number o f organisations run by disabled people, for  
disabled people and your organisation has come to my attention as being 
organised in this way.
I am aware that you are probably extremely busy and may feel that you have not 
got time to be involved in this project. However, all that I would ask is for one 
group discussion with a number o f your members on some o f the key issues in 
the research. The timescale for the project is fairly flexible, so your involvement 
would be at your convenience, and I would, o f  course, travel to you.
Some o f  you may have had some bad experiences o f  research in the past and I so 
want to assure you that my project will be as empowering as possible for those 
involved. For this reason I have involved disabled people from the beginning o f  
the research and will provide feedback throughout the project. I am also 
following the British Sociological Association’s guide for ethical practice in 
research.
I would be extremely grateful for your involvement and am open to any 
suggestions o f  ways that I might be o f assistance to you in your work. Should you 
have any questions that you would like answered before you even consider 
becoming involved in the research, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Finally, what I would like to say to all your members is that I truly believe that 
my research will provide a platform for the voices o f disabled people and I feel 
sure that you have a lot o f very interesting views that I would really like to be 
able to include in the research. I look forward to hearing from you and very much 
hope that I will be able to meet you all at some point.
Yours sincerely,
Angharad Beckett.
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Outline of Questions for Discussion Group
Your group has been asked to be a part of this research because it is 
either a member of the British Council of Disabled People (BCODP), and 
is therefore run by and for disabled people, or is a similar organisation 
that is not affiliated to the BCODP. I am most grateful for your interest in 
this project.
This piece of research will be abiding by the British Sociological 
Association’s “Code of Ethical Practice in Research”. In addition, the 
research aims to be participatory as far as is possible within the 
constraints of a piece of work which will ultimately form the basis for a 
PhD, and which, therefore, must in the end have single authorship. In 
practical terms I envisage that this process will involve the development 
and maintenance of a dialogue between all respondents and myself. 
Feedback will be welcomed throughout the research.
The questions listed below are only meant as a guide, to indicate the 
interests of the research. You may wish to answer some of the more 
straightforward questions in section A before we meet and to send me 
your responses to this section at your convenience.
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S e c t i o n  A
1. W ho is ............................................................for? W ho can become a
member of your organisation?
2. a. Are there any types of people who would not be welcome 
within your organisation?
Yes/No
b. If the answer to the previous questions is “Yes”, then who are 
these people and why are they not welcome within your 
organisation?
3. Are there any non-disabled people who are members/workers 
within your organisation?
Yes/No
4. a. If the answer to the previous question is “Yes", then what is 
their role in your organisation?
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b. Are there any limits to their role within the organisation?
5. W hy is it so important that you run your own organisation?
6. How do you recruit new members to your organisation?
7. If I was a disabled person who had heard about your organisation 
and was interested in joining, what would you say about yourselves 
that might persuade me to join?
8. W hat do you personally gain from being a part of this 
organisation?
9. Have you in the past been, or are you currently, a part of any 
similar organisations? If “Yes” could you indicate the nature and/or 
names of these other organisations?
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S e c t i o n  B
1. W hat would you say was the central function/s o f .................. for
example, group support/campaigning etc?
2. W hat would you say were the central hopes/aims of your 
organisation?
3. Has your organisations been involved in any campaigning, for 
example, for rights for disabled people? If “yes”, could you give me 
any examples?
4.a. Would you say that campaigning is a significant part of the 
function of your organisation?
b. If the answer to the previous question is “no” -  what reasons do 
you have for working in alternative ways?
5. W hat do you regard as the major achievements of your 
organisation?
6. Are there any obstacles in your way preventing you from 
achieving your organisation’s goals or aspirations? W hat are the 
major obstacles?
Section C
1.a. Do you maintain any links with other organisations working 
within the field of disability, or with any other organisation?
b. If you do maintain links with other organisations would you please 
specify which organisations and why they were selected?
2. Is it important that the organisations you are linked to are also run 
in a similar way to your organisation? If so, why?
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3. How would you describe these links, for example, 
formal/friendship?
4. W hat would you say were the value of these links?
Section P
1. Is it realistic to talk about the “Disability Movement" in the same 
way that people talk about the “W om en’s Movement” for example?
2. If you do believe that there is a Disability Movement, do you 
consider yourselves to be a part of it?
3. If you do consider yourself to be a part of the Disability 
Movement, what is it like to be a part of it?
4. Are there any groups, organisations or people (not specific 
individuals) who you do not regard as being part of the Disability 
Movement, and if so, why not?
Section E
1.a. During your own lifetimes what, if any, improvements have 
occurred in the lives of disabled people?
b. Could any of these changes be further improved?
c. In your opinion, what role, if any, has the Disability Movement had 
in causing these changes?
2.a. Are there any further improvements that could be made to the 
life experiences of disabled people?
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b. W hy do you think that these improvements are not already 
happening?
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c. W hat could we do to make these things happen?
3.a. Is there anything that you do not like that is happening currently 
in the lives of disabled people?
b. W hy do you think these things are happening?
c. How could we stop these things from happening?
4.a. Have you any fears for the future in relation to the lives of 
disabled people?
b. Are there any perceived potential changes or risks that would 
affect the lives of disabled people?
c. Are there any unacceptable situations that do not currently occur 
and which we must make sure never happen?
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1. Are any of the following words or phrases important to you if so, 
why? W hat words have been omitted that are important?
S e c t i o n  F
Social Exclusion Sense of Community
Respect Citizenship
Rights and Responsibilities Empowerment
Choice Control
Independence Quality o f .............................?
2. In terms of language how do you prefer to identify yourselves, for 
example, “disabled people” or “people with disabilities”?
3. Is language important to you, and if so, why?
4. Is there such a thing as a “disability identity”?
5. If there is a “disability identity”, what kind of image exists of the 
“disabled people” and what is it like to experience this identity?
6. Is there such a thing as a “culture of disabled people”? Do you 
find this a realistic concept?
7. Is it helpful/useful to talk about a “disability culture"? If so, why? If 
not, why not?
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F in a lly ...
Are these the important questions? Bearing in mind the overall 
theme of this research, do you think that there are any more 
pertinent questions that I could have asked?
Have you any feedback on the questions? This is a rather 
formalised list and is only meant as a guide.
/  am  m ost g ra te fu l fo r  y o u r tim e and  he lp ! I  lo o k  fo rw ard  to  
m eeting you  all.
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Department of Sociological Studies, 
Sheffield, S10 2TU.Tel:
EmalL
Dear All at
“Hello!” My name is Angharad Beckett and I work at the University 
of Sheffield. At the moment I am doing a project about the lives of 
disabled people. After I have found out lots of information I will be 
writing a book.
THE
u v t s  Of
L
FlO H S
As part of my research I would like to visit lots of groups that are 
run by disabled people. I would really like to talk to some of the 
members of your group because I have heard about you and think 
that what you are doing is really exciting.
My research is all about asking disabled people-their opinions 
about things like: ^
“being full citizens"
“rights for disabled people" 
“links with other organisations"
If you would be interested in being involved in my project, I would 
like to have one, group discussion with some of the members of 
your group. It would be like having a chat between your group and 
me, but I would record all of your views so that I can write them up 
into my book. This would be a good chance for people to “have
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their say”! But, if anyone felt that they did not want me to use their
name, that h» nkau ton
W hen I have finished my project I hope that lots of students will 
read my book and that it will help them to understand about the
If you decide that you are interested in helping me with my project, 
then you can ask me as many questions about it as you want to.
I really hope that I will get to m eet you all, I feel sure that you have 
a lot of views and opinions and hope that you will share them with 
me.
With Best Wishes,
Angharad Beckett.
lives of disabled people.
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Questions for the members of Speaking Up For
Action (SUFAÎ
W ith  all these questions there is no right or wrong answer. I am  
just interested to hear all o f your views. You do not need to 
answ er all the questions and you do not need to write your 
answers down. If it is okay with you all I will tape-record your 
answers.
1. W ho is S U FA  for?  W ho can becom e a m em ber of your 
group?
2. How do you find new m em bers for your group?
3. If I w as a person with a learning disability and I had heard  
about SU FA , w hat would you tell m e about yourselves that 
would m ake m e w ant to join your group?
4. Is there any kind of person who would not be w elcom e in 
your group?
5. A re there any non-disabled people who are m em bers of 
S U FA , or who help out?
6. W h at do the non-disabled people who are a part of S U F A  do 
for the group? Is there anything that they are not allow ed to  
do?
7. W hy is it im portant that you run your own group?
8. W h at is S U FA  all about? W hy do you have this group?
290
9. W h at kind of things do you do as m em bers of S U FA ?
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10. As a group does S U FA  have any hopes or dream s that you 
are aim ing for?
11. H ave you ever stood up for the rights of disabled people?  
Could you give m e som e exam ples?
12. Do you think that it is im portant that S U FA  should stand up 
for the rights of people with a learning disability?
13. If you had to choose one thing, w hat is the best part about 
being a m em ber o f SU FA ?
14. H ave you ever m et anyone from  any other groups of 
disabled people? W hich groups w ere they from  and do you 
keep in touch with them ?
15. Thinking back over your life, has anything happened that 
has m ade your life better?
16. Is there anything in your life today that you would like to 
change?
17. Is there anything that is happening in your life that m akes  
you unhappy?
18. If there are things that m ake you unhappy, why do you 
think that they happen?
19. Do you think that any of these words, written below, are  
important? W hy are they im portant?
291
Appendix
Respect
Rights
Responsibility
Choice
Being a citizen
20 . W hich words do you prefer, people with a le a rn in g  
d is a b ility  or people with a le a rn in g  d if f ic u lt ✓ ?
21. A re there any nam es that people in society m ay call people  
with a learning disability that you do not like? W hy do you 
dislike these nam es?
Thank you for helping me with my project!
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A request for help with research -  your views appreciated...
I am currently doing some PhD research into the role o f  the Disability Movement 
and the issue o f Citizenship and the major part o f  my fieldwork has involved 
travelling around the country holding group discussions with a number o f  groups 
run by disabled people, for  disabled people. Although I have met people with a 
number o f different impairments, I have not as yet been able to gain the views o f  
any members o f  the D eaf community and I would very much like to include your 
opinions in my work.
You may not feel that it is appropriate for someone who is researching the 
disability movement to contact D eaf people. For this reason, I would be most 
interested to hear your views about whether D eaf people are disabled'}
Any views that you send to me will be handled according to your instructions. If 
you would be willing for me to quote you I will do so accurately and without re­
interpretation. Please let me know whether you are happy to be quoted. If you do 
not specify whether or not I can quote you, I will assume that I can.
I would value your opinions on whichever o f the questions below interest you. I 
am not asking you to answer them all. I f you have any questions about the 
research that you would like me to answer before you even consider offering your 
views on the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I hope to hear from 
you!
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The questions:
Are D eaf people disabled?
Are D eaf people a part o f  a disability movement? If “no”, could you tell me why 
this is so? I f  “yes”, do you personally feel a part o f a disability movement?
Do you feel a part o f a D eaf community? I f “yes”, how is this different from your 
experiences within the hearing community?
Is there a D eaf identity and/or a D eaf culture that is different from those o f  
hearing people?
Have any important improvements been made in the lives o f  D eaf people in your 
lifetimes? What do you feel has brought these changes about?
Are there any improvements that need to be made in the lives o f  D eaf people and 
how could these be brought about?
Do you have any concerns for the future in relation to the lives o f  D eaf people? 
What could we do to stop these things happening?
How do you see the new developments in technology effecting D eaf people? For 
example, advances in knowledge surrounding genetics?
Angharad Beckett, Department o f Sociological Studies, University o f Sheffield, 
Email:
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SUFA REPORT
In the following report, the names o f respondents have been removed 
in order to maintain their anonymity.
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Notes from meeting at Speaking Op For- Action 
(SOFA) on 14th December- 2000.
The members o f SUFA kindly agreed to discuss some cjuestions 
with Angharad Beckett, from the University o f Sheffield, to help 
with her research. These are the notes from that discussion.
People Present:
(M = SUFA Member)
Ml M7
M2 M8
M3 Support Worker (SW)
M4 Angharad Beckett
M5
M6
A ll the members o f  S17FA introduced themselves and said "Hello!* to 
Angharad-
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A bou t SU FA ...
°  Angharad askecj who SUFA is fo rt
M7 said that: "The Speaking Up For Action group is for people with 
learning difficulties to  say wh?+ they want in their lives and they can speak 
up and to  he independent.' I: M7 }lso said that SUFA is for adults with a 
learning disability.
M7 said that SUFA does not have any members who have NOT got a 
learning disability. Non-disabled people, like sw ;an be the worker with 
the group, or be a volunteer with the group like Angharad but they would 
not be allowed to take control.
M3 said that everyone is involved in the decision making o f  the group 
and this gives everyone responsibility.
Everybody felt that there were some people that 5UFA might not want to 
join the group. These were people such as paedophiles, fraudsters and 
murderers. It was explained to  Angharad that police checks are done when a 
new member wishes to  join the group.
f tK r i FOR N & j 
SiJFA, MFMbFRS
I No-r>r\t.........................
I AtfMnejj..............
¡Ha-ire.
I °rC'rii ^ oJcon rtcb'ons?.
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Angharad asked what SUFA is all about and wily other people with 
a learning disability might like to  join/
M7 said that SUFA members "come to  speak up for ourselves, an4 others 
might want to  come to  speak up for themselves.“
M3 sai4 that SUFA was about having choices and being treated with 
respect.
M2 said that SUFA was about stopping people from getting bullied and 
lots o f  people said that they had been bullied, attacked or treated unkindly. 
Everyone agreed that SUFA is about standing up against these things.
Everyone said that SUFA was about getting control over your own life, 
having responsibilities, and being independent.
M7 also said that SUFA was about making services better for people with a 
learning disability, and this is why SUFA have been going to  the Joint 
Planning Group Meetings and the Joint Investment Plan Meetings.
M
Finally 7 I also told Angharad about the SUFA newsletter, SPEAKING UP, 
and he said that new members might like to  help with the newsletter, or 
even put something into it .
SttAWNG m[S
- =
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Angharad asked everyone what they, personally, thought was the 
best part o f  being a member o f  Sl/FA’
M6 : felt that be had met some nice people at S12FA and that the 
really good thing about the group was that everyone sticks together.
M7 said that being a member o f 5L/FA had given him the chance to  say 
want he wanted to  say. He also enjoyed travelling down to  London, to  a 
meeting with the Downs Syndrome Association which had been held at the 
House o f  Commons and meeting two famous people there -  Dr Who, as 
played by Peter Davidson and Damian Hill. m7 also said that he had 
enjoyed the nights out at the Banker's Draft.
LONDO N  8 0 m m i>
M6 ; said that bad really enjoyed going to  the Barnsley College to  
learn about being a committee, m2 said that he had bad a good time 
there too.
Angharad asked bow 512FA finds new members to  join the group’
M7 said that the 5L/FA group had organised several conferences and had 
invited lots o f  people. He also told Angharad about visiting Gateway to  run 
some workshops and about visiting daycentres to  tell people about Sl/FA.
4
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Angharad asked whether people from SVFA had ever met any 
other groups o f  disabled people!*
. ..k*3..,-. and ■ said that Sl/FA had met Stevenage People First and that 
they had shown SVFA a video about what they were doing in their group.
M7 said that SVFA had also met the Speak Up group from Rotherham, and 
the Down To Earth group from Manchester.
^  said that 5WFA had met Our Vision Our Future, a group from 
Chesterfield-
sw commented that there had been groups from all over the country at 
the conference at Swanwick that SVFA had attended.
M7 said that some o f  the groups that S12FA has met have got a 
constitution and a committee and everyone agreed that this was something 
that SVFA was going to  do in 2001.
. also said that not all groups for people with a learning disability are run 
by  people with a learning disability. He said that the problem with the 
Powns Syndrome Association is that it docs not give people with Powns 
Syndrome the chance to speak -  and that it is, after all, only people with 
Powns Syndrome who can know what it is like to  have Powns Syndrome.
5
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Angtarad asked whether anyone tad ever stood up for the rights o f  
disabled people, either as part o f  the 5L/FA group, or as an individual/
M3 told Angharad about a time when he had been in a pub in (hr* r iiv  
centre and had heard someone being rude to  someone he knew. M3 
told the security people and the man who was being rude was asked to leave. 
Everyone thought that this was a really excellent and brave thing to have 
done.
S said that in the future Sl/FA hoped to  be able to  reach out to people 
with more severe learning disabilities, to  make sure that their voice is being 
heard-
About ourselves...
Angharad asked whether the members o f  5UFA have any hopes or 
dreams for the future/
People said that they had lots o f  hopes and dreams for the future. I lere is 
the list o f  the things that people said:
. , . M4 . . said that he would like his own flat and to share it with a
friend- He also said he would like to  go to  visit Australia one day.
M6 said that he would like to have his own house and to  share it 
with some o f  his friends. He also said that he would like to get married one 
day, to  the right girl! M6 also dreams about winning the lottery.
6
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M2 said that he would also like to  win the lottery and to  be collected In a 
limousine from  outside his house. He would also like to  yet married one 
day.
147 , said that he would like to  live by himself in his own house and to  be an
actor.
?
°  Anyharad asked everyone whether anythiny had happened if) their 
own lifetimes that had made them happier*’
M5 said that she liked it when she became an A unt to  three little  boys and 
M3 said that he liked beiny an Uncle.
M4 I told Any ha rad that his life was better now that he speaks 
up for himself and that 5UFA has helped him to  do this.
M6 t said that his life had chanyed tor the better now that he stands 
up for himself and does his own thiny.
^  said that his life had become much better and chanyed a yreat deal 
since God came into his life.
7
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Angbarad asked everyone whether there was anything in their lives 
that made them unhappy, or that they would like to changei*
ms said that he would like to  see his friends and family more, because he 
does not see them very often. He said that to  change this he needs to  make 
more arrangements to  go to see people.
M8 also said that he would like some o f  the people he lives with to  be 
more understanding.
M2 said that he would like his neighbours to stop being noisy late at night 
and that this makes him unhappy. He said that bis neighbours do not listen 
to  him when he asks them to be quieter at night-time.
M6 said that he would like girls to be much nicer to him.
M7 said that he is trying to  change his life by losing weight and being 
healthier, and that God is helping him to do this.
M4 said that he would like his sister to let him go out more
with his friends at night-time. He said that he knows that his sister cares 
about him, but he needs to  tell her that he /¿going to go out. He said that 
he could also ask her whether his friends could visit him at home.
M5 said that she is bullied when she is at Crown I lill and that this makes 
her very unhappy. She would like this to  stop.
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Angharad asked everyone about the different names that people 
call people with a learning disability and she asked everyone why they 
thought that people used unkind names?
The S UFA group said that they would like to  Speak lJp against the use o f  the 
words in this list because they are disrespectful and hurtful:
Spastic 
Four-eyes
"From the Funny Farm''
Mental
Nutter 
M7
said that he thought that some non-disabled people were frightened o f  
people with 3 learning disability and that this was why they used disrespectful 
names. M2 said that he thought that the people who call people with a 
learning disability cruel names were just "thick*!
M2 j said that in the end any label car) be a bad thing-. We just don 't want 
to  be labelled like jars!'
*>
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Angharad asked everyone wli.it they thought could he done to  
change the way that people treat people with a learning disability*’
M8 said that he thought that anyone who is nasty to  someone with a 
learning disability has got a problem themselves and that they need to  sort it 
out. He said that being aggressive back to  someone who is nasty to you is 
not a good idea because they might become more aggressive towards you. 
Talking to  people is the best way o f  sorting out problems.
M6 said that he thought that people needed to be reminded that
he is a person with feelings.
M7 said that he thought that people needed to see him as an adult. I le also 
said that he thought that having a rally in the city centre would be a good 
way o f  making people aware o f  the bad attitudes that some people have 
towards people with a learning disability.
Everyone thought that people learn these bad attitudes towards people with 
a learning disability through watching TV and when they are children at 
school. Everyone thought that talking to  children about respecting people 
with a learning disability was a good idea.
10
3 0 5
Appendix
?
Finally! Angharad had made a list o f  some words that she thought 
might be important to the members o f  Sl/FA and she asked them for their 
comments on each word. This is what people said'-
RESPECT -  everyone thought that this was a very important word and that 
people had mentioned it  many times during the meeting!
RIGHTS -  everyone thought that this was a very important word.
RESPONSIBILITY -  i  said that the members o f  Sl/FA were responsible for 
claiming their own rights. He also said that everybody is responsible for 
looking after their parents and families.
^  said that it was important to  have responsibility for, and to be 
responsible about, your own money. M3 also said that everyone was 
responsible for themselves.
M2 said that everybody is responsible for looking after their own homes.
CHOICES -  M2 said that he wanted choices about what he wants to do. 
He said that having choices was a part o f  being independent. I le likes being 
able to  choose when he goes out and when he comes back home.
M8 , said that having choices about having relationships was important.
Michael and 7 said that you need information and advice to  be able to 
make real choices.
11
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BEING A  CITIZEN -  M6 said that this is important because it 
means being a part o f  the community. He also said that being a citizen is 
about having responsibilities, like being a part o f  a neighbourhood watch 
scheme.
Paul said that being an egual citizen means that everyone has their say in the 
community and no-one is left out.
This was the end o f  the meeting. Ar^barad saM a p IGTHANKYOl/!" to everyone dt Sl/FA for their help 
with her research.
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